

# ASEAN+3 REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2024

Navigating Tomorrow

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The factual information covers data for the period up to February 29, 2024, except when stated otherwise.

© 2023 ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office  
ISSN: 2529-7538

Printed in Singapore

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# Foreword

2023 was another year of multi-shocks. The year started with a major COVID-19 outbreak in some regional economies but by mid-year, all ASEAN+3 economies had fully reopened—marking a decisive shift away from pandemic-lockdown to endemicity or living with the virus which has become quite mild by then. The year also started with continued monetary policy tightening by the US Fed which caused interest rates to reach multi-year high and led to the collapse of several major regional banks in the US and Euro area. Fortunately, the banks in the region have little exposure to the crisis-affected banks and remained unscathed. In the region, inflation had peaked and were trending down causing most regional central banks to move to a pause in their tightening cycle. At the same time, policy makers have started to consolidate their fiscal stance to rebuild the fiscal buffers that had been eroded by the large stimulus spending during the pandemic years. Notwithstanding the tighter monetary and fiscal policies as well as weak external demand, the regional economies grew robustly by 4.3 percent, led mainly by domestic demand and a rebound in tourism with the reopening of the economies.

Growth momentum is expected to remain favourable in 2024 and 2025, with domestic demand remaining resilient and exports forecast to turnaround, benefitting mainly from the semiconductor upcycle, a pickup in retail spending on durable goods, and continued recovery in tourism. Robust growth in China is also expected to generate positive spillovers for the region. Yet, as the report underscores, the region's promising economic trajectory should not be taken for granted.

In the Chapter 1 of our latest ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook (AREO), we provide deeper insights into the region's near-term outlook, including the risks and vulnerabilities facing the region. While the chapter forecasts a sustained period of firm regional growth, it also highlights potential disruptors to the growth trajectory. Commodity price shocks, weaker-than-expected growth in China, possible sharp growth slowdown in advanced economies outside the region, or escalating geopolitical tensions could undermine the region's growth prospects. In the longer-term, inaction on structural challenges such as aging populations, climate change, and cybersecurity threats could diminish the region's growth potential.

Nevertheless, we are confident that in the baseline case, with robust growth and gradual disinflation, ASEAN+3 economies are well-positioned to regain policy space to address long-term needs and bolster resilience against future shocks. The recalibration of fiscal policy would enable fiscal buffers to be rebuilt, while sustaining targeted support. Meanwhile, monetary policy should remain tight to ensure that inflation expectations are firmly anchored until disinflation is entrenched.

This year's AREO also took a deep dive into the scarring effects of COVID-19 on the region's long-term growth trajectory, highlighting the loss in capital formation during the pandemic and a weak recovery in investment. Looking ahead, restoring and sustaining strong growth would require reinvigorating investments in productive sectors, implementing comprehensive labor market reforms, and exploring avenues for deeper regional collaboration.

As in previous AREO reports, Chapter 2 explores macro-critical issues that confront the region in the longer term. Following last year's in-depth analysis on the topic of climate change mitigation, this year's thematic chapter looks closely at three other major secular shifts facing ASEAN+3 economies: aging populations reflecting the collapse in fertility rates coupled with longer lifespans, the ongoing global trade reconfiguration arising from the pandemic disruptions as well as the geopolitical tension between the US and China, and rapid technological change from digital revolution and generative AI. Navigating these shifts are made more challenging by lingering pandemic scars, geopolitical uncertainties, and the prospect of weaker global growth in the decade ahead. We analyze the macro-implications of these forces across the region's diverse set of economies, recognizing that while these pose various risks, they also create opportunities for innovation, productivity gains, as well as new and inclusive sources of future growth.

Thanks to their openness to rules-based trade and technological change, many of our economies are equipped to transform the risks associated with geoeconomic fragmentation and aging into growth opportunities. But capturing these gains is not guaranteed. As we highlight in the chapter, doing so requires pragmatic and forward-looking policies that are centred on developing quality infrastructure, promoting innovation, and embracing inclusivity.

Our operating economic landscape has become highly challenging and uncertain. Deepening divisions and mounting structural headwinds are casting a shadow over the region's growth prospects. Strengthening regional cooperation to safeguard collective action would therefore reignite the spark to allow ASEAN+3 to continue being a bright spot in a global economy that is increasingly challenging to navigate in.

**Hoe Ee Khor**  
**Chief Economist**

# Acknowledgments

This report provides AMRO staff's assessment of both the conjunctural and structural issues facing the ASEAN+3 region. It covers the short-term risks, vulnerabilities, and challenges facing member economies, as well as the policy options taken by or that are available to their authorities. It also presents staff's study on longer-term issues that are pertinent to sustained economic growth in the region. The report has been submitted to the Executive Committee of the ASEAN+3 members for discussion.

The analysis in this report was coordinated by the Regional Surveillance team led by Allen Ng; it also draws on the surveillance work of the AMRO country teams. The report was reviewed and cleared by Chief Economist, Hoe Ee Khor. It has also benefited from the guidance of AMRO Director Kouqing Li and other members of the Senior Management team.

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Megan Wen Xi Chong coordinated production of the publication, with editorial assistance from James Unwin; Qin Jie, Karen Wilkinson, Lynn Tan, Suk Yee (Daisy) Wong, Andrea Abellon, and Hui Shan Seah coordinated communications and outreach; Karen Chua provided liaison support with member authorities.

The authors would like to thank members of AMRO's Advisory Panel, chaired by Diwa Guinigundo, for their useful input; the ASEAN+3 central bank and finance ministry for their insightful observations on country and regional developments in the AREO 2024 Survey; and member authorities for their constructive comments.

Finally, the views expressed in this report are those of AMRO staff and do not, in any way, implicate ASEAN+3 members.

## Abbreviations

|                 |                                                                        |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>ABSD</b>     | Additional Buyer's Stamp Duty                                          |
| <b>ADB</b>      | Asian Development Bank                                                 |
| <b>AI</b>       | artificial intelligence                                                |
| <b>AFC</b>      | Asian Financial Crisis                                                 |
| <b>ASEAN+3</b>  | ASEAN plus China (including Hong Kong, China), Japan, and Korea        |
| <b>AREO</b>     | ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook                                      |
| <b>ASEAN</b>    | Association of Southeast Asian Nations                                 |
| <b>ASEAN-4</b>  | Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand                     |
| <b>ASEAN-5</b>  | Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore          |
| <b>ASEAN-6</b>  | Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam |
| <b>BCLM</b>     | Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar                      |
| <b>BCLMV</b>    | Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam             |
| <b>BCLV</b>     | Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam                      |
| <b>BI</b>       | Bank Indonesia                                                         |
| <b>BN</b>       | Brunei Darussalam*                                                     |
| <b>BND</b>      | Brunei dollar                                                          |
| <b>BNM</b>      | Bank Negara Malaysia                                                   |
| <b>BOJ</b>      | Bank of Japan                                                          |
| <b>BOK</b>      | Bank of Korea                                                          |
| <b>BSP</b>      | Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas                                            |
| <b>CAR</b>      | capital adequacy ratio                                                 |
| <b>CBM</b>      | Central Bank of Myanmar                                                |
| <b>CLMV</b>     | Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam                                |
| <b>CN</b>       | China                                                                  |
| <b>CNY</b>      | Chinese renminbi                                                       |
| <b>COVID-19</b> | 2019 coronavirus disease                                               |

|                      |                                                  |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| <b>CPI</b>           | consumer price index                             |
| <b>EM</b>            | emerging market(s)                               |
| <b>EU</b>            | European Union                                   |
| <b>FAO</b>           | United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization |
| <b>FDI</b>           | foreign direct investment                        |
| <b>FY</b>            | fiscal year                                      |
| <b>FX</b>            | foreign exchange                                 |
| <b>GDP</b>           | gross domestic product                           |
| <b>Gen AI</b>        | generative artificial intelligence               |
| <b>GFC</b>           | global financial crisis                          |
| <b>GIR</b>           | gross international reserves                     |
| <b>GVC</b>           | global value chains                              |
| <b>HHI/ HH Index</b> | Herfindahl-Hirschman Index                       |
| <b>HK</b>            | Hong Kong, China*                                |
| <b>HKD</b>           | Hong Kong dollar                                 |
| <b>HKMA</b>          | Hong Kong Monetary Authority                     |
| <b>ICT</b>           | information and communication technology         |
| <b>ID</b>            | Indonesia                                        |
| <b>IDC</b>           | International Data Corporation                   |
| <b>IDR</b>           | Indonesian rupiah                                |
| <b>ILO</b>           | International Labour Organization                |
| <b>IMF</b>           | International Monetary Fund                      |
| <b>IoT</b>           | Internet of Things                               |
| <b>JP</b>            | Japan                                            |
| <b>JPY</b>           | Japanese yen                                     |
| <b>KH</b>            | Cambodia                                         |
| <b>KR</b>            | Korea                                            |
| <b>LA, Lao PDR</b>   | Lao People's Democratic Republic                 |

\* For brevity, "Brunei Darussalam" is referred to as "Brunei" in the text.

\* For brevity, "Hong Kong, China" is referred to as "Hong Kong" in the text.

|                |                                                        |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>LFPR</b>    | labor force participation rate                         |
| <b>LLM</b>     | large language models                                  |
| <b>LMOF</b>    | Lao PDR Ministry of Finance                            |
| <b>LTC</b>     | long-term care                                         |
| <b>MAS</b>     | Monetary Authority of Singapore                        |
| <b>MICE</b>    | meetings, incentives, conventions and exhibitions      |
| <b>MM</b>      | Myanmar                                                |
| <b>MMK</b>     | Myanmar kyat                                           |
| <b>MSME</b>    | micro, small, and medium enterprises                   |
| <b>MY</b>      | Malaysia                                               |
| <b>MYR</b>     | Malaysian ringgit                                      |
| <b>NAM</b>     | National Academy of Medicine                           |
| <b>NBC</b>     | National Bank of Cambodia                              |
| <b>NEER</b>    | nominal effective exchange rate                        |
| <b>NODX</b>    | non-oil domestic exports                               |
| <b>NPL</b>     | non-performing loan                                    |
| <b>O&amp;G</b> | oil and gas                                            |
| <b>OADR</b>    | old-age dependency ratio                               |
| <b>OECD</b>    | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| <b>OOP</b>     | out-of-pocket                                          |
| <b>OPR</b>     | overnight policy rate                                  |
| <b>PAYG</b>    | pay-as-you-go                                          |
| <b>PBC</b>     | People's Bank of China                                 |
| <b>PH</b>      | the Philippines                                        |
| <b>PHP</b>     | Philippine peso                                        |
| <b>Plus-3</b>  | China (including Hong Kong), Japan, Korea              |
| <b>PMI</b>     | Purchasing Managers' Index                             |
| <b>PPP</b>     | purchasing power parity                                |
| <b>q-o-q</b>   | quarter-on-quarter                                     |

|                |                                                       |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>R&amp;D</b> | research and development                              |
| <b>RCEP</b>    | Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership           |
| <b>RKN11</b>   | Brunei Eleventh National Development Plan             |
| <b>ROW</b>     | rest of the world                                     |
| <b>S&amp;P</b> | Standard and Poor's                                   |
| <b>SBV</b>     | State Bank of Vietnam                                 |
| <b>SG</b>      | Singapore                                             |
| <b>SGD</b>     | Singapore dollar                                      |
| <b>SIA</b>     | Semiconductor Industry Association                    |
| <b>SMEs</b>    | small and medium-sized enterprises                    |
| <b>SMIC</b>    | Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation |
| <b>TFP</b>     | total factor productivity                             |
| <b>TH</b>      | Thailand                                              |
| <b>THB</b>     | Thai baht                                             |
| <b>UHC</b>     | universal health coverage                             |
| <b>UK</b>      | United Kingdom                                        |
| <b>UN</b>      | United Nations                                        |
| <b>UNCTAD</b>  | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development    |
| <b>UNDP</b>    | United Nations Development Programme                  |
| <b>US</b>      | United States                                         |
| <b>USD</b>     | US dollar                                             |
| <b>VAT</b>     | value-added tax                                       |
| <b>VN</b>      | Vietnam                                               |
| <b>WTO</b>     | World Trade Organization                              |
| <b>WSTS</b>    | World Semiconductor Trade Statistics                  |
| <b>y-o-y</b>   | year-on-year                                          |
| <b>YTD</b>     | year-to-date                                          |

An aerial photograph of two large container ships sailing on a deep blue ocean. The ship on the left is viewed from the side, showing its long deck covered with stacks of colorful shipping containers in shades of red, white, and blue. Two smaller tugboats are positioned near the bow and stern of this ship. The ship on the right is viewed from the front, showing its bridge and the front of its container stacks. The water is a deep teal color, and the ships leave white wakes behind them.

Chapter 1.

# Macroeconomic Prospects and Challenges

# Highlights

- 2023 was a tale of two halves for the global economy and ASEAN+3. The first half saw continued aggressive monetary policy tightening and short-lived financial market instability in the United States (US) and Europe, and elevated inflation. In the second half, monetary policy tightening paused, financial markets stabilized, and growth in the US and Europe proved resilient alongside moderating inflation.
- ASEAN+3 registered stronger growth of 4.3 percent in 2023—an increase from 3.2 percent in 2022—driven by robust domestic demand amid weakness in exports. Inflation in the region moderated, although core inflation remained high given firm domestic demand. Financial conditions improved toward the end of the year, with credit growth remaining firm, equity markets recovering, bond yields moderating, and exchange rates stabilizing. Healthy international reserves levels contributed to the region's external resilience.
- ASEAN+3 is expected to grow at a faster pace of 4.5 percent in 2024, before moderating to 4.2 percent in 2025. Domestic demand is likely to remain resilient, underpinned by recovering investment and firm consumer spending. Export recovery, especially in semiconductors, and tourism should provide an additional lift to growth. In the medium term, the ASEAN+3 region is expected to continue to be an engine of growth in the global economy—growing faster than the world average and contributing around 45 percent of global growth in 2024–2030. Inflation is forecast to continue moderating but disinflation would be gradual and core inflation is likely to remain elevated as domestic demand remains robust.
- The near-term prospects for ASEAN+3 could be impacted by various risks. A sudden spike in global commodity prices due to an escalation in geopolitical tensions or weather shocks is the most salient risk. Other key risks include a slower-than-expected growth in China, adverse spillovers from US Presidential election campaign, and possible recession in major advanced economies outside the region. Over the longer term, escalating geopolitical confrontations, failure to prepare for an aging population, climate change, cyber-attacks, and pandemic outbreaks pose complex challenges to macrofinancial stability.
- Nonetheless, the current positive outlook for ASEAN+3 provides an opportunity for the region to rebuild policy space lost during the pandemic. In 2023, fiscal consolidation continued in most ASEAN+3 economies, though most have not fully regained pre-pandemic policy space, while almost all central banks in the region have kept their monetary policy relatively tight to contain inflationary pressures. Going forward, the priority for fiscal policy should be directed mainly at restoring buffers while providing targeted support for the economy. Meanwhile, it is essential for monetary policy to be focused on anchoring inflation expectations given the continued upside risks to inflation.
- Looking back to developments since the onset of COVID-19, despite a strong initial recovery, GDP growth for the region has remained below pre-pandemic trend. This reflects ongoing adjustments and scarring effects that have lowered underlying growth amid a challenging global environment. Notably, the recovery in investment has been particularly weak. Policies to support investment in productivity- and resilience-enhancing areas, especially for smaller firms, are crucial to steer growth back toward pre-pandemic trends. Closer regional collaboration could also strengthen growth potential eroded by the pandemic.

# I. Economic Developments in 2023: A Resilient but Challenging Year


The global economy faced many challenges in 2023. The year began amid the most aggressive monetary tightening cycle in the United States (US) in over four decades (Figure 1.1). The collapse of several major US regional banks in March 2023 highlighted the potential hidden financial vulnerabilities that could be unraveled by sharply rising interest rates.<sup>1</sup> Concerns over similar financial stability risks in other economies increased investor uncertainties, leading to higher global financial market uncertainty. US Treasury 10-year yields rose to its highest levels since 2007—as market expectations realigned towards a higher-for-longer policy rate scenario and US Treasury bond issuances increased—leading to higher financial market and capital flows volatility. 2023 also saw the highest number of armed conflicts since World War II (United Nations 2023). Heightened geopolitical tensions kept global commodity prices high and increased the risk of supply chain disruptions. Adverse weather conditions further threatened crop production and exacerbated global food insecurity.

However, positive economic developments emerged throughout the year. Inflation in the United States trended steadily downward as monetary conditions tightened with the rise in the US Federal Reserve's (the Fed) policy rate, and commodity prices continued to decline. The Fed's rate hikes did not derail improving domestic demand, with consumer spending on goods resuming its expansion. The US economy was surprisingly robust and expectation of

the United States being on track to achieve a soft landing increased toward the end of the year—with inflation moderating to about 3 percent (Figure 1.2). The fallout from the US regional banks' failures was also quickly contained. Meanwhile, the euro area avoided a recession, in part reflecting a mild winter and easing inflation pressures. These improvements mostly materialized in the second half of 2023, enabling the global economy to end the year on a firmer footing than it began.


ASEAN+3 region demonstrated continued resilience. Overall, the region, led by China, registered a robust growth of 4.3 percent in 2023—an increase from 3.2 percent in 2022—underpinned mainly by resilient domestic demand. External demand weakened sharply in the first half of the year but rebounded in the second half of the year providing a significant boost to growth for many regional economies (Figure 1.3). The negative output gaps in most of the regional economies narrowed in 2023 (Figure 1.4). In particular, Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Thailand are estimated to have smaller negative output gap in 2023, as the economies continued to recover from the pandemic. Japan's negative output gap is estimated to have turned positive by the second quarter following strong growth momentum and a departure from years of deflationary pressures. Meanwhile, the positive output gaps in the Philippines and Singapore narrowed while those in Korea, Malaysia, and Vietnam turned negative, mainly as weak external demand weighed on exports and growth.

**Figure 1.1. United States: Federal Funds Rate and 10-year Treasury Note**  
(Percent)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.

**Figure 1.2. United States: Real GDP Growth and Headline Inflation**  
(Percent, year-on-year)




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Headline inflation refers to the Consumer Price Index.

The authors of this chapter are Catharine Tjing Yiing Kho (lead), Megan Wen Xi Chong, Anthony Chia Kiat Tan, Haobin Wang, and Yuhong Wu, with contributions from Jinho Choi, Diana del Rosario, Suan Yong Foo, Marthe M. Hinojales, Yin Fai Ho, Seung Hyun (Luke) Hong, Wee Chian Koh, Byunghoon Nam, Heung Chun (Andrew) Tsang, and Michael Wynn, with input from AMRO country desk economists.

<sup>1</sup> The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank marked the second and third largest US bank failures (by asset size) since 2008 (Dela Cruz and Gull 2023).


**Figure 1.3. Selected ASEAN+3: Real GDP Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Aggregate GDP is calculated using purchasing power parity (PPP) weighted average. Selected ASEAN refers to Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are excluded due to data unavailability.

**Figure 1.4. Selected ASEAN+3: Output Gap, 2022–2023**  
(Percent of potential output)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; and VN = Vietnam. Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are excluded due to data unavailability. Output gap is calculated as (actual output-potential output)/potential output. Potential output is estimated using a 2-sided HP filter on quarterly GDP data from 1973 (or earliest available quarterly data to 2025). AMRO staff projections are used for GDP in 2024 and 2025.


## Domestic Demand Anchored Growth

Domestic demand continued to be the main driver of the region's growth in 2023. Private consumption was the primary driver, contributing about 60 percent of regional growth during the year (Figure 1.5, Figure 1.6). Investment activities gained momentum towards the end of the year and contributed about a quarter of overall GDP growth in ASEAN+3. Net exports turned around to contribute positively to growth since the third quarter.

Steady recovery in the labor market and improving household incomes underpinned private consumption. Private consumption growth remained especially robust for the ASEAN-5 economies, Brunei, and Hong Kong.

Household spending was driven by higher income amid lower inflation. Labor market conditions broadly improved across the region—unemployment rates fell below pre-pandemic levels for most regional economies (Figure 1.7). Labor force participation rates remain high—exceeding pre-pandemic levels—in most economies, except Hong Kong, and Vietnam (Figure 1.8). The tight labor market in most regional economies was also partially due to the slow return of foreign workers who went back to their home countries during the COVID-19 pandemic (Box 1.1). Given the strong demand for labor, growth in nominal wages was sustained or increased further in most economies (Figure 1.9).


**Figure 1.5. Selected ASEAN+3: Aggregate Real GDP Growth, by Expenditure Category**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Statistical discrepancies are not shown. Excludes Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam due to data unavailability.


**Figure 1.6. Selected ASEAN+3: Private Consumption Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year)




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: ASEAN-5 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

**Figure 1.7. Selected ASEAN+3: Unemployment Rate**  
(Index, Q4 2019 = 100, seasonally adjusted)

#### Plus-3




#### ASEAN-6




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.  
Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; and VN = Vietnam. ASEAN-6 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Data are up to Q4 2023, except for Indonesia (Q3 2023).

**Figure 1.8. Selected ASEAN+3: Labor Force Participation Rate**  
(Percent of working-age population, seasonally adjusted)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.  
Note: HK = Hong Kong; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; ID = Indonesia; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Latest 2023 data are for Q4, except for Indonesia (Q3 2023).

**Figure 1.9. Selected ASEAN+3: Nominal Wages, by Economy**  
(Percent, year-on-year)




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.  
Note: HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Data for Malaysia refer only to manufacturing wages. Data are up to Q4 2023, except for Hong Kong and Indonesia (Q3 2023).

Domestic investment recovered gradually and has yet to reach pre-pandemic levels. Gross fixed capital formation grew at a modest pace in the first half of the year as financial conditions tightened following interest rate increases in most ASEAN+3 economies (Figure 1.10). Investment activities in Japan and Korea moderated throughout the year due mainly to lower capital expenditure in machinery and equipment in line with the downturn in the electronics and semiconductor cycle. In contrast, investment in ASEAN-5 and Brunei remained firm. In particular, investment activities in these economies picked up in the second half of the year partly as a result of the gradual realization of investment projects, including those approved in previous years (Figure 1.11).

Property market distress in China—the largest economy in the region—raised some concerns in the middle of 2023, but the economy stabilized toward the end of the


year. The property sector correction in China weighed on its economic growth, with investment in real estate contracting as several large property developers faced financial difficulties (Figure 1.12). Swift and wide-ranging policy measures—such as the injection of liquidity and maintaining access to credit for productive sectors—mitigated broader spillovers to the rest of the economy. Growth slowdown was also cushioned by continued robust investment in the manufacturing sector and on infrastructure, along with strong household spending (Figure 1.13). The steady increase in durable goods demand suggests gradual improvement in consumer sentiments, reflecting the underlying strength of private consumption in China. Overall, China achieved an above-target annual growth rate of 5.2 percent in 2023 thanks to relatively robust private consumption that offset the impact of falling real estate investment and weak external demand.

**Figure 1.10. Selected ASEAN+3: Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation and Contribution to GDP Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year; percentage points)




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: ASEAN-5 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Data are unavailable for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Data for China refer to the contribution of gross fixed capital formation to year-on-year GDP growth.

**Figure 1.11. Selected ASEAN: Investment Approvals**  
(Percent, year-on-year, four-quarter moving average)




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data for Malaysia refer to capital investment in approved projects in the manufacturing sector. Data for Thailand refer to all sectors. Data for Vietnam refer to newly registered capital for foreign direct investment. Data refer to local currency values of approved projects, excluding Vietnam (in US dollars).

**Figure 1.12. China: Fixed Asset Investment**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.

**Figure 1.13. China: Real Consumer Spending**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics  
Note: Real retail sales and online sales are estimated by deflating nominal sales with the consumer price index. Passenger car sales refer to units of passenger cars sold.

**Box 1.1:****Migrant Worker Developments in Selected ASEAN+3 Economies**

The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the flow of migrant workers including in the region. Migrant workers were badly affected as economies imposed stringent containment measures and mobility restrictions in 2020–21. Many lost their jobs as lockdown measures froze most economic activities, and work passes were suspended to contain the spread of the virus. Some were forced to return home, while others were unemployed and stranded in their host country. Key migrant worker destinations in ASEAN, notably Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, experienced significant declines in the number of migrant workers in 2020–21, given that these economies have the largest share of migrant worker participation in the workforce (Figure 1.1.1). Unlike the ASEAN peers, the corresponding period saw the number of migrant workers increase in Japan, while remaining largely stable in Korea.

In several regional economies, despite the economic recovery, migrant worker flows have not fully returned to pre-pandemic levels. In Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia, total number of migrant workers remain at between 10 percent and 16 percent below the (2019) pre-pandemic levels. This shortfall has contributed to the tightening of labor market conditions in some segments of the economy, particularly industries that are heavily reliant on migrant workers, such as agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and services (mainly tourism-related). As recovery gains traction, businesses are facing difficulties meeting demand because of a shortage of manpower as the normalization of migrant worker flows has been slow to materialize. In Malaysia, migrant worker needs in the palm oil plantations and construction industries remain large, as the inflows of migrant workers in these two industries continue to fall short in 2022–2023, given the sizable outflows observed during the height of the pandemic. Similarly, in Thailand, the inflows of migrant workers into the service industry in 2022–2023 remain modest, as compared to the sizable outflows in 2020 (Figure 1.1.2). The notable exception is Singapore, where migrant worker inflows have surpassed pre-pandemic levels, as the economy saw an increase of

more than 250,000 migrant workers in 2022–2023,<sup>1</sup> mostly in the construction sector.

The current shortage of migrant workers has come at a critical juncture, particularly for regional economies that are on the path to strengthening recovery, as this would hinder growth by impeding businesses from fulfilling orders and expanding operations. This situation could lead to increased production costs, production delays and further straining industries that are dependent on migrant labor. However, it is unlikely that the issue can be resolved quickly, due to the following:


- First, it remains challenging to recruit migrant workers with relevant skillsets, especially after experienced workers returned home during the height of the pandemic and found jobs at home. Therefore, new migrants may need time to be trained before they are able to replace the ones who left during the pandemic.
- Second, the pandemic brought to fore lapses in migrant worker services—including access to healthcare and social support services in certain host countries that have yet to be rectified (ILO 2020). Prolonged negotiations with source countries (such as Bangladesh and Indonesia) over migrant workers' benefits and working conditions are hampering the swift resumption of migrant worker flows into these economies (Lee, Latiff, and Chu 2022).
- Third, heightened international scrutiny of human trafficking is leading to more bureaucratic process for approving migrant worker applications, especially for regional economies that rank high on the US State Department's annual Trafficking Persons Report (Foyez 2022).

As a result, labor market conditions in industries that are disproportionately dependent on migrant workers will continue to remain relatively tight, as it would take some time for migrant worker flows to fully recover.

This box was written by Anthony Tan.


<sup>1</sup> This figure excludes Migrant Domestic Workers—persons employed to work in or for a household.

**Figure 1.1.1. Selected ASEAN+3: Number of Migrant Workers**  
(Index, 2019 = 100)



Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; Statistics Korea; Thailand Ministry of Labor; Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia; Brunei Department of Economic Planning and Statistics; Singapore Ministry of Manpower; AMRO staff estimates.  
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the share of migrant workers in the labor force in 2022. Except for Japan, migrant worker data are up to May 2023 (Korea and Thailand), June 2023 (Singapore), and November 2023 (Malaysia). The 2023 data point for Brunei refers to AMRO staff estimates. Data for Singapore excludes migrant domestic workers. Data for Thailand refers to migrant workers holding work permits only, which underestimates the true picture of migrant workers. According to the Thailand Migration Report (United Nations 2019), migrant workers account for over 10 percent of the labor force in 2019.

**Figure 1.1.2. Selected ASEAN+3: Number of Migrant Workers, by Key Sectors**  
(Annual change, thousand persons)



Source: Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; Statistics Korea; Thailand Ministry of Labor; Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia; Brunei Department of Economic Planning and Statistics; Singapore Ministry of Manpower.  
Note: Data for Singapore excludes migrant domestic workers, while data for Thailand refers to migrant workers holding work permits.


## Weaker Exports Performance

Exports for ASEAN+3 was weak in 2023. Gross exports for all regional economies, except Cambodia, contracted in 2023 (Figure 1.14). The slow growth in goods exports mainly reflected still-weak global electronics demand, and lower commodity prices. Global semiconductor sales declined by 20 percent year-on-year in May, the largest contraction in over a decade (SIA 2023). With electronics accounting for a large share of the ASEAN+3 exports base, the downcycle weighed significantly on the region's export performance (Figure 1.15). At the same time, the moderation in global commodity prices lowered export value for commodity exporters in the region.

Signs of a turnaround emerged in the second half of the year. Goods exports have contracted at a slower pace since August, while goods volume has continued to expand after turning positive in April, lending optimism to the prospect of weak exports having bottomed out (Figure 1.16). Resilient GDP growth in the United States and continued demand for durable goods also benefited the region's exports. Notably, the milder contraction in non-tech exports provided some counterbalance against the weakness in technology-related exports (Figure 1.17).

In contrast, services exports remained resilient, partially offsetting the drag on goods exports. Strong growth in travel services more than offset the continued contraction in transport and manufacturing services (Figure 1.18). The weak growth in the latter segments was in line with the sluggish goods exports. The recovery in the travel services since the full removal of COVID-19 restrictions continued apace. Tourist arrivals across the region have on average exceeded 70 percent of pre-pandemic levels (Figure 1.19). Overall, intraregional tourism was particularly strong, except for China where recovery of outbound tourism has been more gradual (Figure 1.20). The share of tourists from ASEAN has exceeded the pre-pandemic share for all regional economies as of September 2023, while the share of tourists originating from China reached only about 25 percent of pre-pandemic levels. Growth in other services exports also remained robust, reflecting continued firm demand for modern services—services that can be provided without physical presence, enabled by technology—in the post-pandemic environment.


**Figure 1.14. ASEAN+3: Goods Export Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year, three-month moving average)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Calculated based on merchandise exports in US dollars for all economies. Colors indicate the size and direction of change: the deeper the shade of red, the larger the negative change, with the darkest shade indicating a decrease of more than 30 percent year-on-year; the deeper the shade of green, the larger the positive change, with the darkest shade indicating an increase of more than 30 percent year-on-year.


**Figure 1.15. World: Global Semiconductor and Capital Expenditure Cycles**  
(Percent, year-on-year, six-month moving average)



Source: World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Inc.; AMRO staff calculations.


Note: Underlying data represent actual global billings up to December 2023 and estimated monthly billings next year using WSTS forecasts. Capital expenditure data are for the Germany (as proxy for euro area), Japan, and the United States.

**Figure 1.16. Selected ASEAN+3: Goods and Services Export Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year, three-month moving average)




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Goods exports value data are not available for Brunei, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. Goods exports volume data are not available for Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. Services exports data are not available for Brunei and Myanmar.

**Figure 1.17. Selected ASEAN+3: Export Growth, by Product Type**  
(Index, Q1 2022 = 100, three-month moving average)



Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data refers to export values in US dollars. "Tech" covers goods that fall under HS codes 8541-42 and 8486 (all semiconductor-related). Data excludes Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR.


**Figure 1.18. Selected ASEAN+3: Growth in Exports of Services, by Category**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.


Note: Transport services comprise sea transport, air transport, other modes of transport, and postal and courier services. Exports of travel services cover goods and services (excluding transport services) that are acquired from an economy by nonresidents during visits to that economy. Data for Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam are not available.

**Figure 1.19. Selected ASEAN+3: Tourist Arrivals**  
(Index, 2019 monthly average = 100)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CMV = Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam; KH = Cambodia; ID = Indonesia; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam; HK = Hong Kong; JP = Japan; KR = Korea. Brunei, China, and Lao PDR are excluded due to data unavailability. Data are as of January 2024, except for Malaysia, Cambodia, and Myanmar (December 2023).

**Figure 1.20. Selected ASEAN+3: Share of Tourist Arrivals, by Source Economy**  
(Percent of total arrivals)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: 2023 data are from January to December 2023, except for Japan (January to November).

## Gradual Disinflation

Headline inflation continued to moderate from its peaks in 2022—where inflation surged due mainly to the confluence of global supply chain disruption, spike in commodity prices following the Russia-Ukraine conflict which escalated into a crisis, and post-pandemic demand recovery. Headline inflation across the Plus-3 and ASEAN economies grew at a slower pace in 2023, while core inflation trends diverged between the two subregions, with core inflation continuing to increase in the Plus-3 but moderating for ASEAN economies (Figure 1.21). The moderation in headline inflation was due mainly to declines in global commodity prices (Figure 1.22). In terms of levels, however, commodity prices continued to be higher than prior to the pandemic in 2019, except for natural gas which declined to below the prices in 2019.

Volatility in energy and food prices continued to exert pressure on regional inflation. In September, crude oil prices hit the highest level since the start of 2023 following the extension

of oil production cuts by Saudi Arabia and Russia. The increased prices led to an uptick in transportation costs across the region (Figure 1.23). Food prices remained high as the dry weather due to El Niño reduced agricultural yield. The price of rice—a staple for most ASEAN+3 economies—surged in August 2023, reaching its highest level since 2008, following India’s export ban on non-basmati white rice. Food inflation in the ASEAN+3 region consequently outpaced inflation in other major categories by the second half of the year (Box 1.2).


Core inflation remained elevated in most regional economies. Core inflation in the Plus-3 subregion is on an increasing trend while core inflation in the ASEAN economies has begun to moderate. The dynamics of core inflation differ significantly across the region, reflecting the economies’ diverse economic structure, import reliance, exchange rate passthrough and inflation management

approach, among others. Supply-factors such as global commodity prices and exchange rate passthrough have played a more prominent role in core inflation in recent periods. Strong demand pressures arising from robust


domestic demand conditions further complicate the identification and isolation of inflation drivers, and by extension, the appropriate policy response (Box 1.3).

**Figure 1.21. ASEAN+3: Average Headline and Core Inflation**  
(Percent, year-on-year)

Plus-3




ASEAN ex Lao PDR and Myanmar



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Average headline and core inflation refer to the respective trim means, which exclude outliers. Core inflation excludes food and energy.

**Figure 1.22. World: Commodity Prices**  
(Index, January 2019 = 100)




Source: Bank Negara Malaysia; Financial Times; US Energy Information Administration; Wall Street Journal; World Bank, via Haver Analytics.

Note: Wheat price refers to Kansas City wheat, natural gas refers to Henry Hub Natural Gas, and rice refers to Thailand white rice.

**Figure 1.23. ASEAN+3: Consumer Price Inflation**  
(Percent, year-on-year)

Plus-3



ASEAN



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Aggregate consumer price inflation is calculated as a simple average of individual economies' data series. Data for ASEAN are up to Q4 2023, except for Myanmar (Q2 2022).

**Box 1.2:****Sticky Food Prices Spice Up ASEAN+3 Inflation Outlook**

Elevated food prices remain a key concern in the ASEAN+3. While regional food inflation declined notably in 2023, it continued to outpace headline inflation in most of the region's economies.

The stickiness of retail food prices following commodity price shocks is a common historical phenomenon, as reviewed in Ferrucci, Jimenez-Rodriguez, and Onorante (2012). In an empirical study, del Rosario and Wynn (2023) show that global food price shocks exhibit a delayed and persistent impact on headline inflation in the ASEAN+3—typically materializing 1–5 months after the shock and the spillovers extending over 14–22 months (Figure 1.2.1). By comparison, the effects of global oil price shocks to domestic headline inflation manifest and dissipate more quickly—either contemporaneously or 1 month after the shock, with a duration of 2–14 months, which is roughly half the span of the spillover duration of global food prices on ASEAN+3 inflation.

The global food price index of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) fell by 14 percent in 2023, suggesting a potential easing in food price pressures on ASEAN+3 headline inflation in 2024. That said, global food prices have remained above historical norms, hovering just below the levels observed during the food price shocks in 2008 and 2011 (Figure 1.2.2). This situation raises concerns about food affordability for low-income economies, including Lao PDR, and Myanmar in the ASEAN+3, and could dampen discretionary spending among cash-strapped households across the region. Currency depreciations exacerbate the cost pressures for most ASEAN+3 economies that are net importers of food commodities (Tan, Choo, and Chong 2022).

At the same time, various factors could reverse the recent declines in global food prices. First, an escalation of the conflict in the Middle East could trigger a spike in oil prices, raising the cost of food production and transportation. While oil prices have been relatively stable to date, attacks on cargo vessels in the Red Sea since mid-November 2023 pushed up ocean freight rates by 40–80 percent by the first week of January 2024 (Figure 1.2.3).<sup>1</sup>

Second, extreme weather events arising from the interaction of El Niño and global warming could reduce agricultural yields and push up food prices, which in turn could be exacerbated by export restrictions imposed by major commodity producers.<sup>2</sup> For example, rice prices rose by 21 percent in 2023 following India's ban on exports of non-basmati rice in July 2023, and tighter global rice supply due to El Niño-related dry weather conditions (Figure 1.2.2). Sugar prices also surged by 27 percent in 2023 owing to similar concerns over the impact of El Niño and the likelihood of export restrictions (World Bank 2023a). The US Climate Prediction Center expects ongoing El Niño conditions to persist through April, leading to 2024 potentially surpassing 2023 as the hottest year on record (Hirji and others 2024).

In addition, a worsening of geopolitical tensions in major food producing economies could unsettle global food markets once again. Russia's withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023 caused an uptick in the FAO food price index, although this was subsequently abated by ample harvests in major food-producing nations and declines in input costs, particularly, from energy, shipping, and fertilizers (Vos and others 2023).


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This box was written by Diana del Rosario.

<sup>1/</sup> The Red Sea connects to the Suez Canal, which handles 12 percent of global trade and as much as 30 percent of global container traffic (Cooban and North 2024; Partington 2024).

<sup>2/</sup> Recent studies show that human-induced global warming has led to more frequent and extreme El Niño and La Niña events since the 1960s. Wilcox and others (2023) find a shift in the factors influencing the formation of El Niño—or more generally, the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO)—since the 1970s, attributing it to human-induced global warming rather than changes in solar output as observed in the prior 3,500 years. Cai and others (2023) show that the increased frequency and severity of El Niño and La Niña events—the warm and cold phases of ENSO—post-1960 is associated with human-induced global warming.


**Figure 1.2.1. ASEAN+3: Transmission Period of Global Commodity Price Shocks to Headline Inflation**  
(Months after shock)



Source: Bank for International Settlements, FAO, and national authorities, all via Haver statistics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: CN=China; HK = Hong Kong, China; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; ID = Indonesia; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; BN = Brunei; KH = Cambodia; LA = Lao PDR; VN = Vietnam. See del Rosario and Wynn (2023) for information about the modelling specifications.


**Figure 1.2.2. World: Aggregate and Selected Food Price Indices**  
(Index, 2014–2016 = 100)



Source: FAO via Haver Analytics.

Note: The FAO Food Price Index is the average of the price indexes of meat, dairy, cereals, vegetable oils, and sugar, weighted by the respective average export share of each of the said commodity groups in 2014–2016.

**Figure 1.2.3. World: Ocean Freight Rates**  
(Index, 2019 = 100)



Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Container freight rate is represented by the Drewry World Container Index, a composite of spot container freight rates for major East-West trade routes; dry bulk carrier rate by the Baltic Dry Index, a composite of prices paid for shipping dry bulk materials across more than 20 routes.

**Box 1.3:****Drivers of Core Inflation in ASEAN+3**

Headline and core inflation in the ASEAN+3 region have experienced multi-year highs since 2021. Inflation escalated due to pandemic-induced shifts in demand, global supply chain disruptions, labor shortages, and commodity price spikes due in part to the Russia-Ukraine conflict which escalated into a crisis. Headline and core inflation moderated in 2023, but remained elevated, surpassing long-term averages in most economies.

Nevertheless, headline inflation in ASEAN+3 rose at a slower pace and reached a lower peak compared to major economies outside the region, likely reflecting the lower pass-through of global commodity prices due in part to administrative price controls and subsidies (Figure 1.3.1). Similar to the United States, the euro area and other OECD economies, core inflation in ASEAN+3 has also moderated at a slower pace than headline inflation. In China, Japan<sup>1</sup>, and the Philippines, the slower pace of disinflation in core inflation relative to headline inflation is more pronounced, with core inflation outpacing headline inflation for 7 to 9 months out of the first 10 months in 2023. At the same time, core inflation in ASEAN+3 now fluctuates in a range three times wider than before the pandemic. For some economies, the increase in core inflation range has even exceeded that of headline inflation.

To identify the drivers of core inflation, demand and supply factors are decomposed using the framework in Shapiro (2022).<sup>2</sup> Domestic demand was the main driver of core inflation for the region both before and after the pandemic for most economies.<sup>3</sup> From 2010 to 2019, demand factors underpinned the core inflation dynamics in China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore (Figure 1.3.2). In Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines, core inflation was driven by both demand and supply factors, with demand factors being slightly more prevalent. On the other hand, supply factors dominated the core inflation dynamics in Thailand, mainly reflecting the fluctuation in international commodity prices.

In 2021 to 2022, the role of supply factors in driving core inflation in the ASEAN+3 region increased in line with the prevalence of supply shocks. Supply factors became the main driver of core inflation in China, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and a more significant driver in other regional economies. This shift was mainly due to a broad-based increase in input prices after supply shocks. Concurrently, domestic supply constraints and currency depreciation against the US dollar in the latter half of 2022 put more upward pressures on core inflation, on top of the recovery in demand with the reopening of economies.

Overall, in 2023, while supply pressures subsided as global commodity prices declined and stabilized, demand-side factors regained prominence as robust post-pandemic recovery supported inflation. Nevertheless, supply factors continued to contribute more than before the pandemic while core inflation remained sticky at high levels despite tighter monetary policy in most regional economies. Across ASEAN+3 economies, supply factors continued to dominate in Thailand and China. Conversely, demand became the primary driver for other regional economies, fueled by stronger economic growth, higher exports (Indonesia, Korea), robust domestic consumption recovery (Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore), and a rebound in tourism (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan) following the complete reopening of economies.

All in all, supply factors have become more important drivers of inflation in ASEAN+3, raising concerns about the limitations of conventional demand-focused interventions. Looking ahead, supply factors are expected to become more frequent and persistent due to global shifts, such as global value chain reconfiguration, diminishing demographic returns, and the transition toward a greener economy. Supply-side policy responses could thus see an increased role in inflation management.

This box was written by Megan Wen Xi Chong, Catharine Tjing Yiing Kho and Heung Chun (Andrew) Tsang.

<sup>1/</sup> Core inflation for Japan refers to “core-core” inflation, which excludes fresh food and energy.


<sup>2/</sup> See Kho, Chong and Tsang (2024) for details on the decomposition method.

<sup>3/</sup> Given data limitations, inflation drivers for Indonesia before 2021 could not be assessed.

Despite the increasing complexity in distinguishing between supply and demand-driven shocks, monetary policy remains crucial for maintaining price stability by adjusting aggregate demand and anchoring inflation expectations. However, targeted supply-side policy responses, such as relaxing import

restrictions or introducing temporary price subsidies, may be more effective in specific circumstances. Overall, a nuanced and coordinated approach to identify and manage the shifting demand and supply drivers across ASEAN+3 is essential for calibrated policy responses to achieve price stability.


**Figure 1.3.1. US, euro area, OECD, and ASEAN+3: Headline and Core Inflation**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: ASEAN+3 includes China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. OECD here refers to OECD economies excluding the United States and economies in the euro area and ASEAN+3 to avoid double counting. Türkiye is also excluded to avoid skewing the regional data due to the idiosyncratic sharp depreciation of the lira.

**Figure 1.3.2. Selected ASEAN+3: Average Contribution to Core Inflation**  
(Percent share)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand.

## Financial Conditions Eased


Overall financial conditions in ASEAN+3 eased, in line with global financial conditions. The US federal funds rate has remained unchanged since July 2023, while the European Central Bank began to increase rates at a slower pace from June 2023 before pausing in September (Figure 1.24). The more gradual monetary policy tightening helped ease global financial conditions. Improving capital markets performance towards the end of the year, in addition to slower tightening of monetary policy in regional economies led to more favorable financial conditions in ASEAN+3 (Figure 1.25). In China and Vietnam, monetary conditions were even more accommodative after the economies reduced interest rates and provided additional liquidity support—in the form of lower reserve requirements and the provision of long-term capital to boost growth.

Credit growth continued but at a more moderate pace. Bank lending to the nonfinancial private sector continued to grow for most regional economies but at a slower pace, except for Japan, Indonesia, and the Philippines (Figure 1.26). Credit growth for Japan continued to expand firmly, while credit growth recovered strongly in 2022 and was sustained in 2023 for Indonesia and the Philippines, in line with strong economic growth in these economies. Despite interest rate increase across the region, nonperforming

loan ratios fell for most regional economies, except Hong Kong, Cambodia, and Vietnam (Figure 1.27). The high interest rates may increase default risks in some sectors, but ASEAN+3 banks have strengthened their resilience by building capital buffers well above regulatory minima (Figure 1.28, AMRO 2023b).

Capital markets performance was adversely impacted by the banking turmoil in the US in the first half of 2023 but recovered by the end of the year. Regional equity markets price indexes weakened temporarily after the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in March in the United States heightened concerns over hidden financial vulnerabilities, particularly in emerging market economies (Figure 1.29). China's equity returns remain weak throughout the year reflecting continued investor uncertainty over a turnaround in its property sector. At the same time, high interest rates pushed up long-term bond yields in the second and third quarter of 2023 (Figure 1.30). In the fourth quarter of the year, improved economic performance and the stabilization of interest rates regionally and globally pushed bond yields back down to January 2023 levels, while the equity market performances broadly improved for most regional economies except for China and Hong Kong.


**Figure 1.24. Selected Economies: Policy Interest Rates**  
(Percent share)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.

Note: Data are up to February 2024. Policy rates refer to one-year loan prime rate (China, CN); BI Rate (Indonesia, ID); the target rate for the 10-year government bond yield (Japan, JP); base rate (Hong Kong, HK; Korea, KR); overnight policy rate (Malaysia, MY); overnight reverse repo rate (the Philippines, PH); one-day repurchase rate (Thailand, TH); refinancing rate (Vietnam, VN); federal funds rate (upper range) (United States, US); and deposit facility rate (euro area, EU).


**Figure 1.25. Selected ASEAN+3: AMRO's Financial Conditions Index**  
(Normalized Scores)




Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: The financial condition index reflects the overall enabling conditions for future economic activity, which could potentially provide complementary information about future economic activity (BNM 2017). AMRO's financial conditions index is based on indicators covering the banking system, foreign exchange market, bond and equity markets. Data covers China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand only.


**Figure 1.26. Selected ASEAN+3: Growth in Credit to Private Nonfinancial Sector**  
(Percent, year-on-year, four-quarter moving average)




**Figure 1.27. Selected ASEAN+3: Banking Sector Nonperforming Loan Ratios**  
(Percent)




**Figure 1.28. Selected ASEAN+3: Capital Adequacy Ratio**  
(Percent of Risk-Weighted Assets)



Source: National authorities via CEIC.  
Note: Data are up to Q4 2023, except for Lao PDR, the Philippines, Singapore, and Korea (Q3 2023).

**Figure 1.29. Selected ASEAN+3: Equity Market Indices**  
(Index, 2 January 2022 = 100)

Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
 Note: ASEAN-5 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand;  
 CLMV = Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam; SVB = Silicon Valley Bank.  
 Data for Brunei are unavailable.

**Figure 1.30. Selected ASEAN+3: 10-year Government Bond Yields**  
(Basis point change from 2 January 2022)

Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
 Note: ASEAN-6 (average) is the simple mean of changes for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Data are up to 29 February 2024.

## Sustained External Strength

ASEAN+3 continued to receive foreign direct investment (FDI), albeit at a slower pace—but developments were uneven. Realized FDI inflows fell by 43.7 percent to USD 195 billion in the first half of 2023 compared to the same period of 2022 (Figure 1.31). China continued to register FDI inflows, albeit at a slower rate, while FDI inflows into most other regional economies were sustained despite the challenging external environment—underscoring continued investor confidence in the region’s overall growth prospects (Figure 1.32). Ongoing US-China tensions also contributed to this divergence—affecting inflows into China, and partly diverting investments into the rest of ASEAN+3 as firms circumnavigate the US investment and trade restrictions (Zhao and Ho 2023).

Non-resident portfolio flows for ASEAN+3 experienced continued shifts throughout the year. Portfolio investment registered a smaller outflow of USD 79 billion in the first three quarters of 2023 compared to USD 116 billion in the same period in 2022 (Figure 1.33). Equity markets received inflows in the first quarter of the year due to optimism surrounding China’s economic reopening (Figure 1.34, Figure 1.35). Subsequently, concerns about China’s growth prospects and expectations of higher-for-longer US interest rates led to capital outflows from the region. Debt inflows to the rest of the region have broadly recovered—Korea and the ASEAN-4 economies recorded net debt inflows of USD 14.5 billion in the first three quarters of the year, compared to USD 13.9 billion in the same period in 2022. On the other hand, debt outflows from China continued


into 2023 as the interest rate differential with major global and regional economies widened.

Most regional currencies depreciated in the middle of 2023 but rebounded and stabilized by the end of the year. Multiple interest rate increases in the United States and the euro area, and idiosyncratic risks in some ASEAN+3 economies put downward pressure on regional currencies in the first three quarters of the year. Most regional currencies depreciated against the US dollar in 2023, but recovered in the last quarter of the year following improving growth prospects and suspension of interest rate increases in the United States and the euro area (Figure 1.36). The exceptions were the Laotian kip and Myanmar kyat which continued to depreciate, reflecting country-specific challenges. Trade-weighted nominal and real exchange rates for ASEAN+3 saw smaller depreciations (Figure 1.37).

International reserves for the regional economies remain high and adequate to finance short-term needs. After declining in 2022, net central bank reserves rose to 24.3 percent of GDP in 2023 due mainly to a higher current account balance (Figure 1.38). International reserves in the Plus-3 increased towards the end of the year, while ASEAN-5 economies broadly accumulated reserves throughout 2023 and surpassed its 2021 levels (Figure 1.39). International reserves for regional economies generally remain adequate, except for Lao PDR (Figure 1.40).<sup>2</sup> Lao PDR’s international reserves have increased slightly since the start of the year, but can only provide 2.7 months of import cover—which is below the recommended 3 months.


<sup>2/</sup> In the case of Lao PDR, imports of goods related to direct investment projects are not included in their internal calculation mechanism. Lao PDR authorities assess the level of international reserves remains sufficient, covering 4.6 months of imports as of December 2023.

**Figure 1.31. Selected ASEAN+3: Foreign Direct Investment**  
(Billions of US dollars)




Source: Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics database, IMF; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: YTD = year-to-date. Data refer to the direct investment liabilities item in the balance of payments. Data are up to Q3 2023, except for Vietnam (Q1 2023). Brunei, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are excluded due to unavailability of data.

**Figure 1.32. Selected ASEAN+3: Foreign Direct Investment, by Regional Grouping**  
(Millions of US dollars)




Source: International Financial Statistics database, IMF; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: ASEAN-5 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; Plus-3 ex China = Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea; YTD = year-to-date, which includes data from Q1 to Q3. Data refer to the direct investment liabilities item in the balance of payments.

**Figure 1.33. Selected ASEAN+3: Nonresident Portfolio Investment, Q1-Q3 2023**  
(Billions of US dollars)




Source: Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics database, IMF; national authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: ASEAN-4 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; Plus-3 = China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea.

**Figure 1.34. Selected ASEAN+3: Nonresident Portfolio Investment, Monthly**  
(Billions of US dollars)









Source: Institute of International Finance via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Selected ASEAN+3 includes China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, and Thailand.

**Figure 1.35. Selected ASEAN+3: Nonresident Portfolio Flows, by Country**  
(Billions of US dollars)



Source: Institute of International Finance via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: ASEAN-4 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.



**Figure 1.36. ASEAN+3: Exchange Rates against the US Dollar**  
(Index, 2 January 2022 = 100)**Figure 1.37. Selected ASEAN+3: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates**  
(Percent, year-on-year)**Figure 1.38. ASEAN+3: Net International Reserves**  
(Trillions of US dollars; percent of GDP)**Figure 1.39. Selected ASEAN+3: Net International Reserves, by Subregion**  
(Index, 2021 average = 100)**Figure 1.40. ASEAN+3: Reserves Adequacy**

## II. Outlook for ASEAN+3: Sustained Growth amid Continued Disinflation

AMRO staff expect the region to grow at a slightly faster pace of 4.5 percent in 2024 before moderating to 4.2 percent in 2025. The improvement in regional growth from 4.3 percent in 2023 to 4.5 percent this year is mainly driven by a stronger growth in ASEAN economies, which more than offset the steady growth in the Plus-3 region (Table 1.1). Regional growth is subsequently forecast to be more moderate in 2025 as economic expansion in the Plus-3 subregion normalizes to potential growth while growth in ASEAN remains steady.

- **Plus-3.** Growth in 2024 will be led by China and Korea. In China, GDP growth is expected to pick up slightly in 2024, supported by gradual recovery in the property sector and improving external demand. The rebound in the global chips cycle will boost Korea's exports and drive its recovery in 2024. Growth in Hong Kong is forecast to remain robust as external demand improves. Meanwhile, GDP growth in Japan is expected to moderate as post-pandemic growth momentum wanes. Growth in all Plus-3 economies would moderate toward potential growth in 2025.

- **ASEAN.** GDP growth for most ASEAN economies, with the exception of Myanmar, is forecast to improve in 2024. The rebound in merchandise exports as well as firm domestic demand will continue to drive the region's growth. The return of tourism to pre-pandemic levels will also benefit most economies. Growth is forecast to be maintained in 2025 as global economic prospects improve and economies converge toward potential growth.

Headline inflation is projected to trend downward.

Inflation in ASEAN+3 is set to moderate from 6.3 percent in 2023 to 3.7 percent in 2025. Excluding Lao PDR and Myanmar, where persistent currency depreciation has pushed up prices, inflation for the rest of the region is forecast to be lower at 2.5 percent in 2024 and 2.3 percent in 2025. Lower inflation for most regional economies is mainly occurring in tandem with the continued stabilization of global commodity prices. However, inflation for some regional economies is likely to remain above long-term average as strong domestic demand places upward pressure on prices.

**Table 1.1. ASEAN+3: AMRO Staff Growth and Inflation Estimates and Forecasts, 2024–25**  
(Percent, year-on-year)


| Economies               | GDP Growth |            |            | Inflation  |            |            |
|-------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
|                         | 2023e      | 2024f      | 2025f      | 2023e      | 2024f      | 2025f      |
| <b>ASEAN+3</b>          | <b>4.3</b> | <b>4.5</b> | <b>4.2</b> | <b>6.3</b> | <b>4.3</b> | <b>3.7</b> |
| ex. Lao PDR and Myanmar | –          | –          | –          | 2.8        | 2.5        | 2.3        |
| <b>Plus-3</b>           | <b>4.4</b> | <b>4.4</b> | <b>4.1</b> | <b>2.3</b> | <b>2.1</b> | <b>2.0</b> |
| China                   | 5.2        | 5.3        | 4.9        | 0.2        | 1.0        | 1.6        |
| Hong Kong               | 3.2        | 3.5        | 3.0        | 2.1        | 2.5        | 2.3        |
| Japan                   | 1.9        | 1.1        | 1.0        | 3.3        | 2.5        | 2.1        |
| Korea                   | 1.4        | 2.3        | 2.1        | 3.6        | 2.5        | 2.0        |
| <b>ASEAN</b>            | <b>4.2</b> | <b>4.8</b> | <b>4.9</b> | <b>8.0</b> | <b>5.2</b> | <b>4.4</b> |
| ex. Lao PDR and Myanmar | –          | –          | –          | 3.0        | 2.7        | 2.4        |
| Brunei                  | 1.4        | 2.7        | 2.9        | 0.4        | 1.4        | 1.0        |
| Cambodia                | 5.3        | 6.2        | 6.4        | 2.1        | 3.1        | 2.8        |
| Indonesia               | 5.0        | 5.2        | 5.2        | 3.7        | 2.8        | 2.5        |
| Lao PDR                 | 4.3        | 4.7        | 4.9        | 31.2       | 14.3       | 9.3        |
| Malaysia                | 3.7        | 5.0        | 4.7        | 2.5        | 2.5        | 3.0        |
| Myanmar                 | 3.4        | 3.2        | 3.2        | 24.4       | 16.1       | 15.8       |
| Philippines             | 5.6        | 6.3        | 6.5        | 6.0        | 3.6        | 2.9        |
| Singapore               | 1.1        | 2.6        | 1.9        | 4.8        | 3.0        | 2.5        |
| Thailand                | 1.9        | 2.9        | 3.1        | 1.2        | 1.2        | 1.9        |
| Vietnam                 | 5.1        | 6.0        | 6.5        | 3.3        | 3.6        | 2.7        |

Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates and forecasts.

Note: e = estimates; f = forecast. Myanmar's growth and inflation numbers are based on its fiscal year, which runs from 1 April to 31 March. Regional aggregates for growth are estimated using the weighted average of 2022 GDP on purchasing power parity basis; inflation estimate and forecasts refer to the yearly average; regional aggregates for inflation are computed using simple averaging.

Over the medium term, the ASEAN+3 region is expected to remain a major driver of the global economy. The region is forecast to expand by an average of 4.4 percent in 2024–2030, outpacing global growth (Figure 1.41). The growth slowdown, as compared to an average growth of 5.3 percent in 2011–2019 is mainly a result of a moderation in potential growth as the middle income and developing economies of the region move towards the production possibility frontier and converge to the potential growth rates of advanced economies. In the short-to-medium term, however, the region will need to contend with a more challenging external environment, although this is partly offset by continued strength of domestic demand and support from intraregional demand. Nonetheless, ASEAN+3 will remain a major


**Figure 1.41. World: Real GDP Growth on PPP Basis**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; Oxford Economics; IMF *World Economic Outlook* January Update 2024; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: f = forecast. Real GDP is forecast in local currency and converted to purchasing power parity (PPP).

driver of global growth, contributing about 45 percent of global growth, slightly above the pre-pandemic average of 44.5 percent (Figure 1.42). This growth trajectory will predominantly be driven by the Plus-3 economies, contributing three-quarters of this growth. Within the ASEAN region, the ASEAN-6 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) economies will continue to anchor growth at 4.9 percent, contributing an average of 10 percent to global growth in 2024–2030. Growth of the BCLM (Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar) economies is also expected to pick up gradually, expanding by more than 5 percent per year. These economies are thus poised to account for a larger share of the regional and world economy by the end of the next decade.

**Figure 1.42. World: Contribution to Real GDP Growth on PPP Basis**  
(Percent share)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; Oxford Economics; IMF *World Economic Outlook* January Update 2024; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: ASEAN-6 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; BCLM = Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar; Plus-3 = China, Japan, and Korea; ROW = rest of the world. f = forecast. Real GDP is forecast in local currency and converted to purchasing power parity (PPP).

## Key Factors Shaping the Near-Term Outlook


Overall growth for ASEAN+3 is set to be driven by a gradual recovery in external demand and resilient domestic demand. The operating environment underpinning the outlook for the region in 2024 and 2025 is expected to be more benign, as the various shocks that have affected the global economy over the past few years begin to subside. Notably, the semiconductor cycle, which saw an exceptionally deep downturn in the last couple of years, is expected to turn around—benefitting the region’s major semiconductor exporters. In addition, the continued demand for exports from major economies, especially the United States, and the full recovery of tourism activity from pandemic lows, is expected to further support overall external demand. Meanwhile, domestic demand in ASEAN+3 economies are forecast to remain robust, driven by a resumption of growth in private investment amid resilient private consumption.

The recovery in the global electronics cycle will lift the region’s exports. Following last year’s growth contraction of 9.4 percent—a four-year low—global semiconductor sales are expected to rebound to 13.1 percent in 2024, with demand improving broadly across key regions. The forthcoming recovery is partly driven by the “replacement cycle”—or the time it takes to replace an old unit, particularly those bought during the COVID-19 pandemic. It is also boosted by increasing demand for highly advanced chips, such as for automotive intelligence, high-performance computing, and Artificial Intelligence (AMRO 2023c; IDC 2023). Economies that can swiftly expand their existing production capacities toward high-performance chips should benefit from this rising demand, relative to others in the region that are more concentrated in more mature chips.

However, the current global semiconductor cycle upturn could be rather narrow and gradual. Current underlying demand dynamics show that demand is narrowly focused on certain advanced segments. Further, the next “peak”—especially for the non-memory sector, which comprises about 80 percent of the industry—could also be lower than those in previous cycles (Figure 1.43). Chips demand from China—which accounts for a third of global demand—is only expected to recover briskly by the second half of this year, and electronics manufacturers worldwide would also need to continue contending with rising input prices, as recent PMI surveys suggest. Nevertheless, global semiconductor demand is expected to accelerate until about the first half of 2025, after which some moderation would be expected as base effects fully dissipate. As semiconductor demand normalizes further, global chip sales are anticipated to grow at a healthy average of 9.5 percent per year in 2025–2026 (Figure 1.44, WSTS Inc. 2023). The anticipated subsequent increase in global capital spending, due to a recovery in demand for technology, could also provide a second-order boost to overall ASEAN+3 exports.<sup>3</sup>

The resumption of goods consumption in the United States would benefit regional exports. Between the latter half of 2021 to the middle of 2023, growth in services consumption in the United States outpaced goods consumption. This trend emerged as services spending surged while the spike in revenge spending on goods dissipated after lockdowns and social distancing measures were lifted. The weaker growth in the demand for goods led to lower imports from the region despite the better-than-expected performance of the US economy through 2023. However, recent developments suggest a moderation in this trend. The growth in the consumption of goods in the United States regained strength in the second half of 2023, surpassing the growth of services consumption for the first time since 2021. The demand rotation from goods to services in the past two years is likely to be transitory, with a normalization toward pre-pandemic trend (Figure 1.45, AMRO 2024a). Recovery in goods consumption in the United States, supported by continued disinflation, is expected to benefit demand for regional exports.


**Figure 1.43. World: Global Semiconductor Cycles**  
(Percent, year-on-year; 18-month moving average)



Source: AMRO staff estimates using data from WSTS Inc.

Note: The underlying data for the dashed lines are WSTS (annual) projections, extrapolated by AMRO staff to derive the monthly cycle estimates.

**Figure 1.44. World: Annual Global Semiconductor Demand**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: WSTS Inc.; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: Dashed lines are projections. The value projections by WSTS were used by AMRO staff to extrapolate the 2024–2026 growth for semiconductor volumes.

<sup>3/</sup> As discussed in AMRO (2020), and updated in AMRO (2023a), recovery in demand for technology has historically led new capital expenditure (capex), based on empirical data. The correlation between the semiconductor cycle and the capex cycle—when computed between January 2005 and July 2023—is about 0.60, and slightly higher for the non-memory sector at 0.65.


Tourist arrivals to the region are poised to see a full recovery in 2024–2025. The resumption of flights and normalization of travel patterns toward pre-pandemic trends are expected to proceed further (Figure 1.46). Tourist arrivals from China to the region are likely to increase as authorities in the region lifted or ease visa requirements for visitors from China and vice versa. High tourist arrivals from other ASEAN+3 economies and major economies outside the region which drove the tourism recovery in 2023 would remain a significant driver of tourism in 2024–2025. The full resumption of cross-border physical activities, including trade exhibitions and concerts, would boost demand for the Meetings, Incentives, Conferences and Exhibitions (MICE) industry. For example, most MICE venues in Malaysia have been fully booked for 2024; and all ASEAN-5 economies will be hosting multiple major concerts by various international artists throughout the year (Ganesan 2023; Neo 2023).

Domestic demand will continue to underpin growth, with the gradual recovery in private investment and robust private consumption. Private investment is projected to pick up as financial conditions ease, and the resumption of investment projects that were previously delayed due to the pandemic is expected to accelerate this year. The recovery in external

demand is also expected to spur investment in export-related sectors. In China, gradual property sector recovery amid ongoing policy support would also boost real estate investment, generating spillovers for the rest of the region (Box 1.4). Meanwhile, private consumption is expected to remain strong amid favorable labor market conditions and moderating inflation.


Lower global commodity prices but rising domestic demand pressures would complicate inflation dynamics. Global commodity prices are expected to remain on a moderating trend as the supply shocks in recent years subside. However, heightened geopolitical tensions affecting key commodity-producing economies would keep commodity prices elevated. The end of the US interest rate hiking cycle should limit further currency depreciations against the US dollar and reduce imported inflation for ASEAN+3 economies. Notwithstanding these downward pressures, disinflation is likely to progress at a slow pace due to offsetting domestic factors. Core inflation in some economies will likely remain high due to strong demand pressures—the output gap has turned positive in several economies in 2024 and is projected to widen further in 2025 (Figure 1.47). Administrative adjustments to domestic prices—such as subsidy cuts in Thailand and Malaysia, and the increase in Goods and Services Tax in Singapore—could put additional upward pressure on prices.

**Figure 1.45. United States: Real Private Consumption Expenditure (Percent, year-on-year)**




Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; AMRO staff estimates.

**Figure 1.46. Selected ASEAN+3: International Flight Arrivals (Index, December 2019 = 100)**



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand. Brunei, Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam are excluded due to data unavailability. Data for Japan include both arrivals and departures. Data for Indonesia refer to departures only.

**Figure 1.47. Selected ASEAN+3: Output Gap, 2024–2025 (Percent, 2024 and 2025)**



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Output gap is calculated as (actual output-potential output)/potential output. Potential output is estimated using a 2-sided HP filter on quarterly GDP data from 2010 to 2025. AMRO staff projections are used for GDP in 2024 and 2025.

**Box 1.4:****Will Risks China Faced in 2023 Carry Over to 2024?**

China's 2023 economic recovery was bumpy, marked by a delayed consumption pick-up, real estate sector challenges, subdued external trade, and cautious sentiment. The effects of the pandemic lingered for several months after the economy reopened. The much-anticipated 'revenge' consumption rebound did not fully materialize as households remained cautious, and investment was hampered by subdued business sentiment and strains in the real estate sector (Figure 1.4.1). Some sectors also faced significant supply chain challenges, including related to adverse geopolitical events and tensions between China and the United States.

Despite the challenging conditions, China's economy grew by 5.2 percent, reflecting its resilience in various aspects. Policy measures implemented by Chinese authorities played a crucial role in keeping the economic recovery broadly on track. Labor market conditions improved gradually, with the urban surveyed unemployment falling significantly to 5.2 percent in 2023, and per capita disposal income rising by more than 6 percent. These positive developments supported household spending, which remained resilient throughout the year. Enterprises in strategic emerging industries continued to thrive in many provinces and cities.


China's growth momentum is expected to pick up moderately in 2024. China's macro fundamentals remain sound, paving the way for a more stable economic recovery in 2024 following the challenges of 2023. Consumption should remain the primary driver of growth, supported by further improvements in labor market conditions. Investment is anticipated to gain greater traction in the later part of 2024, driven by the expansion of traditional infrastructure, the construction of modern and advanced infrastructure, and substantial investments in high-tech manufacturing and services. Real estate investments are expected to recover gradually as overall conditions in the sector improve and confidence starts to return. The real estate sector has seen nascent signs of stabilization with prices for Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities bottoming out (Figure 1.4.2). The property sector's drag on growth has halved from -3.7 percent in

2022 to -1.8 percent in 2023, and is on track to diminish further in 2024. Exports are forecast to pick up, benefitting from the global electronics cycle turnaround and providing a further lift to growth.


However, China's outlook is subject to some risks and uncertainties. The real estate recovery requires careful management to alleviate strains related to overstretched property developers and to restore confidence. Financial strains faced by some local governments may also persist. Concurrently, high leverage remains a vulnerability in certain sectors of the economy. Orderly deleveraging is therefore necessary to enable enterprises—particularly small and medium-sized ones—to become more financially resilient, invest more, and enhance their competitiveness. Globally, forces driving geoeconomic fragmentation could remain formidable. In this regard, China's efforts to strengthen cooperation with partner economies to shape conditions for trade, investments, and technological gains should yield good results. At the same time, perennial challenges, such as those related to population aging, socioeconomic disparities, and climate change, could weigh on the economy's growth potential.

China has ample policy space and capacity to navigate through these challenges. Fiscal soundness remains intact amid continued efforts at fiscal consolidation (Figure 1.4.3). China's external position remains robust, characterized by a healthy current account surplus and substantial foreign currency reserves (Figure 1.4.4). Domestically, China hosts well-organized and efficient supply production networks and supply chains—enabling it to mitigate the effects of intermittent global supply chain disruptions and continue supporting regional production and trade. On the financial front, the banking system continues to be well-capitalized (Figure 1.4.5). China therefore continues to have moderate room to ease monetary and credit policies further. In addition to the recent approach of measuredly reducing the reserve ratio requirements and loan prime rates for banks, the authorities continue to have many macroprudential levers at their disposal to support the domestic economy, particularly the real estate sector's recovery (AMRO 2024b).


**Figure 1.4.1. China: GDP Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year; percentage points)




**Figure 1.4.2. China: Property Price Index, by City Tiers**  
(Percent, year-on-year)




**Figure 1.4.3. China: General Public Budgetary Account Balance**  
(Percent of GDP)



**Figure 1.4.4. China: Balance of Payments**  
(Trillions of US dollars; percent of GDP)



**Figure 1.4.5. China: Banking System Capital Adequacy Ratio**  
(Percent)




### III. Risks to the Outlook: Uncertainties Remain

The overall balance of risk to the region's outlook is tilted to the downside, with a spike in global commodity prices—especially food—a key macroeconomic risk. In the financial markets, the spillover risk from tighter US monetary policy has subsided since the middle of 2023. However, the risk of increased volatility in asset prices and capital flows has become more salient especially given the ongoing campaign in the US presidential election in 2024, potentially

heightening market uncertainties and/or amplifying systemic risks. At the same time, the risk of a sharper-than-expected moderation in the growth of major economies has receded but cannot be ruled out, compounding uncertainty in the growth outlook of the region.

The key risks facing the region are summarized in AMRO's Regional Risk Map (Figure 1.48).

**Figure 1.48. Regional Risk Map, April 2024**



Source: AMRO staff.

Note: The Regional Risk Map captures those risks and challenges that could derail the region's macro-stability. These are in relation to (1) growth and inflation outlook, (2) financial stability concerns, and (3) other key long-term challenges. The risks and challenges are divided into two categories; (1) short-term risks (these are conjunctural risks, up to 2 years, where the risks represent scenarios that could materially alter the baseline path), and (2) long-term risks (these are more persistent or secular trends and/or challenges, including perennial risks).

- **Spike in global commodity prices.** The risk of significant spikes in global commodity prices, fueled by a combination of weather-related and geopolitical factors in 2024, remains salient. 2024 may mark another record for high global temperatures, primarily attributed to the El Niño weather pattern, which typically peaks in winter and contributes to an increase in the global mean temperature. A worse-than-expected El Niño could significantly alter rainfall patterns and temperatures, potentially impacting the global supply of key food commodities such as grains, vegetable oils, and sugar in the upcoming months. Such changes could raise global food prices, exacerbated by additional protectionist measures on exports, especially of staple foods. Global energy and transportation costs are also at risk of surging, particularly if conflicts in the Middle East and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict intensify or should crucial sea routes be disrupted. As most economies in the region are net importers of commodities, these developments would contribute to a resurgence in inflation pressures.
- **Slower economic growth in China.** Economic growth in China remains resilient and is benefiting from the government's supportive policies, but pockets of vulnerability persist. The real estate sector, in particular, which is a significant contributor to GDP and household wealth, continues to display signs of weakness. Protracted weakness in the property sector could pose risks to the financial system. Additionally, local government fiscal strains could limit the capacity for further policy interventions to support the economy. A notable slowdown in China's economic growth, hypothetically, falling to 4.3 percent in 2024—a full percentage point below the baseline forecast—could significantly impact the broader ASEAN+3 region. This decline could result in a 1.7 percentage point reduction in aggregate growth for these economies, due to decreases in trade, investment, and tourism.


- Adverse spillovers from US presidential election.** As the US presidential election progresses through 2024, heated populist debates during the campaign period could lead to heightening of protectionist sentiments and greater uncertainty in future policy directions of the United States. In particular, a spike in risk aversion following potential changes in major policy directions and/or geopolitical shifts could trigger swift and unpredictable market reactions, leading to sharp fluctuations in asset prices and volatile capital flows, affecting regional emerging economies that are often more susceptible to external shocks.
- Sharp growth slowdown in the US and Europe.** The likelihood of recession in both the United States and Europe has receded compared to last year. However, if inflation remains elevated and interest rates stay higher for longer, these economies could experience a sharper growth moderation and new financial vulnerabilities, especially in the commercial property sector and the credit market. If growth in the United States and Europe were to be lower by one percentage point in 2024, ASEAN+3 growth could be reduced by a third—posting a similar growth as in 2022, when some regional economies have not fully reopened (Figure 1.49).

Over the longer-term risk horizon, ASEAN+3 faces a complex interplay of deeper structural and perennial challenges that could have consequential impact

on macroeconomic and financial stability of the region. Chief among these is the risk of escalating geoeconomic confrontations and continued heightening of global geopolitical tensions. These tensions are reshaping trade links and investment flows, and presenting significant policy challenges and uncertainties. This could potentially disrupt existing economic relationships and force countries to deal with a complicated mix of alliances and economic policies, which could result in a more fragmented and unstable economic environment. This challenge is explored more fully in Chapter 2: Navigating Tomorrow.

Alongside this concern, other long-term risks persist. The region's efforts with climate change mitigation and adaptation remain critical, given its vulnerability to environmental disasters and extreme weather events. Natural disasters exacerbate these challenges, directly impacting economies and livelihoods. Cybersecurity threats and the unintended consequences of advanced technologies also pose significant risks, affecting everything from financial stability to privacy. Lastly, the region's response to infectious disease outbreaks, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, underscores the importance of enhancing healthcare systems and preparedness. The risk of another pandemic cannot be downplayed—the likelihood of a recurrence of another pandemic like COVID-19 in the next 25 years is predicted to be about 50 percent (UNDP 2023).

**Figure 1.49. Selected ASEAN+3: Impact of 1 Percentage Point Lower Growth in the US and Europe on Baseline GDP Growth (Percentage points, 2024)**



Source: Oxford Economics Global Economics Model; AMRO staff estimations.  
 Note: ASEAN-6 = Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam; Plus-3 = China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea. Estimates refer to the impact on Plus-3 and ASEAN-6 economies, which account for 99 percent of ASEAN+3's GDP in 2022 (purchasing power parity basis). Remaining economies are omitted due to data unavailability.

## IV. Policy Considerations: To Prepare for Tomorrow

Looking ahead, growth in ASEAN+3 is expected to remain resilient, with gradually moderating inflation. The region grew at a faster pace in 2023, as robust domestic demand offset weak external demand. Growth momentum is projected to be sustained in 2024, with strengthening exports expected to provide more impetus for growth. Inflation in the region moderated in 2023 and that is expected to continue in 2024. However, upside risks to inflation remain salient due to geopolitical tensions, adverse weather conditions, and strengthening domestic demand pressure.


The positive growth prospects for ASEAN+3 offer a timely opportunity to rebuild policy space. Most regional authorities continued to consolidate fiscal positions in FY2023. Despite ongoing efforts, some regional economies have only partially recovered the policy space lost in the pandemic (Figure 1.50). Fiscal deficits are expected to narrow for most regional economies in FY2024, with the fiscal stance in most economies assessed as contractionary or neutral, with the exception of Brunei and Lao PDR (Table 1.2). In the short term, fiscal policy should continue to strike the right balance between restoring fiscal buffers and supporting growth. Delays in fiscal consolidation could heighten market concerns about public debt sustainability, given the higher debt-to-GDP ratios in most regional economies (Box 1.5).

Monetary policy remains tight in most regional economies amid moderating but elevated inflation. As of December 2023, central banks in the region, except for China and

Vietnam, kept policy interest rates equal or higher than their pre-pandemic levels. The overall pace of monetary tightening slowed toward the end of 2023 on signs that headline inflation has peaked. For China and Vietnam, monetary policy was progressively eased throughout the year to support growth (Figure 1.51). Going forward, the uneven pace of disinflation amid upside risks to inflation would warrant careful monetary policy adjustments (Box 1.6). In economies where core inflation remains high, central banks should keep policy rates sufficiently restrictive to ensure that inflation expectations remain well-anchored. On the other hand, monetary policy stance can be more accommodative in economies that face rapid disinflation amid lackluster growth momentum. Concurrently, the change of monetary policy framework in Japan to mitigate the rising disconnect between the easy monetary policy stance and still elevated inflation could have important but manageable impact on the rest of the region (Box 1.7).

Targeted credit policies continue to support vulnerable sectors. Although pandemic-related extraordinary credit policies have generally been withdrawn, many regional authorities are still maintaining some form of targeted credit support for sectors badly impacted by the pandemic. These measures include credit guarantees for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in hospitality services and other sectors. In some regional economies, financial institutions are also given the flexibility to tailor targeted credit solutions (including loan restructuring) to help businesses adjust to the new normal.


**Figure 1.50. ASEAN+3: Assessment of Policy Space to Support Economy, 2024 Compared to 2019**



Source: AMRO staff, based on Poonpatpibul and others (2020).

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. This framework does not take into account the ability and capacity of monetary authorities to undertake unconventional monetary policy.

**Figure 1.51. Selected ASEAN+3: Cumulative Changes in Policy Interest Rates**  
(Basis points)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.

Note: Data are up to December 2023. Policy rates refer to seven-day repo rate (China); seven-day reverse repo rate (Indonesia); base rate (Korea); overnight policy rate (Malaysia); overnight reverse repo rate (the Philippines); one-day repurchase rate (Thailand); refinancing rate (Vietnam).

**Table 1.2. ASEAN+3 Policy Matrix: AMRO Staff Assessment of Current Policy Stance and Recommendations**

|             | Fiscal Policy              |                            |                   |                              | Monetary Policy            |                   |                   |                              |
|-------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
|             | 2023 Policy Stance         | 2024 Policy Stance         | 2024 Policy Space | Recommended Policy Direction | Current Monetary Policy    | 2023 Policy Space | 2024 Policy Space | Recommended Policy Direction |
| Brunei*     | Expansionary/Accommodative | Expansionary/Accommodative | Ample             | ↓                            | Limited                    | Limited           | Limited           | ↑                            |
| Cambodia    | Expansionary/Accommodative | Contractionary/Tight       | Moderate          | ↔                            | Expansionary/Accommodative | Limited           | Limited           | ↔                            |
| China       | Neutral                    | Neutral                    | Moderate          | ↔                            | Expansionary/Accommodative | Moderate          | Moderate          | ↔                            |
| Hong Kong*  | Contractionary/Tight       | Contractionary/Tight       | Ample             | ↔                            | Limited                    | Limited           | Limited           | ↑                            |
| Indonesia   | Contractionary/Tight       | Neutral                    | Moderate          | ↔                            | Limited                    | Moderate          | Moderate          | ↔                            |
| Japan*      | Expansionary/Accommodative | Contractionary/Tight       | Limited           | ↓                            | Expansionary/Accommodative | Limited           | Limited           | ↓                            |
| Korea       | Contractionary/Tight       | Neutral                    | Moderate          | ↔                            | Limited                    | Moderate          | Moderate          | ↔                            |
| Lao PDR     | Contractionary/Tight       | Expansionary/Accommodative | Limited           | ↓                            | Expansionary/Accommodative | Limited           | Limited           | ↓                            |
| Malaysia    | Contractionary/Tight       | Neutral                    | Moderate          | ↓                            | Neutral                    | Moderate          | Moderate          | ↔                            |
| Myanmar*    | Expansionary/Accommodative | Contractionary/Tight       | Limited           | ↓                            | Limited                    | Limited           | Limited           | ↔                            |
| Philippines | Contractionary/Tight       | Contractionary/Tight       | Moderate          | ↔                            | Contractionary/Tight       | Moderate          | Limited           | ↔                            |
| Singapore*  | Expansionary/Accommodative | Neutral                    | Ample             | ↔                            | Contractionary/Tight       | Moderate          | Moderate          | ↔                            |
| Thailand*   | Contractionary/Tight       | Contractionary/Tight       | Moderate          | ↔                            | Neutral                    | Moderate          | Moderate          | ↔                            |
| Vietnam     | Expansionary/Accommodative | Neutral                    | Moderate          | ↓                            | Expansionary/Accommodative | Moderate          | Moderate          | ↓                            |

**Legend:**

**AMRO's assessment of current policy stance**

|                            |
|----------------------------|
| Expansionary/Accommodative |
| Neutral                    |
| Contractionary/Tight       |

**AMRO's recommendation**

**Expand**

|   |                                           |
|---|-------------------------------------------|
| ↑ | Expand more/more accommodative            |
| ↓ | Expand less/less accommodative            |
| ↔ | Maintain current expansion /accommodation |

**Tighten**

|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| ↓ | Tighten more        |
| ↑ | Tighten less        |
| ↔ | Maintain tightening |

**Neutral**

|   |                  |
|---|------------------|
| ↑ | Easing bias      |
| ↓ | Tightening bias  |
| ↔ | Maintain neutral |

Note: Asterisk (\*) denotes fiscal year from 1 April to 31 March. Fiscal policy stance is assessed by the fiscal impulse based on structural primary balance. The fiscal policy stance in 2023 is based on 2023 estimates, while the fiscal stance in 2024 is based on the 2024 budget. For Brunei and Hong Kong which have a currency board arrangement, the current monetary stance refers to current monetary condition. Data are up to 26 March 2024.

**Box 1.5:****Fiscal Policy: Recent Developments and Outlook**

Most regional authorities shifted to consolidate their fiscal positions in 2023, although at different paces, leading to some variations in fiscal outcomes. In Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the fiscal balances continued to improve as the deficit narrowed in FY2023. Similarly, the improvement in fiscal balances resumed in China and Hong Kong, benefiting from the economic reopening. In Korea, the withdrawal of temporary income support measures contributed to better fiscal outcomes. Despite these positive developments, fiscal deficits across most regional economies are still bigger than pre-pandemic levels. In contrast, falling oil and gas revenue in Brunei and the expansion of capital spending in Cambodia and Myanmar resulted in a worsening of their fiscal deficits in FY2023 (Figure 1.5.1).


Regional authorities are seeking to further improve their fiscal positions in FY2024. Based on announced budgets for FY2024, fiscal deficits are expected to narrow in most regional economies (Figure 1.5.2). Stronger economic activities will contribute to robust revenue growth, supported by digitalizing tax administration and payments. Expenditure is also planned to increase, albeit to a lesser extent, in order to address post-pandemic spending priorities. As a result, the fiscal stance in FY2024 is assessed as contractionary or neutral, except in Brunei and Lao PDR (Table 1.5.1).

ASEAN+3 member authorities should strike a careful balance between restoring fiscal buffers and carrying out active fiscal policy in the near term. Deteriorated

fiscal position due to unprecedented fiscal stimulus and sizable revenue shortfalls during the pandemic underscore the urgent need to rebuild policy space. Delays in fiscal consolidation amid higher financing costs could heighten concerns about debt sustainability, as government debt-to-GDP ratios and debt service burden have increased sharply in some regional economies, subjecting them to market scrutiny (Figure 1.5.3). While fiscal policy should transition from its extended crisis mode to its fundamental role in promoting growth and fostering inclusiveness, continuing uncertainties in the near term calls for a flexible and agile fiscal policy response.


Strengthening fiscal consolidation over the medium term would be crucial to safeguard fiscal sustainability. Establishing clear fiscal consolidation targets and schedules, coupled with a strong commitment, would be crucial in guiding medium-term fiscal consolidation plans. In formulating policy measures for fiscal consolidation, the authorities should not only focus on reducing the primary deficit through revenue-enhancing measures and expenditure restructuring or reform, but also implement initiatives to enhance growth potential to achieve more favorable debt dynamics. For economies with a high share of foreign currency debt, policies to maintain exchange rate stability, such as tight monetary and fiscal policies, are particularly important. In addition, addressing long-term structural challenges calls for more pre-emptive roles of fiscal policy, including in preparing for the aged and post-aged populations in ASEAN+3 in the next 10 to 20 years, and tackling critical climate change adaptation and mitigation needs of the region.

Figure 1.5.1. ASEAN+3: Fiscal Balance, FY2019–2023  
(Percent of GDP)



Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. (1) Fiscal balance for Korea represents the fiscal balance including social security funds; (2) Fiscal balance for Singapore is based on the overall budget surplus/deficit, excluding capitalization and depreciation of nationally significant infrastructure from the overall fiscal position.

Figure 1.5.2. ASEAN+3: Contribution to the Change in Fiscal Balance, FY2024  
(Percent of GDP)




Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; FY = fiscal year; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. The FY2024 budget is not available for Myanmar.

Table 1.5.1. ASEAN+3: Fiscal Stance, FY2023–2024

|        |                | FY2024       |            |                |
|--------|----------------|--------------|------------|----------------|
|        |                | Expansionary | Neutral    | Contractionary |
| FY2023 | Expansionary   | BN           | SG, VN     | KH, JP, MM     |
|        | Neutral        |              | CN         |                |
|        | Contractionary | LA           | ID, KR, MY | HK, PH, TH     |

Source: AMRO staff assessment.  
Note: FY = fiscal year. AMRO assesses the fiscal stance by fiscal impulse, measured by the changes in structural primary balance. The fiscal stance of Brunei is assessed by the change in primary expenditure as its revenue is heavily dependent on oil and gas prices. The FY2024 budget is not available for Myanmar. Data are up to 26 March 2024.

Figure 1.5.3. ASEAN+3: Gross Government Debt, FY2019–2023  
(Percent of GDP)



Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates  
Note: CN = China; FY = fiscal year; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Brunei is not shown as it has almost zero government debt.

**Box 1.6:****Estimating the Neutral Rate of Interest for Selected ASEAN+3 Economies**

The neutral rate of interest, or R-star, is the short-term real interest rate that prevails when the economy is at full employment and stable inflation. It is the equilibrium interest rate at which monetary policy is neither contractionary nor expansionary. Knowing the level of R-star helps policymakers assess the potential impact of their monetary policy decisions. While it is an important reference in the conduct of monetary policy, R-star is not directly observable. It can only be inferred from macroeconomic empirical models.

Long-term trends in the short-term real interest rate can provide insights to the levels of R-star, especially when monetary policy decisions align with a variant of the Taylor Rule. In such cases, policy instruments are adjusted in response to inflation pressures and excessive demand, and the policy actions are effectively transmitted through to economic activity and prices (Fujiwara and others 2016). The interest rate is a key monetary policy instrument for several ASEAN+3 economies—China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand (AMRO 2023a).<sup>1</sup> For these economies, except for Malaysia and Thailand, short-term real interest rates trended downward in the two decades preceding the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1.6.1). These trends are consistent with the decreasing pattern in our R-star estimates, as well as with studies that find similar declines in R-stars across both advanced and emerging market economies (IMF 2023; Obstfeld 2023). The concurrent downshift in R-stars has been attributed to common macroeconomic and financial forces such as demographic transitions, productivity slowdowns, and the scarcity of safe assets.

Real interest rates of ASEAN+3 economies experienced heightened volatility during the COVID-19 pandemic. They fell to exceptionally low levels in 2021–2022 in the wake of large policy rate cuts to counter the impact of the pandemic. Rising inflation subsequently prompted policy rate hikes—in Korea since August 2021, and in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand since May or August 2022. As a result, real rates have picked up in these economies in more recent periods.

Where does monetary policy in ASEAN+3 economies stand at the current juncture? Latest R-star estimates are derived from the widely used Laubach-Williams model that has been augmented to account for the large and persistent COVID-19 shock (Holston, Laubach, and Williams 2023; henceforth, HLW).<sup>2</sup> While the HLW model is a closed economy model that is more applicable to advanced economies, the estimates—when combined with expert judgment—can serve as a useful benchmark in assessing the monetary policy stance for some of the ASEAN+3 economies.

The R-star estimates are highly imprecise and sensitive to model specification, as noted by the model proponents themselves (Holston, Laubach, and Williams 2017). To compensate, a range of R-star estimates is obtained for each of the seven ASEAN+3 economies; the estimates are then averaged over the first three quarters of 2023.<sup>3</sup> The current stance of monetary policy is summarized as follows:

This box was written by Diana del Rosario, Yin Fai Ho, and Michael Wynn, with inputs from Jinho Choi, Suan Yong Foo, Xu (Kimi) Jiang, Jungsung Kim, Justin Lim, Allen Ng, Thi Kim Cuc Nguyen, and Heung Chun (Andrew) Tsang.

<sup>1/</sup> The other ASEAN+3 economies, which do not use the domestic interest rate as a key monetary policy instrument, are omitted.

<sup>2/</sup> The HLW model is a semi-structural model that identifies R-star from a set of relationships consistent with the New Keynesian framework (see Holston, Laubach, and Williams 2023; Choi and Kim forthcoming).


<sup>3/</sup> The range of estimates for each economy is derived from adjusting model parameters (particularly, the constraints for the slopes of the investment-saving (IS) and Phillips curves and the coefficient of the COVID-19 variable) and seasonally adjusted inflation metrics (headline or core inflation, and year-on-year or quarter-on-quarter transformations). Derived estimates are subject to model convergence and screened based on economist judgment. It is important to note that the results are indicative only and not exhaustive of the findings from all possible model iterations. Nonetheless, AMRO's overall assessments of monetary conditions and monetary policy stance take a more comprehensive approach which goes beyond the estimates provided by this exercise.

- **China** and **Japan** exhibit an accommodative monetary policy stance, i.e., the 1-quarter and 1-year ahead R-star estimates surpass the economies’ respective measures of the real interest rate (Figure 1.6.2). Choi and Kim (2023) reached the same conclusion for Japan, advocating for the Bank of Japan to gradually normalize its ultra-easy monetary policy.
- The monetary policy stance of the **Philippines** and **Thailand** are characterized as borderline neutral to restrictive. For these two economies, the 1-quarter ahead real rates are higher than the R-star range, suggesting tight monetary conditions. However, the 1-year ahead real rates are close to the upper bound of the R-star estimate as inflation rates for the Philippines and

Thailand are expected to approach the midpoint of their respective target bands.


- **Indonesia** and **Korea** have contractionary monetary policy stances—the real interest rates are significantly higher than the estimated range of R-star. The increase in real interest rates reflect moderating inflation and multiple policy rate increases.
- For **Malaysia**, the assessment is less conclusive and dependent on the real interest rate metric. With the real interest rate metrics hovering around both ends of the range of Malaysia’s R-star estimates, Bank Negara Malaysia may have some flexibility to either maintain the policy rate in 2024 or raise it should inflation surprise to the upside.

**Figure 1.6.1. Selected ASEAN+3: Estimated R-star and Short-term Real Interest Rate, 2000–2023 (Percent)**



Source: International Monetary Fund and national authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.  
Note: CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; TH = Thailand. R-stars are median estimates by AMRO staff based on the HLW model. Real interest rate is the nominal policy rate adjusted for the average of headline inflation in the current quarter and the next.

**Figure 1.6.2. Selected ASEAN+3: Estimated R-star and Short-term Real Interest Rates, Q1–Q3 2023 (Percent)**



Source: International Monetary Fund and national authorities via Haver Analytics; Bloomberg, AMRO staff estimates.  
Note: CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; TH = Thailand. Estimated R-stars are based on the average of the first three quarters of 2023. Real rate metrics are based on the latest policy rate adjusted for Bloomberg’s median forecast for 1-year ahead and AMRO’s headline inflation forecasts for 1-quarter ahead.

**Box 1.7:****Japan's Yield Curve Control Policy: A Rethink and Its Significance**

The Bank of Japan (BOJ) adopted the Yield Curve Control (YCC) policy in September 2016, with the aim to anchor long-term interest rates at zero percent. The BOJ introduced the Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP) in January 2016 initially to put downward pressure on short-term interest rates and raising inflation expectations. However, not only did short-term interest rates fall into negative territory, but the yield curve flattened, and long-term interest rates also dropped below zero percent. When concerns emerged that the compression in interest

rate margins would undermine the profitability of financial institutions, the BOJ implemented the YCC<sup>1</sup> framework to make monetary easing more sustainable. Operationally, this entailed switching from quantity to interest rate targeting. The YCC was aimed at shaping the yield curve by keeping the short-term policy interest rate at –0.1 percent and targeting the long-term interest rate—the yield on the 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) at about 0 percent by buying JGBs along the entire yield curve.

**How the adjustments and exit of Japan's YCC affect the domestic economy**

The BOJ typically maintained close control over the term structure of interest rates with the YCC policy. In July 2018, the former Governor Kuroda mentioned in the press conference that 10-year JGB yields were expected to move around  $\pm 0.1$  percent with the possibility of fluctuations up or down at twice that level (i.e. around  $\pm 0.2$  percent). The allowance band was subsequently decided to be 0.25 percent in March 2021. Strict control of the YCC has come at the expense of a sharp decline in bond market liquidity, consequently diminishing the role of the bond market in setting the price of government bonds and determining the yield curve. For instance, since the Fed began its interest rate tightening cycle in early 2022, 10-year JGB yields have persistently been under upward pressures, occasionally hitting the upper bound (Figure 1.7.1). The heightened volatility in overseas financial and capital markets triggered by the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in March 2023 subsequently caused significant disruptions in the functioning of the JGB market. Bid-ask spreads widened and correlations between the spot and

futures prices of JGBs weakened, impeding the smooth formation of the entire yield curve.

In recent times, the BOJ has increased the flexibility of its YCC policy to mitigate the side effects of prolonged monetary easing on financial markets amid upward yield pressures. In December 2022, the BOJ unexpectedly doubled the band width to 0.5 percent above or below the target of 0 percent in response to rising yields and continued deterioration in bond market functioning.<sup>2</sup> This move aimed to enhance bond market functioning, addressing issues arising from the deterioration in liquidity and the disruption of the price discovery function (Figure 1.7.2). In July 2023, the BOJ decided to conduct YCC with greater flexibility, effectively raising the upper bound from 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent. In October 2023, the BOJ further increased the flexibility of the YCC by regarding the 1.0 percent upper bound as a “reference”. Many financial market players viewed the recent policy tweaks to the YCC framework as indicative steps towards a formal exit from the YCC policy framework.

This box was written by Jinho Choi and Wee Chian Koh.

<sup>1/</sup> YCC is not a widely used monetary policy tool. Besides the BOJ, only the Fed (during and after World War II) and the Reserve Bank of Australia (during the COVID-19 pandemic) have employed YCC.


<sup>2/</sup> After decades of bond purchases, the BOJ had crowded the market, with its JGB holdings making up more than half of outstanding JGBs. There were emerging signs of bond market illiquidity such as reduced trading volumes and price distortions. The BOJ's bond market survey showed that the diffusion index for the degree of bond market functioning from the surveyed institutions' viewpoint declined to minus 64 percentage points in Q1 2023 from minus 21 percentage points in Q1 2022.

On 19 March 2024, the BOJ decided to terminate its NIRP and YCC on the basis of the virtuous cycle between wages and prices. Japan's CPI inflation has moderated from its peak in 2023 but continues to be relatively high (Figure 1.7.3). In particular, the "core-core" CPI (less fresh food and energy) has surged to around 4 percent (year-on-year) since April 2023, as the passthrough effects of high commodity prices and a weak yen strengthened with some time lag. The BOJ has judged that achieving its inflation target in a stable and sustainable manner has come in sight, thus lifting its negative interest rate policy and resetting the short-term policy rate to 0–0.1 percent. It emphasized that high nominal wage growth is likely to be sustained due to improving corporate profits and tight labor market conditions, as reflected

in this year's annual spring labor-management wage negotiation results. For the time being, the BOJ maintains its accommodative policy stance despite its first rate hike in nearly two decades.


The BOJ's exit from the YCC and NIRP may lead to a rise in interest rates, which would help improve the profitability of financial institutions. The timing for the next rate hike is contingent upon sustained growth of nominal wages and its subsequent impact on overall price levels, particularly in services, which have historically been low. With the termination of the YCC and NIRP, long-term interest rates are expected to rise which would have a positive impact on financial institutions' profitability as the increase in net interest incomes is expected to offset

**Figure 1.7.1. Japan: 10-year JGB Yield (Percent)**




Source: Bank of Japan; Japan Ministry of Finance.  
Note: JGBs = Japanese Government Bonds; NIRP = Negative Interest Rate Policy; QE = Quantitative and Qualitative Easing; YCC = Yield Curve Control.

**Figure 1.7.2. Japan: JGB Yield Curve, Before and after the BOJ's Monetary Policy Meeting on 19–20 December 2022 (Percent per year)**




Source: Ministry of Finance Japan; AMRO staff calculation.  
Note: JGBs = Japanese Government Bonds. Yields for long-term maturities were linearly interpolated using the 10-year, 15-year, 20-year, 25-year, and 30-year yields.

**Figure 1.7.3. Japan: Core CPI and Nominal Wage Inflation (Percent, year-on-year)**



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CPI = consumer price inflation.

**Figure 1.7.4. Japan: Outstanding JGBs and Interest Payments (Trillions of yen; percent per year)**



Source: Ministry of Finance Japan; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: JGBs = Japanese Government Bonds. The effective interest rates were calculated as the proportion of annual interest payments relative to the outstanding JGBs from the previous year.

the unrealized losses in bond investments. Bond market functions will also improve significantly with enhanced liquidity and price discovery, especially for JGBs, as domestic financial institutions have large demands for long-term JGBs with higher coupons.

In contrast, higher long-term interest rates would increase debt servicing costs of Japan's high government debt. Japan's government debt rose to 261 percent of GDP in fiscal 2022 from 239 percent in

fiscal 2019, due mainly to large pandemic-related fiscal stimulus. However, the government's interest payments have remained low, due to the very low interest rates in JGBs during the YCC period (Figure 1.7.4). The recent YCC adjustments have resulted in an uptick in long-term JGB yields. With the termination of the YCC and NIRP, higher interest rates would gradually increase the financing costs for new JGB issuances, and so raise the effective interest rate.

## What the end of Japan's YCC could mean for global markets


Markets are concerned about the risks posed by a strong repatriation of Japan's foreign portfolio assets. Japanese investors hold very large quantities of global assets, reflecting decades of foreign bonds purchases in response to low yields domestically. Total holdings of foreign bonds by Japanese residents—even after excluding the economy's USD 1.1 trillion official reserve holdings—amounted to about USD 3 trillion at its peak in 2021. Japanese investors are by far the biggest foreign owners of US Treasuries and hold a large share of French, Australian, and UK debt securities as well (Figure 1.7.5). An end to Japan's YCC policy and the expected rise in long-term JGB yields could incentivize Japanese institutions to shift investments back to Japan, which would drive up global bond yields and tighten global financial conditions.

However, a rise in long-term JGB yields may not necessarily pose trouble for global markets. Japanese investors sold large amounts of foreign bonds in 2022 as the high US dollar hedging costs more than offset the returns from interest rate yield differentials between long-term foreign bonds and JGBs. The sales were largely driven by hedging activities of institutional investors such as banks and life insurers (Figure 1.7.6). Yet, the reduction in Japanese foreign bond demand has had limited impact on global markets. Japanese investors subsequently resumed buying foreign bonds in 2023. With hedging costs expected to fall in 2024 as central banks cut interest rates, long-term JGB yields would have to rise significantly to offset the fall in hedging costs for a large-scale repatriation of Japanese foreign portfolio investments to occur. Under the scenario of a phased YCC exit, 10-year JGB yields are estimated to remain below 1 percent (AMRO 2024c).

A rapid unwinding of Japan's large foreign bond portfolio could still arise if there are unexpected shocks, but the risk is small. For instance, if JGB yields surge while hedging costs stay high, Japanese investors could face large capital losses on their JGB holdings as well as their hedged foreign bond holdings. Such a scenario could force these investors to sell the bonds at significant losses. To some extent, this risk is mitigated by the large passively managed investments of Japanese pension funds and life insurers under their benchmark asset allocations, which are not expected to change significantly due to short-term market shifts. Vulnerabilities could also lurk in nonbank financial institutions as shown in the liability-driven investment crisis in the United Kingdom's gilt market in 2022. This risk is currently low as a large share of Japanese bond holdings is "held-to-maturity" and recorded at amortized cost.


The yen would probably strengthen if the BOJ declares a turn to a tightening bias. A rise in JGB yields, amid an end to the Fed's tightening cycle, is expected to lead to an appreciation of the yen. This would weigh on the competitiveness of Japan's exports, although the impact may be limited since about 60 percent of exports are invoiced in foreign currency. Nonetheless, imported goods will become cheaper with a stronger yen, which would boost the exports of Japan's main trading partners, particularly China and the United States. Another important implication is the headwind to corporate profitability as the yen-value of overseas earnings of foreign subsidiaries will fall. This could slow the rally in Japanese stock markets, which have outperformed even the S&P 500 in 2023.

**Figure 1.7.5. Japan: Holdings of Foreign Bonds in 2022**  
(Billions of US dollars; percent)



Source: Haver Analytics; National authorities; AMRO staff calculations.

**Figure 1.7.6. Japan: Residents' Net Purchase of Foreign Bonds**  
(Billions of US dollars)



Source: BOJ; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data shows 12-month trailing sums.

## Opportune time to phase out YCC?


The BOJ's YCC exit taken place in a well-timed and smooth manner and is expected to alleviate the adverse effects on Japan's financial system. The confluence of heightened inflation, yen depreciation pressures, and side effects from prolonged ultra-easy monetary policy provided conducive conditions for the BOJ to reassess its YCC program. Although higher long-term interest rates will raise financing costs and lower yen-denominated overseas earning

of Japanese companies if the yen strengthens, the YCC exit is justified from the longer-term perspective. The BOJ's exit from the YCC will allow long-term JGB yields to move with market dynamics, and so improve how the JGB markets function and bolster the profitability of financial institutions. In the event that JGB yields rise sharply, some selling pressure in the global bond markets would be likely, but the potential disruptions are expected to be limited.

## V. Special Feature: The Long Recovery from COVID-19


The COVID-19 pandemic caused the sharpest contraction in GDP growth for ASEAN+3 in the past three decades. The region narrowly avoided recession and registered flat growth in 2020 (Figure 1.52). COVID-19 occurred at a time when regional GDP growth had already slowed to 5 percent a year, from an average of about 9 percent leading up to both the Asian financial crisis and the global financial crisis (Figure 1.53). While the initial recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic was stronger than after previous crises, growth for ASEAN+3 has since plateaued at 4.5 percent—lower than the pre-crisis growth rate and among the lowest regional growth rates in the past 30 years. The sustained lower growth raises concerns about the possibility of a prolonged period of reduced growth due in part to economic scarring caused by the pandemic.

**Figure 1.52. ASEAN+3: Real GDP Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: As most crises occur over one or two calendar years, the year with the lowest annual GDP growth among the affected years is used as reference year for the crises above. The reference year for the Asian financial crisis is therefore 1998; 2009 for the global financial crisis and 2020 for COVID-19.


**Figure 1.54. Selected ASEAN+3: Real GDP Trend**  
(Index, 2019 = 100)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: The pre-pandemic trend is estimated using a one-sided HP filter on quarterly data from Q1 2010 to Q4 2019 and extended to Q4 2023 using linear regression. The post-pandemic trend is estimated using a two-sided HP filter on quarterly data from Q1 2010 to Q4 2025, including AMRO-forecast GDP data. Aggregate trend is weighted using 2022 GDP. Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar are excluded due to data unavailability.


Despite the strong recovery in real GDP growth, ASEAN+3 is expanding at a slower rate than its pre-pandemic growth trend. Underlying growth of GDP, derived by removing the cyclical components, indicates that the region is growing at 3.5 percent a year, slower than the 4.2 percent growth recorded prior to the pandemic (Figure 1.54). Except Brunei and Japan, trend growth in most regional economies is lower by about one percentage point (Figure 1.55). This slower trend growth partly reflects ongoing post-pandemic adjustments, such as continuing efforts to rebuild businesses' balance sheets and the reconfiguration of labor dynamics. The series of shocks after 2020 and in the global economy and the sharp tightening of global monetary policy further dampened growth for the region. The pandemic's longer-term effect on productivity, due in part to learning losses, could further lower trend growth (AMRO 2022).

**Figure 1.53. ASEAN+3: Average Real GDP Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations and estimates.  
Note: The pre-crisis (post-crisis) period refers to the simple average of GDP growth in the five years before (after) 1998 for the Asian financial crisis; 2009 for the global financial crisis and 2020 for COVID-19. 2024 and 2025 GDP growth refers to AMRO's forecast.

**Figure 1.55. Selected ASEAN+3: GDP Trend Growth**  
(Percent)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. GDP trend growth refers to the average year-on-year growth of HP-filter detrended GDP. Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar are excluded due to data unavailability.

## Investment: Picking Up from a Deep Trough

Investment in most ASEAN+3 economies has yet to return to the pre-pandemic trend, in contrast to private consumption. While growth in both private consumption and investment remain below pre-pandemic trend for regional economies besides China and Thailand, the private consumption slowdown is less severe than that of investment (Figure 1.56). The decline in investment from its pre-pandemic trend is deeper than the trend declines in GDP and consumption (Figure 1.57). Stringent containment measures at the onset of the pandemic in 2020, including workplace closures and mobility restrictions, weighed on both investment and consumption activities (Figure 1.58). However, swift and substantial income and liquidity support to households helped mitigate the decline in household spending. Investment, on the other hand, came to a standstill. Mobility restrictions halted structures investment, while the synchronized global slowdown weighed on exports and dampened capital expenditure for machinery and equipment.


The pandemic impacted high-contact sectors, such as construction, disproportionately. Emphasis on physical distancing affected economic activities in high-contact sectors such as construction, retail trade, transportation and accommodation. The construction industry, vital for economic growth, was at a near-standstill due to mobility restrictions, remote working arrangements, disruptions in supply chains, delays in material deliveries, and prolonged project timelines. All these factors increased the cost of doing business and hampered new investments, while uncertainty about the pandemic recovery also eroded investor confidence. The slowdown in construction and social activities had cascading effects on related sectors, driving down demand for materials, labor, and services, and consequently generating spillover effects and simultaneous shocks (Das and others 2021).

Smaller firms were also more severely impacted by the pandemic. During the pandemic, smaller firms experienced a greater drop in sales revenue than large firms in the same sector and location (Adian and others 2020). These firms also have fewer financial buffers from

external financing or accumulated profits, limiting their ability to withstand prolonged shutdowns or demand shocks. Up to 70 percent of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, and Thailand had to suspend their operations, and up to two-thirds encountered a shortage of working capital during the pandemic (ADB 2020). The multiple shocks post-pandemic—lower global growth, high commodity prices, heightened financial market volatility—further weakened the cash flow and balance sheet for MSMEs. With MSMEs forming over 90 percent of businesses and employing more than half of the workforce in the region (Ong, Wei and Wong 2024), the lingering challenges of post-pandemic recovery not only weighed on overall investments but could also impact private consumption and broader export competitiveness.


Investment activity recovered more slowly than after the global financial crisis. While the negative impact on investment and the subsequent recovery was not as severe as the Asian financial crisis, investment recovery has been weak, particularly in ASEAN, relative to the aftermath of the global financial crisis. During crises, large fiscal stimulus packages were often directed toward infrastructure investment, providing a quick boost to investment and GDP growth (Green 2010). This approach could not be implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic as physical distancing incapacitated infrastructure construction which is labor-intensive. In addition, containment measures were kept in place almost throughout 2020 and 2021, delaying a return to investment activity. The financial distress among firms further limited investment capacity (Li and others 2020). The decline in investment growth was consequently much deeper and the recovery path was more challenging after COVID-19. Investment activity in ASEAN-5 took 11 quarters to return to pre-crisis levels, compared to only 2 quarters during the global financial crisis (Figure 1.59). Meanwhile, investment growth recovered at a similar pace as it did during the global financial crisis for Japan and Korea, although investment remained sluggish for China and Hong Kong due to the drag from the real estate sector (Figure 1.60).

**Figure 1.56. Selected ASEAN+3: Deviation of Investment and Private Consumption from Pre-pandemic Trend Level**  
(Percent of pre-pandemic trend, 2023)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand. Deviation is calculated as percentage difference between post-pandemic trend and pre-pandemic trend for 2023 average quarterly data (2023 yearly data for China). The pre-pandemic trend is estimated using a one-sided HP filter on quarterly data from Q1 2010 to Q4 2019 and extended to Q4 2023 using linear regression. The post-pandemic trend is estimated using one-sided HP filter on quarterly data from Q1 2010 to Q4 2023. Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are excluded due to data unavailability.


**Figure 1.57. Selected ASEAN+3: Deviation of GDP, Investment and Private Consumption from Pre-pandemic Trend Level**  
(Percent of pre-pandemic trend, 2023)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand. Deviation is calculated as percentage difference between post-pandemic trend and pre-pandemic trend for 2023 average quarterly data (2023 yearly data for Investment and Private Consumption of China). The pre-pandemic trend is estimated using a one-sided HP filter on quarterly data from Q1 2010 to Q4 2019 and extended to Q4 2023 using linear regression. The post-pandemic trend is estimated using one-sided HP filter on quarterly data from Q1 2010 to Q4 2023. Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam are excluded due to data unavailability.


**Figure 1.58. ASEAN+3: COVID-19 Containment Measures**  
(Number of economies)

#### Stay-at-home requirement




Source: Our World in Data; AMRO staff calculations.

#### Workplace closures




**Figure 1.59. Selected ASEAN+3: Level of Investment after Crises**  
(Index, 1997 = 100; 2008 = 100; 2019 = 100)

#### Plus-3 ex China




#### ASEAN-5




Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: As most crises occur over the span of one or two calendar years, the year with the lowest annual GDP growth among the affected years is used as reference year for the crises above. ASEAN-5 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. Brunei, Cambodia, China, Lao PDR and Vietnam are excluded due to data unavailability.

**Figure 1.60. Selected ASEAN+3: Level of Investment after Crises, by Economy**  
(Index, 1997=100; 2008 = 100; 2019 = 100)

### ASEAN-5



### Plus-3



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: As most crises occur over the span of one or two calendar years, the year with the lowest annual GDP growth among the affected years is used as reference year for the crises above. Annual data is used for China, with index average 1996–1997 = 100, average 2007–2008 = 100 and average 2018–2019 = 100. Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam are excluded due to data unavailability.

## Private Consumption: Fast Recovery Aided by Policy Support


Private consumption contracted marginally in 2020, the first time in the past 30 years. Private consumption fell from an average of 8 percent annual growth to –0.4 percent in 2020, double the 4-percentage point decline during the Asian financial crisis and global financial crisis (Figure 1.61). Most regional economies underwent prolonged—sometimes multiple—rounds of stringent mobility restrictions throughout 2020 and 2021. International borders only began to be reopened in the second quarter of 2022 (AMRO 2023a). The loss of household income due to disrupted employment and weakened consumer sentiment amid heightened anxiety weighed on private consumption in 2020 and 2021. Mobility restrictions and bans on social gatherings also eliminated services consumption.

However, household spending rebounded faster than in past crises due in part to policy support. ASEAN+3 governments swiftly disbursed sizable financial assistance to households as part of their fiscal stimulus. The reduction in interest rates and the introduction of moratoriums and other concessions on debt repayment helped to support household disposable income during the pandemic. The shift to working from home preserved employment income for some households, while a concurrent

rise of the platform-based economy (e.g., private hire transportation, food delivery services, and e-commerce) provided alternative income for others. Platform-based economy and digital payments also enabled continued goods and services consumption during and after the pandemic. Collectively, these measures helped to smoothen income fluctuations during the pandemic and allowed for a more seamless recovery once the economies reopened.

The rebound in private consumption across the region, however, masks underlying disparities. Private consumption has rebounded firmly in ASEAN-5 after mobility restrictions were removed (Figure 1.62). The recovery was more muted in the Plus-3 subregion, mainly reflecting lower real income growth and subdued consumer sentiments in China, Hong Kong, and Japan. Although the financial assistance programs supported the rebound in private consumption, they did not fully offset the negative impacts on the low-income households. In 2021, while the incomes of the top 60 percent in the global income distribution began to recover, those in the lowest 40 percent income bracket continued to experience disproportionate challenges. The largest income improvements were observed within the highest 20 percent income group (Narayan and others 2022).


**Figure 1.61. Selected ASEAN+3: Real Private Consumption Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Selected ASEAN+3 refers to Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. All other economies were excluded due to data unavailability. The reference year for the Asian financial crisis is 1998; 2009 for the global financial crisis, and 2020 for COVID-19.

**Figure 1.62. Selected ASEAN+3: Level of Private Consumption after Crises**  
(Index, start of crisis = 100)



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: As most crises occur over the span of one or two calendar years, the year with the lowest annual GDP growth among the affected years is used as reference year for the Asian financial crisis, global financial crisis and COVID-19. Stay-at-home requirements were implemented broadly across the region from the onset of the pandemic in Q1 2020 to Q4 2021, spanning eight quarters. Annual data is used for China, with index average 1996–1997 = 100, average 2007–2008 = 100 and average 2018–2019 = 100. Remaining economies are omitted due to data unavailability.

## Labor Market: A Relatively Speedy—but Incomplete—Recovery

Labor markets have recovered quicker than in past crises. Unemployment rates peaked at 3.5 percent in 2020 due to lockdowns and workplace closures, lower than the 3.8 percent seen a year after the Asian financial crisis (Figure 1.63). Policy support measures, such as job retention schemes and wage subsidies, helped to mitigate employment losses during the pandemic. As a result, unemployment rates across most ASEAN+3 economies have broadly recovered to pre-pandemic levels since economies reopened. Notably, labor market tightness has emerged in most economies. In Japan, Korea, and Singapore, unemployment rates fell while the ratio of job vacancies to unemployed persons increased concurrently, indicating high demand for workers (Figure 1.64). Furthermore, a significant decrease in the number of migrant workers in Singapore

and Malaysia in 2020 and 2021 exacerbated existing labor market tightness (Box 1.1).

However, COVID-19 had a more severe impact on labor force participation compared to past crises. The labor force participation rate (LFPR) declined across the region in 2020 (Figure 1.65). For most economies, the effects appear to be short-lived—LFPRs for most economies in 2022 exceeded 2019 levels. However, the recovery is uneven. In Hong Kong and China, LFPRs remain below pre-pandemic levels (Figure 1.66). The decline is especially severe in Hong Kong, where LFPR has fallen by about 2 percentage points since 2019. This is mainly attributable to an increase in the proportion of elderly persons as Hong Kong's population ages (AMRO 2024d). Meanwhile, LFPR has increased for other regional economies.


**Figure 1.63. ASEAN+3: Unemployment Rate (Percent)**



Source: World Bank via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.


Note: Data refers to the average unemployment rate across the ASEAN+3 economies. The reference year for the Asian financial crisis (AFC) is 1998; 2009 for the global financial crisis (GFC), and 2020 for COVID-19.

**Figure 1.64. Selected ASEAN+3: Job Vacancy to Unemployment Ratio (Index, 2019 = 100)**



Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia; National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.


**Figure 1.65. Selected ASEAN+3: Labor Force Participation Rate, 1997–2023 (Percent)**



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.

Note: AFC = Asian financial crisis; GFC = global financial crisis; HK = Hong Kong; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand.

**Figure 1.66. Selected ASEAN+3: Labor Force Participation Rate, 2019 versus 2022 (Percent)**



Source: National authorities via Haver Analytics.

Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; ID = Indonesia; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand.

The relatively fast labor market recovery is largely the result of extensive policy support measures implemented by regional economies. These measures include wage support for employers and employees in high-contact sectors, such as tourism, to reduce the necessity for layoffs. For example, Singapore's Job Support Scheme provided SGD 26.9 billion in wage support for firms to retain their employees, preventing an estimated 0.9 percentage point increase in the resident unemployment rate in 2020 (AMRO 2021). Economies across the region also implemented various fiscal measures to stimulate job creation. For instance, in April 2020, Hong Kong announced plans to create 30,000 jobs in 2020–2021, while Thailand introduced

a program in September 2020 to facilitate the hiring of 260,000 new graduates. These measures helped mitigate potential scarring effects of the pandemic on the region's labor force. At the same time, reducing job losses helped bolster household incomes, which supported the recovery in private consumption when economies reopened. However, while aggregate employment has broadly recovered, labor market scarring could still exist through lower job quality and underemployment, especially with the rapid growth of the gig economy during the pandemic. In the Philippines, for example, the share of occupations with low and irregular pay have risen to above pre-pandemic levels (World Bank 2023b).

## Policy Priorities: Rebuilding for a Better Tomorrow

Four years after the pandemic began, the still highly shock-prone operating landscape calls for a careful balancing of rebuilding policy space and providing policy support. After an unprecedented scale of fiscal spending, ongoing fiscal consolidation should prioritize structural reforms, to offset the temporary contractionary impact of fiscal adjustments and structurally enhance long-term growth potential (Andriansyah and Hong 2022). Monetary policy normalization—while necessary—should strive to maintain investor confidence while anchoring inflation expectations. A stable macroeconomic environment will support the investment recovery momentum, crucial for steering growth back to its pre-pandemic trend without triggering adverse shocks.

Boosting investment in productive sectors would be crucial in raising GDP growth back to pre-pandemic trend growth. The impact of the pandemic on firms has been uneven, with smaller firms and businesses in the construction and services harder hit. Having in place policies that support the smaller firms to recover, restructure, or move to a more promising sector would be useful, especially for these firms to modernize such as by improving energy efficiency and adopting greater digitalization. Separately, policies directed at new sources of growth for the broader economy, and investment in productivity- and resilience-enhancing areas such as for climate change adaptation and the adoption of new technologies would also be key. This reinforces the pandemic's impact on remote working

and innovation trends, which have accelerated digitalization and automation (Njoroge and Pazarbasioglu 2020). Das and others (2021) highlighted the significance of considering amplification and transmission effects in policy design, especially those with sectoral emphasis. Positive spillovers are likely in scenarios such as the transition to a low-carbon economy or in allocating sector-specific public investments. A parallel commitment should also be made toward stimulating job creation and reskilling labor forces, laying the foundation for long-term sustainable growth.

Regional collaboration could strengthen the growth potential that was eroded by the pandemic. The disruption to cross-border trade and talent flows during the pandemic has increased resource misallocation, with regional economies unable to optimize operational costs and supply chain structures during the pandemic. The post-pandemic period therefore presents an opportunity for economies to tap their comparative strengths and leverage complementarities to raise collective growth potential. With rapid technological advancements, the pooling of resources and expertise would allow economies to accelerate the development and adoption of new technologies—from digitization, and automation to renewable energy. The collective approach would not only enhance each economy's technological capabilities but also foster a more inclusive and sustainable economic growth model.

## Appendix: Selected Key Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators

|                                                            | 2022  | 2023e | 2024f | 2025f |
|------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Brunei Darussalam</b>                                   |       |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | -1.6  | 1.4   | 2.7   | 2.9   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 3.7   | 0.4   | 1.4   | 1.0   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 19.6  | 16.0  | 17.4  | 16.2  |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | 1.3   | -9.8  | -8.7  | -8.8  |
| <b>Cambodia</b>                                            |       |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 5.2   | 5.3   | 6.2   | 6.4   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 5.3   | 2.1   | 3.1   | 2.8   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | -25.7 | 1.0   | -3.1  | -3.6  |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -3.3  | -6.9  | -3.2  | -3.1  |
| <b>China</b>                                               |       |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 3.0   | 5.2   | 5.3   | 4.9   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 2.0   | 0.2   | 1.0   | 1.6   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 2.2   | 1.5   | 1.6   | 1.4   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -4.7  | -4.4  | -4.8  | -5.0  |
| <b>Hong Kong, China</b>                                    |       |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | -3.7  | 3.2   | 3.5   | 3.0   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 1.9   | 2.1   | 2.5   | 2.3   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 10.0  | 7.5   | 5.5   | 6.0   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -6.7  | -3.6  | -1.0  | 0.5   |
| <b>Indonesia</b>                                           |       |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 5.3   | 5.0   | 5.2   | 5.2   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 4.2   | 3.7   | 2.8   | 2.5   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 1.0   | -0.1  | -0.3  | -0.5  |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -2.4  | -1.7  | -2.0  | -2.0  |
| <b>Japan</b>                                               |       |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 1.0   | 1.9   | 1.1   | 1.0   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 2.5   | 3.3   | 2.5   | 2.1   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 1.9   | 3.5   | 3.4   | 3.6   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -3.6  | -5.2  | -2.5  | -1.9  |
| <b>Korea</b>                                               |       |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 2.6   | 1.4   | 2.3   | 2.1   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 5.1   | 3.6   | 2.5   | 2.0   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 1.5   | 2.1   | 2.4   | 2.3   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -5.4  | -3.8  | -3.8  | -3.0  |

## Appendix: Selected Key Macroeconomic and Financial Indicators

|                                                            | 2022 | 2023e | 2024f | 2025f |
|------------------------------------------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Lao PDR</b>                                             |      |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 4.4  | 4.3   | 4.7   | 4.9   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 23.0 | 31.2  | 14.3  | 9.3   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | -0.1 | 3.0   | 2.4   | 2.4   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -0.2 | 0.1   | -0.6  | -0.2  |
| <b>Malaysia</b>                                            |      |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 8.7  | 3.7   | 5.0   | 4.7   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 3.3  | 2.5   | 2.5   | 3.0   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 3.1  | 1.2   | 2.5   | 3.1   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -5.6 | -5.0  | -4.3  | -4.0  |
| <b>Myanmar</b>                                             |      |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 2.4  | 3.4   | 3.2   | 3.2   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 13.2 | 24.4  | 16.1  | 15.8  |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | -2.0 | -3.4  | -3.2  | -3.1  |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -2.1 | -2.8  | -4.8  | -4.6  |
| <b>Philippines</b>                                         |      |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 7.6  | 5.6   | 6.3   | 6.5   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 5.8  | 6.0   | 3.6   | 2.9   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | -4.5 | -2.6  | -2.2  | -1.8  |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -7.3 | -6.2  | -5.1  | -3.8  |
| <b>Singapore</b>                                           |      |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 3.8  | 1.1   | 2.6   | 1.9   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 6.1  | 4.8   | 3.0   | 2.5   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | 18.0 | 19.8  | 19.2  | 19.9  |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | 0.3  | -0.5  | 0.1   | 0.6   |
| <b>Thailand</b>                                            |      |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 2.5  | 1.9   | 2.9   | 3.1   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 6.1  | 1.2   | 1.2   | 1.9   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | -3.2 | 1.3   | 1.7   | 1.5   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -3.6 | -3.3  | -3.3  | -3.1  |
| <b>Vietnam</b>                                             |      |       |       |       |
| Real GDP growth (percent, year-on-year)                    | 8.0  | 5.1   | 6.0   | 6.5   |
| Headline inflation (period average, percent, year-on-year) | 3.2  | 3.3   | 3.6   | 2.7   |
| Current account balance (percent of GDP)                   | -1.1 | -4.3  | 0.6   | 3.9   |
| Government fiscal balance (percent of GDP)                 | -0.2 | -4.1  | -3.2  | -3.0  |

Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: Numbers in red are AMRO staff estimates and forecasts. Data refer to calendar year; except for government fiscal balances, and Myanmar, which refer to fiscal year. Data for 2023 refer to AMRO staff estimates, for data releases that are not yet available. Government fiscal balance refers to balance of the central and local governments for Cambodia; general government for Japan; and central government for all other economies. e = estimates; f = forecasts.

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
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Chapter 2.

# Navigating Tomorrow


# Highlights

- The ASEAN+3 region has achieved immense economic progress in the past two decades. Collectively, ASEAN+3 economies have now become the biggest driver of global growth. However, the various tailwinds that facilitated remarkable growth are dissipating while headwinds are rising, and the speed of the region's catch-up with high-income peers has been moderating since the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. More critically, the region is experiencing this slowdown in an environment increasingly beset by challenges from key secular trends, including aging, a global trade reconfiguration, and rapid technological change.
- Aging is happening faster in ASEAN+3 than in many parts of the world. Its total working-age population is projected to shrink in the second half of this decade, which carries negative implications for the region's growth potential, macroeconomic stability, and the sustainability of public finances. However, these consequences are not predetermined and can be mitigated somewhat—especially if the population is allowed, and able, to age productively. When considering healthier life expectancies in the ASEAN+3 region, policies that support and promote healthy longevity could see about 200 million workers reenter the region's labor force by 2050.
- The ongoing reconfiguration in global trade carries key implications for the region's time-tested export strategies. Geopolitical dynamics are increasingly realigning trade relationships globally and have unveiled new trade opportunities for ASEAN+3 economies that have been able to swiftly leverage their comparative advantage. At the same time, the region's trade has become concentrated into fewer trading partners and—in a world economy faced with higher uncertainty—this could translate into lower economic security. On the other hand, harnessing cross-border services trade, especially modern and digitally deliverable services, offers significant opportunities for growth and diversification.
- Technology will unlock many solutions that the ASEAN+3 region can use to navigate the ongoing demographic transition and global trade reconfiguration. Tech-enabled advances in medicine, automation, and work and learning platforms are crucial for productive aging. Advanced production technologies and smart logistics will be instrumental in making regional supply chains highly agile against sudden shocks. Yet, technology is also a harbinger of change. Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, for example—especially in generative artificial intelligence or Gen AI—are raising legitimate concerns about the future of work. A realistic, qualified, and balanced approach to Gen AI's capabilities would be a sensible approach at the current juncture.
- This chapter provides context for AMRO's future in-depth research work and to help steer policy discussion on these issues. While the optimal policy mix—and timing—will differ across the region's economies, well-designed domestic policies that (1) emphasize quality infrastructure, (2) encourage innovation, and (3) promote inclusivity, would enable each economy to transform the challenges from these secular trends into growth opportunities.
- Aging, trade reconfiguration, and rapid technological change are common long-term challenges that cut across borders. Effective responses to these common challenges—such as diversification, infrastructure upgrading, technology diffusion, and labor mobility—require enhanced and inclusive dialogue within ASEAN+3 economies and their key economic partners. Leveraging the strength of collective action will make for robust and resilient long-term growth in ASEAN+3—regardless of how the global economic order unfolds.

# I. Introduction

The ASEAN+3 region has experienced immense economic progress in the past two decades. With relatively stronger and more stable growth compared to other parts of the world, the ASEAN+3 region has become the largest economic region in the world, accounting for more than a quarter of world GDP in 2022, at market exchange rates (Hinojales, Kho, and Tan 2023). Between 2000 and 2019—barring the years of the global financial crisis—the regional economy expanded at an average of 5 percent a year, double the growth in advanced economies and about 30 percent higher than that of other emerging market and developing peers (Figure 2.1). This rapid growth was also less volatile than for other peers. It was underpinned by various factors: active participation in global value chains (GVCs), which helped the boom in ASEAN+3 exports; favorable domestic policies that attracted large foreign direct investments (FDI); and brisk improvements in the quality of the labor force, alongside strong involvement in global and regional initiatives that signaled that the ASEAN+3 region was “open for business” (AMRO 2021). With the strong and stable growth in national incomes, all the region’s economies have transitioned to middle-income status, with China and Malaysia well-positioned to reach high-income status by the end of this decade (Figure 2.2).


**Figure 2.1. ASEAN+3: 2000–19 GDP Growth and Growth Volatility**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: Penn World Tables; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: EMDE = emerging market and developing economies. The calculation of average annual GDP growth rate exclude 2008 and 2009; whiskers show average standard deviation. “Advanced economies” and “Other EMDEs” follow the International Monetary Fund’s classification.

Economic transformation across the region’s economies is occurring at varying degrees and speeds. Industrialization is pushing forward in most economies but is stalling for others. Most ASEAN-5 economies, in particular, continue to see the share of their manufacturing sectors lower than their historical peaks (Figure 2.3). Singapore, which experienced peak manufacturing the earliest, was able to shift economic activity rapidly toward services, especially high value-added ones related to information and communication technology (ICT), finance, and other business services. In contrast, the other ASEAN-5 economies have developed more traditional services, such as travel and tourism, transport, as well as goods-related services. Elsewhere across the ASEAN+3 region, industrialization continues. The growth of Vietnam’s manufacturing sector is notable in the CLMV group, having increased its share to total output and employment at a brisk pace (Figure 2.4).<sup>1</sup> In the Plus-3, Korea and China are experiencing advanced industrialization, with the share of manufacturing to total value-added output still growing, although at a more moderate pace than during the past decade. Nevertheless, its relatively stable share of total employment indicates that manufacturing activity is mostly toward high-productivity and high-value added processes. In addition, the share of modern services in these economies is also gaining traction.

**Figure 2.2. ASEAN+3: Gross National Income per Capita, 2000 versus 2022**




Source: World Bank via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HIC = high-income class; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; HK = Hong Kong; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; LMIC = lower middle-income class; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; UMIC = upper middle-income class; VN = Vietnam. Thresholds for the gross national income (GNI) follow the World Bank’s country classifications as of 2022.

The authors of this chapter are Marthe M. Hinojales (lead) and Allen Ng, with contributions from Megan Wen Xi Chong, Yin Fai Ho, Seung Hyun (Luke) Hong, Jae Young Lee, Dek Joe Sum, Fan Zhai, and Hongyan Zhao.


<sup>1</sup> Lao PDR is an exception to the overall trend in the CLMV. While industrialization has stalled, the economy has witnessed growing shares in the construction and non-modern services instead.

**Figure 2.3. Selected ASEAN+3: Share in Total Value-Added, by Sector**  
(Percent, five-year moving average)


### Manufacturing






### Modern Services






### Other Services



### CLMV



### Plus-3



Source: GGDC/UNU-WIDER Economic Transformation Database; GGDC10-sector database; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Share in total value added is calculated based on constant 2015 prices. Modern services include business, financial, and real estate services. Data not available for Brunei.

**Figure 2.4. Selected ASEAN+3: Share in Total Employment, by Sector**  
(Percent, five-year moving average)







Source: GGDC/UNU-WIDER Economic Transformation Database; GGDC10-sector database; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Modern services includes business, financial, and real estate services. Data not available for Brunei.

However, the pace of growth and productivity improvements in the ASEAN+3 region—especially after the global financial crisis—is slowing. The region's income "catch-up" with more advanced and richer peers was especially evident in mid-1980s—driven by ASEAN-4—as well as in the 2000s, with the addition of China (Figure 2.5).<sup>2</sup> However, this "convergence effect" began to weaken in the years following the global financial crisis, as global growth slowed (Patel, Sandefur, and Subramaniam 2021). Further, productivity gaps remain wide between many in the region and the productivity frontier (proxied by the United States), despite significant progress achieved in the past two decades. In some economies, the total factor productivity (TFP)

gap from the frontier has even widened (Figure 2.6). Compared to previous decades, TFP growth has decelerated across the region since 2010, except for Vietnam (Figure 2.7). Nevertheless, this slowdown is not unique to the ASEAN+3 region: the post-crisis decline was widespread, affecting all emerging market and developing economies and about 70 percent of advanced economies (Dieppe 2021). A confluence of factors underpinned this global phenomenon, including a deceleration in working-age population growth, stalled momentum in GVC expansion, a slower pace of structural transformation for developing economies, and slower economic growth in major advanced economies following the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe.

<sup>2/</sup> Convergence, following the Solow-Swan (1956) model, hypothesizes that "poorer economies' per capita incomes will tend to grow at faster rates than richer economies." This is because growth is driven by the accumulation of physical capital until an optimum level of capital per worker is reached. Developing economies have the potential to grow at a faster rate than developed economies because diminishing returns (in particular, to capital) are not as strong as in capital-rich countries, and all economies should eventually converge in terms of per capita income. That economic development is a result of capital accumulation is also posited by the Lewis Theory of Development (1954). In this theory, an unlimited supply of labor is available at a subsistence wage rate in underdeveloped economies. Growth results from the withdrawal of the surplus labor from the *subsistence* or traditional agricultural sector toward the *capitalist* or modern industrial sector, where it is more productive.

**Figure 2.5. ASEAN+3:  $\beta$ -coefficient of Unconditional Convergence****Figure 2.6. Selected ASEAN+3: Selected Productivity Measures, 1990 versus 2019**  
(Index, distance to productivity frontier)**Labor Productivity****Total Factor Productivity****Figure 2.7. ASEAN+3: Growth in Total Factor Productivity**  
(Percent)

More crucially, the ASEAN+3 region is experiencing this slowdown in an environment increasingly beset by longer-term challenges to growth and stability. While the ASEAN+3 region will remain a major driver of global growth in the next decade, it also faces a multitude of structural challenges. An October 2023 survey by AMRO on the region's monetary and fiscal policymakers identified the ongoing reconfiguration in global trade and FDI as the most pressing risk to the long-term growth of ASEAN+3 economies, especially if it leads to a protracted global economic

slowdown (Figure 2.8). This was followed by climate change, rapid technological transformation, and population aging—all affecting ASEAN+3 economies, although to varying degrees. Nevertheless, the macrostability implications of these secular risks will be contingent on each economy's ability to adapt to these challenges, and the extent with which they utilize technology-enabled solutions, among others, especially given unique country circumstances—including the depth of its scarring from the COVID-19 pandemic (Section V of Chapter 1).

**Figure 2.8. ASEAN+3 October 2023 Survey: Most Pressing Challenges to Long-Term Growth**

(Score, most pressing = 5)



Source: AMRO staff.

Note: The survey questions were "How would you rank the following challenges in relation to the long-term growth of your economy?" followed by "What do you think are the top three risks to your economy from [risk]?" Numbers represent the weighted average of all responses, where a higher "score" indicates that the challenge is more pertinent. Under "Others," the quality of human capital, as well as poverty and inequality, were cited by responding members.

## ASEAN+3: Long-term Economic Prospects Amid Major Secular Shifts

Without commensurate policy responses, these secular trends could undermine ASEAN+3's long-term growth prospects and macro-financial stability. These developments are not unique to ASEAN+3, and their consequences are of concern to policymakers worldwide. Specific to the region, however, navigating these long-term issues—and their interactions—could become even more challenging, given their strong and extensive linkages with the rest of the global economy. The demographic transition across several ASEAN+3 economies is also occurring at relatively lower levels of development, which could further derail their ability to reach the per capita incomes of advanced economies. Critically, member economies are confronting these dynamics with varied degrees of economic scarring from the COVID-19 pandemic, and, in some cases, compressed policy space.

In this context, this year's thematic chapter explores how the region can potentially manage these secular shifts to secure sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth for the future. The chapter follows up on the 2023 *ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook* (AREO), which looked at the long-term growth implications of climate change mitigation and the transition to net zero (AMRO 2023). The rest of this chapter will focus on the following three trends:

- **Aging.** In the next decade, several ASEAN+3 economies are projected to become "super-aged"—or societies with more than 20 percent of the population above the age of 65. A shrinking working-age population not only impacts the economy's growth potential but also carries implications for the region's long-term inflation dynamics, fiscal sustainability,

and the strength of the domestic financial system. However, these macroeconomic consequences are not predetermined.

- **Global trade reconfiguration.** Global trade is undergoing several changes—trade relationships are being increasingly influenced by geopolitics while at the same time becoming less diversified. The face of globalization is also gradually shifting: amid the weaker momentum in global goods trade, global services trade is rising in importance. How these forces interact carries significant policy implications for ASEAN+3's long-tested export strategies.
- **Technological change.** Technology has long enhanced productivity and underlying long-term growth potential of ASEAN+3 economies, and it will continue to power many solutions that they can use to successfully navigate the demographic transition and global trade reconfiguration. However, the speed of technological advancements, such as artificial intelligence and automation, are fueling concerns on the future of entire industries and jobs in the ASEAN+3 region.

This thematic chapter aims to provide a background on each of these secular trends and put forward several options for the region's policymakers. Each section first sets the current landscape as it relates to the ASEAN+3 region and analyzes the diverse impacts across the region's economies—recognizing that while each of these long-term challenges pose various risks, they also create opportunities for innovation, productivity gains, as well as new sources of growth. The chapter aims to set the context for future in-depth AMRO research on how the region can navigate demographic change, shifting global trade and investment patterns, and rapid technological changes.

## II. Navigating Aging

The ASEAN+3 region currently stands on the cusp of significant demographic shifts. Large demographic dividends—arising from the rapid expansion of the working-age population—have been important in supporting economic growth across many of the region’s economies in the past several decades. However, these gains are slowly dwindling as nearly all member economies are now aging, albeit at different speeds. Except for two, all others in the ASEAN+3 region will be technically considered “aging societies” by the end of this decade. Within the next decade, the region’s working population will start to decline, and the age profile of the labor force will be gradually dominated by older workers. As aging influences the trajectory of economic growth, concerns are rising that the ongoing demographic transition will impede ASEAN+3’s ability to sustain its long-term growth trajectory. This arises from a *chronological* view of aging: as the economy grows older, it is moving toward a situation where more people are consuming goods and services while fewer people are producing them (Scott 2023).

However, the ongoing demographic transition has another dimension: while the region—and the world as a whole—is

aging, from a *biological* point of view it is aging more slowly. Life expectancy globally, including in the ASEAN+3, has increased by over 20 years since the 1980s—thanks to significant progress in medicine, health care, technology, education, and economic development. With rising longevity and more years of capable work, the demographic dividend can give way to a “longevity dividend” (Olshanky and others 2006).<sup>3</sup> Longer lives, and thus an older yet healthier workforce, can be sources of economic growth. However, proactive and urgent policy responses will be essential to maximize this potential. By implementing appropriate, well-designed, and well-targeted policies—such as by employing smart technologies, encouraging more women to join the labor force, and reforming social protection systems—there can be positive gains to growth from an aging population.

This section looks at current demographic trends in ASEAN+3 economies, mapping out its various macroeconomic implications, while at the same time reframing the issue of aging. Ultimately, policies that capitalize on the longevity dividend will become as crucial as policies that mitigate the economic burden of population aging.

### Aging in ASEAN+3

*“By 2050, one in four people in Asia and the Pacific will be over 60 years old.”*

United Nations World Population Prospects, 2022

ASEAN+3’s population is expected to peak in 10 years and start to decline by the 2030s. With 2.2 billion people in 2021, the ASEAN+3 region is home to a third of the world’s population and nearly half of Asia’s (Figure 2.9). However, this share has fallen over time, as population growth in other parts of the world has been consistently faster since the 1990s. From 2000 to 2020, ASEAN+3’s population grew by an annual average of 0.75 percent, half its pace in 1980–2000. This speed is expected to further decelerate in the next 20 years to about 0.11 percent, with the population peaking at 2.3 billion by the mid-2030s.<sup>4</sup> Since the turn of the century, ASEAN+3 has had the second-slowest population growth among key regions, but it could take Europe’s spot as the slowest by the 2050s if current trends continue (Figure 2.10). Nearly all Plus-3 economies have seen their populations peak, led by Japan in 2010, while

China reached its peak in 2021. Thailand will be the first in ASEAN to reach its population peak—projected around 2030—while economies like Lao PDR and the Philippines are not expected to see their populations decline in the next 40 years (Table 2.1).

Some ASEAN+3 economies are in the advanced to late stages of the demographic transition. While many developing economies tend to have younger populations than developed economies, the issue of aging is “a reality for all economies across all income levels” (NAM 2022). Following the methodology by Amaglobeli and others (2019), ASEAN+3 economies can be grouped by where they are in the demographic transition: late, advanced, early, or pre-transition.<sup>5</sup> With declining fertility and mortality rates, all ASEAN+3 economies have moved beyond the


<sup>3/</sup> Olshanky and others (2006) defined this dividend as “the economic and health benefits that would accrue to individuals and societies if we extend healthy life by slowing the biological processes of aging ... [by] shifting our emphasis from disease management to delay[ing] aging.”

<sup>4/</sup> The population projections cited in this section relies on UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects (2022), using the medium-fertility variant. It is important to note that long-term projections are strongly influenced by underlying assumptions regarding future fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration flows, among others. As such, caution must be exercised when utilizing these data, given the large degree of uncertainty surrounding population projections.

<sup>5/</sup> Similar to the original study by Amaglobeli and others (2019), “k-means” clustering was used to create these four groups of economies. This method finds similar “traits” within the data set, and clusters them into k number of groups. For this exercise, AMRO used the following variables for clustering: average annual population growths; annual child and old-age dependency ratios; and the number of years before (or after) the lower level of total dependency ratio is reached. Data ranged from 2010 to 2021.

pre-transition stage—where most economies in Africa are (Figure 2.11). Four economies—Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and the Philippines—are in “early transition”, with fertility rates still high (although declining). Half of the region’s economies are considered “advanced transition”: those in this group have been able to largely reap the demographic dividend and have seen the share of their


**Figure 2.9. ASEAN+3: Total Population**  
(Percent; billions of people)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 are UN estimates (medium variant).

working populations peak in the past 20 years (Table 2.1). Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea are considered to be in “late transition”, where their working age-populations have long declined and old-age dependency ratios have risen rapidly. In general, most advanced economies are in this stage—including Canada, Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States (Figure 2.11).

**Figure 2.10. World: Population Growth, by Region**  
(Percent)




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean.

**Table 2.1. ASEAN+3: Selected Demographic Indicators, 2021**

| Economy       | Total Population         |                   | Median Age | Working-Age Population   |                   | Fertility Rate        | Life Expectancy, Years |             | Old Age                       |                  |
|---------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|------------------|
|               | Average growth (percent) | Peak year (level) | Years      | Average growth (percent) | Peak year (level) | Live births per woman | At birth               | At 65 years | Share of population (percent) | Dependency ratio |
|               | 1                        | 2                 | 3          | 4                        | 5                 | 6                     | 7                      | 8           | 9                             | 10               |
| <b>Plus-3</b> |                          |                   |            |                          |                   |                       |                        |             |                               |                  |
| China         | 0.56                     | 2021              | 37.9       | 0.65                     | 2009              | 1.16                  | 78.2                   | 17.7        | 13.1                          | 19.0             |
| Hong Kong     | 0.51                     | 2026              | 44.9       | 0.34                     | 2011              | 0.75                  | 85.5                   | 22.6        | 19.6                          | 28.7             |
| Japan         | -0.09                    | 2009              | 48.4       | -0.77                    | 1991              | 1.30                  | 84.8                   | 22.4        | 29.8                          | 51.0             |
| Korea         | 0.48                     | 2020              | 43.4       | 0.46                     | 2015              | 0.88                  | 83.7                   | 21.5        | 16.7                          | 23.3             |
| <b>ASEAN</b>  |                          |                   |            |                          |                   |                       |                        |             |                               |                  |
| Brunei        | 1.37                     | 2049              | 31.8       | 2.01                     | 2018              | 1.78                  | 74.6                   | 15.6        | 5.8                           | 8.1              |
| Cambodia      | 1.49                     | 2067              | 26.5       | 2.24                     | 2044              | 2.34                  | 69.6                   | 14.2        | 5.5                           | 8.5              |
| Indonesia     | 1.16                     | 2060              | 29.4       | 1.45                     | 2029              | 2.18                  | 67.6                   | 12.1        | 6.8                           | 10.0             |
| Lao PDR       | 1.49                     | 2072              | 23.8       | 2.39                     | 2045              | 2.50                  | 68.1                   | 13.1        | 4.4                           | 6.7              |
| Malaysia      | 1.81                     | 2066              | 29.9       | 2.41                     | 2022              | 1.80                  | 74.9                   | 15.3        | 7.3                           | 10.4             |
| Myanmar       | 0.80                     | 2052              | 29.0       | 1.21                     | 2025              | 2.15                  | 65.7                   | 12.5        | 6.6                           | 9.7              |
| Philippines   | 1.80                     | 2092              | 24.5       | 2.27                     | 2051              | 2.75                  | 69.3                   | 12.6        | 5.3                           | 8.3              |
| Singapore     | 1.79                     | 2041              | 41.8       | 1.84                     | 2010              | 1.02                  | 82.8                   | 20.2        | 14.1                          | 19.1             |
| Thailand      | 0.60                     | 2029              | 39.3       | 0.64                     | 2012              | 1.33                  | 78.7                   | 20.2        | 14.5                          | 20.8             |
| Vietnam       | 1.00                     | 2051              | 32.0       | 1.52                     | 2013              | 1.94                  | 73.6                   | 16.4        | 8.8                           | 12.7             |

Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Average growths (columns 1 and 4) are calculated over 2000–21. Numbers in gray italics (columns 2 and 5) are based on projections from the UN World Population Prospects (2022). Peak year refers to the year when the total population/share of working population reached (or is projected to reach) their highest level. Old age (columns 9–10) is defined as ages 65 and above. The old-age dependency ratio is calculated as the old-age population divided by the working-age population (defined as those of ages 15 to 64). For columns 1 and 4, the redder the color, the slower the growth; for columns 3, and 9–10, the redder the color, the older the population; for columns 6–8, the redder the color, the lower the indicator.

**Figure 2.11. World: Stages in the Demographic Transition**

Source: AMRO staff calculations following Amaglobeli and others (2019).

This reflects declining fertility rates across the ASEAN+3 region, with women having only one child each on average. Six in the region are among those with the lowest birth rates in the world (Figure 2.12). ASEAN+3 aggregate fertility rate (measured by live births per woman in 2021 stood at 1.4, well below the present replacement fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman.<sup>6</sup> Individual-economy birth rates have also fallen rapidly: while some advanced economies took more than 50 years to see fertility rates fall from 4.0 births per woman to subreplacement levels, many in ASEAN+3 experienced this in less than half that time (Figure 2.13). In Asia, economic and social modernization over the years—including gains in living standards, the spread of education, increased female labor participation, as well as breakthroughs in health and family planning—have led to lower fertility (Westley, Choe, and Retherford 2010).<sup>7</sup> More recently, COVID-19 also intensified the decline in fertility rates in ASEAN+3 economies—especially those in advanced transition—prompting policymakers to urgently announce policies to boost marriage and birth rates (AMRO 2022) (Figure 2.14). Within the next decade, nearly all of ASEAN+3 could have subreplacement fertility

rates, in turn accelerating population aging and pointing to smaller young cohorts joining the future labor force.

Longer life expectancies compound the effect of falling birth rates on ASEAN+3 population dynamics. By 2050, about 44 percent of the world's centenarians are likely to be from ASEAN+3, mostly in China, Japan, Thailand, and Korea. The region's average life expectancy has increased by about 10 years since 1980, with most of the gains happening in the past 20 years. Widespread improvements in health care, hygiene, and living standards have pushed life expectancy by 13 years longer in late-transition ASEAN+3 economies, and about 10 years longer for those in the advanced and early stages (Figure 2.15). The largest increases in life expectancy since the 1980s are in Cambodia and Lao PDR, in part due to the drastic reduction in infant mortality rates.<sup>8</sup> While the COVID-19 pandemic halted the region's decade-long increase in life expectancy, most economies are estimated to have returned to pre-pandemic trends as of 2023, and by 2050, the average person is likely to live five years longer than in 2021. By then, half of the region's economies would have life expectancy of between 80–90 years, with Japan and Hong Kong at the higher end.

<sup>6/</sup> The replacement fertility rate refers to the rate at which a population exactly replaces itself from one generation to the next.


<sup>7/</sup> Some socioeconomic circumstances—such as inflexible work situations, limited support during and after maternity while in employment, and the imperative for dual-income households—has also led to many Asian women postponing childbearing (Boydell and others 2023).

<sup>8/</sup> In Lao PDR, infant mortality has fallen to 34 per 1,000 births in 2021, from 137 in 1980; this has dropped to 22 from 83 per 1,000 births for Cambodia over the same period.

With declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancies, nearly half of the region’s economies will be considered “super-aged” by 2040. As of 2023, eight of the region’s economies are considered “aging” societies, with people aged 65 and above comprising 7 percent to 14 percent of the total population. Japan was the first to become an aging society in 1969, while Malaysia the most recent in 2020. In the next decade, six are likely to be “super-aged”, with 21 percent of the population over the age of 65 (Figure 2.16). In Japan, the shift from aging to super-aged took about 37 years—twice as fast as New Zealand, and four times faster than Australia and the United Kingdom. Others in the region—Singapore, Korea, Thailand, and Brunei—could take less than 30 years to transition to super-aged status (Figure 2.17). At this rate, they will also move faster than other aging emerging market economies like India, Mexico, and South Africa. In contrast, the shares of elderly people in Myanmar and the Philippines are unlikely to reach the super-age threshold until close to the end of the century (Figure 2.16).

Consequently, ASEAN+3’s median age is projected to remain higher than the global median in the coming decades. The global average median age was about 30 years in 2021—that is, half of the world’s population was younger than 30 years old, and the other half older. Japan had the third-highest median age globally with 48.4 years, with Hong Kong placed 12<sup>th</sup> and Korea 22<sup>nd</sup>. The ASEAN+3 region’s median age will exceed the global median by 10 years in 2050—from only 6 years in 2021—given its relatively faster pace of aging. The Plus-3

**Figure 2.12. ASEAN+3: Fertility Rates, 2021 and 2035**  
(Live births per woman)




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Figures for 2035 are UN estimates (medium variant). The ASEAN+3 regional aggregate is a population-weighted average.

economies, as well as Singapore and Thailand, will see the highest median ages across the region, each with over 50 years. The pace of increase will ease thereafter, in line with the projected decline in the ASEAN+3’s overall population.

Several ASEAN+3 economies are growing old before becoming rich. Rapid aging is triggering fiscal concerns due to the potential rise in health care costs and pension liabilities, on top of the needed infrastructure spending that is required to sustain growth. When Singapore transitioned to an “aging” society, its GDP per capita (at constant 2015 prices) was about USD 40,000 (Figure 2.18). By the time it became an “aged” society three years ago—where 14–21 percent of its population is 65 years old and above—its per capita income had increased to about USD 60,000. A similar increase in per capita incomes was evident for Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea. Generally, late-transition economies in the ASEAN+3 were able to age at relatively high incomes. However, several advanced-transition economies in the region could be entering their super-aged status with per capita incomes less than USD 10,000 (Figure 2.18).<sup>9</sup> Within this group, there also are significant variations: Thailand, for example, became an “aged” society at a per capita income of USD 6,000 in 2021—an increase of USD 2,000 from when it first became an “aging” society in 2004 (Figure 2.19). China’s transition from “aging” to an “aged” society, on the other hand, was accompanied by an increase of nearly USD 10,000. Early-transition economies in the ASEAN+3 are approaching the aging status with per capita incomes of less than USD 4,000.


**Figure 2.13. Selected Economies: Years Taken for Fertility Rates to Fall Below Replacement Level**  
(Number)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; Asian Development Bank; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: The starting point is a fertility rate of 4.0 live births per woman; and the replacement level is 2.1.

<sup>9</sup> This situation can contribute to the risk of falling into the middle-income trap problem, which many emerging and developing economies are worried about.


**Figure 2.14. ASEAN+3: Fertility Rates, by Demographic Group**  
(Live births per woman)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant) and are population-weighted averages for each group.


**Figure 2.15. ASEAN+3: Life Expectancy, by Demographic Group**  
(Number of years)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant) and are population-weighted averages for each group.


**Figure 2.16. ASEAN+3: Projected Period to Super-Aging**



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). Super-aged/super-aging is defined as when the share of people of ages 65 years and above comprises at least 21 percent of the total population.


**Figure 2.17. ASEAN+3: Speed of Aging**



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). Economies become "aging societies" when people of ages 65 years and above comprise 7 percent of the total population, "aged" when the share increases to 14 percent, and "super-aged" when the share increases to above 21 percent.


**Figure 2.18. ASEAN+3: Income Levels versus Share of Old Persons, 1960–2021**  
(GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2015 US dollars)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; World Development Indicators, World Bank; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand.

**Figure 2.19. China, Malaysia, and Thailand: Income Levels versus Share of Old Persons, 1960–2021**  
(GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2015 US dollars)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; World Development Indicators, World Bank; AMRO staff calculations.

The ASEAN+3 region’s working-age population—typically defined as those between 15 and 64 years of age—will start to shrink in the second half of this decade. Slowing population growth is also seen from the muted expansion in the region’s working-age population, which is projected to peak within the next five years (Figure 2.20). Its share of the total population has declined since 2010, alongside the rapid rise in the share of the old-age population and the subdued expansion in the young cohorts. By 2050, ASEAN+3’s working-age population will be 12 percent smaller than it was in 2021—equivalent to about 190 million workers exiting the workforce. Economies in the late stages of the demographic transition will experience the biggest declines in the working-age population, while those in early transition should still see their working-age populations expand until the 2050s (Figure 2.21). These dynamics mean that ASEAN+3’s population pyramid will eventually reshape into one with a narrower base, as the size of the portions from the middle and/or toward the apex gradually widens (Figure 2.22). China’s base by 2050, in particular, is projected to be narrower than the rest of the region’s.

In addition, ASEAN+3’s working-age population will progressively become older. ASEAN+3 economies in the advanced to late stages of the demographic transition typically have a larger share of individuals aged 55 and above in their total working-age populations. For Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong, this group corresponds to nearly one-fifth of their total working population in 2021, compared to less than 10 percent in the Philippines and Lao PDR. Generally, workforce aging is quite common (ADB 2019). In 2021, the average age of the ASEAN+3 workforce was 39 years—about six years higher than in

the 1980s—and this is anticipated to increase to 41 years by 2050 (Figure 2.23). Half of the region’s economies are projected to see the average age of their working cohorts increase by about two to three years relative to 2021. The upward trend will be most stark for Lao PDR and Malaysia, both adding four years to their average working ages (Figure 2.24).


Old-age dependency ratios are projected to rise rapidly, along with the decline in potential support ratios across the ASEAN+3. Higher old-age dependency ratios (OADRs)—defined as the ratio of those aged 65 and above to the total working-age population—imply a greater burden to the overall economy. With the rise in non-working (non-earning) individuals, the working (earning) population could be subject to higher taxes and/or social security payments to compensate for the larger number of dependents that would need government support.<sup>10</sup> OADRs are thus higher for ASEAN+3 economies in late transition: more than twice the ratio of the advanced transition group, and over 4.5 times the ratio of the early transition group in 2021 (Figure 2.25). Unsurprisingly, Japan has the highest dependency ratio—at over 50 percent—followed by Hong Kong, Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and China. Except for Japan and the Philippines, all could see their OADRs double by 2050, with the increase most pronounced in Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Singapore (Figure 2.26). Correspondingly, potential support ratios (i.e., the inverse of OADR) are projected to decline across the board, highlighting the shrinking base in the ASEAN+3 that older persons can depend on for support (Figure 2.27). In Brunei, for example, there were 12 potential workers to support 1 elderly person in 2021, but this is projected to decline to 4 workers by 2050 (Figure 2.28).

**Figure 2.20. ASEAN+3: Working-Age Population**  
(Billions of people; percent)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant).

**Figure 2.21. ASEAN+3: Growth in Working-Age Populations**  
(Percent, year-on-year)




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant).

<sup>10/</sup> The magnitude of the additional tax or social security burden on the working population would also depend on various country-specific circumstances; for example, the tax structure, which would determine the share of the working population as a tax base (relative to retirees).


**Figure 2.22. ASEAN+3: Population Pyramids**  
(Percent share of total population)

**ASEAN+3 excluding China**


**1990**



**2021**




**2050**




**China**


**1990**



**2021**




**2050**




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant).

**Figure 2.23. ASEAN+3: Average Working Age**  
(Years)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant) and are weighted averages.


**Figure 2.24. ASEAN+3: Projected Average Working Age in 2050, by Economy**  
(Years)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: A+3 = ASEAN+3; BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant) and are weighted averages.


Compared to the many parts of the world, old-age labor force participation rates in the ASEAN+3 are generally higher. Labor force participation rates (LFPRs) of workers of senior ages tend to be higher in developing economies, in part, due to the lack of early retirement benefits or other related financial support for those who are no longer economically active (Samorodov 1999). LFPRs in Asia for those of ages 65 and above have remained high—second only to Africa—and relatively steady over the years (Figure 2.29). In most ASEAN+3 economies, LFPRs even exceeded both the global

**Figure 2.25. ASEAN+3: Old-Age Dependency Ratios (Percent)**



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). Old-age dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of the population of ages 65 years and above to the working-age population (15 to 64 years).


**Figure 2.27. ASEAN+3: Potential Support Ratios (Percent)**



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). Potential support ratio is calculated as the ratio of the working-age population (ages 15 to 64 years) to the old-age population (ages 65 and above).


and Asia regional averages (Figure 2.30). If including participation rates of individuals aged within 10 years of a retirement age of 65, LFPRs rise to as high as above 70 percent in Korea, Singapore, Cambodia, and Japan. Kikkawa and Gaspar (2021) suggest that majority of seniors who remain active at work—including in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—are mostly self-employed and are engaged in informal work. Mostly in rural areas, these workers tend to work predominantly in agriculture, due to its attractive advantages to older workers.<sup>11</sup>

**Figure 2.26. ASEAN+3: Projected Old-Age Dependency Ratios in 2050, by Economy (Percent)**



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). Old-age dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of the population of ages 65 years and above to the working-age population (15 to 64 years).

**Figure 2.28. ASEAN+3: Projected Potential Support Ratios in 2050, by Economy (Working-age people per one elderly person)**




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). Potential support ratio is calculated as the ratio of the working-age population (ages 15 to 64 years) to the old-age population (ages 65 and above).

<sup>11</sup> ADB (2019) suggests that this is due to the agricultural sector not imposing “strict” retirement ages, and that it offers more flexibility in working hours, especially in family-run or family-owned farms. Further, machines are increasingly being used for the more laborious part of agricultural work. Note, however, that the degree of agricultural mechanization varies widely in the ASEAN+3 region and tends to be lower in economies where small- and medium-scale farming dominate.

However, LFPRs for elderly women lag elderly men in the ASEAN+3 region—and by a wide margin. Unequal distribution of household tasks based on gender norms as well as limited economic opportunities help explain the disparity (Kikkawa and Gaspar 2021). In general, LFPRs of women of ages 65 and above in the ASEAN+3 are about half that of men, with no marked differences between ASEAN and Plus-3 economies. Nevertheless, the gap is narrowest in Vietnam and Brunei, where the ratio of male-to-female seniors in the workforce is about 1.3:1 in 2021, and widest in Myanmar and Malaysia, at about 3.4:1 (Figure 2.31). The slightly higher female LFPR in the preretirement cohort (ages 55 to 64) supports the observation that women begin to gradually exit the labor force from their fifties to take a more active role in family-related responsibilities such as raising grandchildren (Ko and Hank 2014). Nevertheless, labor force participation among older females has generally risen at a faster rate across the ASEAN+3 region than for males, in part due to the lower base and the rollout of policies aimed at encouraging more women to work (Figure 2.32).


**Figure 2.29. World: Old-Age Labor Force Participation Rates (Percent)**



Source: International Labour Organization.  
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa. Old age is defined as ages 65 years and above.


Net migration will be increasingly important for ASEAN+3 economies that are further ahead in the demographic transition. Aging populations across the world create incentives for migration. On aggregate, migration still accounts for a small portion of population change in the ASEAN+3 region, when compared to the latter's natural increase, as expressed by births less deaths (Figure 2.33, left panel). However, variations across economies exist. For late transition economies, net migration has exceeded the balance of births over deaths since the 2010s (Figure 2.33, center panel). In fact, migration will be the sole driver of population growth for this group in the next few decades, as the number of deaths will progressively exceed the number of births. In contrast, population changes in early transition economies will continue to be driven by higher births (relative to deaths) rather than by migration, given still-high fertility rates in this group (Figure 2.33, right panel). Some advanced transition economies—such as Singapore and Thailand—are projected to follow the same trend as those in late transition. Others—like Malaysia and Vietnam—will rely less on net migration as a driver of population change, the same pattern as their early transition peers.

**Figure 2.30. Selected Economies: Old-Age Labor Force Participation Rates, 2021 (Percent)**




Source: International Labour Organization.  
Note: AP = Asia and the Pacific; BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam; WD = World.

**Figure 2.31. ASEAN+3: Old-Age Labor Force Participation Rates in 2021, by Economy (Percent; ratio)**




Source: International Labour Organization; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam.

**Figure 2.32. ASEAN+3: Old-Age Labor Force Participation Rates, by Gender (Index, 1990 = 100)**



Source: International Labour Organization; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Old age refers to people of ages 65 and above.

**Figure 2.33. ASEAN+3: Drivers of Population Changes**  
(Millions of people)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). Natural change refers to births less deaths, while net migration refers to the difference between immigrants and emigrants. Late-transition ASEAN+3 economies are Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea, while early-transition economies are Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and the Philippines.

## Macroeconomic Implications of Aging in ASEAN+3

*"An aging population will totally change the way our society works."*

Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore

Rapid aging has multifaceted economic implications for long-term macroeconomic stability in ASEAN+3. Among the various aging-related risks, the negative consequences on labor productivity, fiscal health, and overall retirement security concern regional policymakers the most.<sup>12</sup> A shrinking population is likely to translate to lower demand and output, with spillover effects on future investment trends. Higher aging-related fiscal expenditures, along with a smaller working population from which to derive tax revenues, can amplify fiscal vulnerabilities. Additionally, the resulting shift in saving and investment decisions as people approach retirement can directly impact price and financial stability in the ASEAN+3 region. On the other hand, population aging can incentivize faster adoption of labor-saving technology, which will have a positive impact on economy-wide productivity, while also driving the rise of new products and services that comprise the so-called "silver economy."<sup>13</sup> The ultimate impact of population aging is more nuanced and will depend on its extent and policymakers' ability to utilize necessary policy tools (Lee and Mason 2017).

Growth across ASEAN+3 economies can slow down as the working-age population shrinks. A primary concern stemming from an aging population is the decline in the

size of the labor force (Box 2.1). Fewer people entering the workforce, along with a rising number of retirees, means fewer labor inputs available for production. This will constrain output for economies that are further ahead in the demographic transition (IMF 2019). Even for ASEAN+3 economies in early transition, the smaller labor supply could reduce the cost advantage they have historically enjoyed from favorable demographics. Some electronics-related and auto-related jobs, for example, are more susceptible to aging and could see earlier retirements than other occupations (Figure 2.34). Labor force participation rates across ASEAN+3 economies also tend to decline when people reach their mid-fifties, underscoring supply risks as economies' average working ages increase (Figures 2.35 and 2.23). Firms can become averse to taking on more investment in response to the shrinking labor force. These dynamics point to a reduction in ASEAN+3 potential growth unless there is a commensurate increase in total factor productivity. In the case of China, for example, overall output growth could be 1.6 percentage points lower in 2050 relative to the counterfactual baseline (with stationary population). That reflects the rapid shrinking of the labor supply—especially from 2040 onward—if no other offsetting measures are put in place (Box 2.2).

<sup>12/</sup> Based on a survey conducted by AMRO on ASEAN+3 central banks and ministries of finance in October 2023. The question was "What do you think are the top three risks to your economy from an aging population?"


<sup>13/</sup> The "silver economy" can be taken as the "sum of all economic activity that serve the needs of people aged 50 and over, including the products and services they purchase directly and the further economic activity this spending generates" (European Commission 2018). As such, it is not a single sector. The term is also used closely with the "silver market," a concept that emerged in Japan in the 1970s in relation to age-inclusive provision of goods, services, and facilities.

Growth on a *per capita* basis can also slow due to rising old-age dependency ratios. Downward pressure on GDP per capita growth from rising OADRs across the ASEAN+3 region is only set to increase over the next decade. While late transition economies will see, on average, large or larger declines in the growth of GDP per capita, some in the advanced transition stage—such as Singapore and Thailand—could see growth fall substantially as a result of their increasing dependency ratios (Figure 2.36).

All else equal, labor productivity must rise by a comparable magnitude to offset the decline in the size of the labor force (IMF 2019). Further, as the working-age population shrinks, the number of total workers relative to total consumers (i.e., the entire population) declines over time, putting more pressure on economically active individuals (Lee and Mason 2017). Falling worker-to-consumer ratios in ASEAN+3 mean there will be fewer workers to support total consumption activity over the next decade (Figure 2.37). The additional burden on the working population will be particularly stark in economies where seniors' consumption is primarily funded by government support. In this case, unless the labor supply increases—for example through immigration or an increase in the retirement age—consumption in these economies may have to slow down substantially to mitigate the overall budgetary pressure on the economy.

Declining productivity can magnify the negative impact of aging on the region's long-term growth prospects. Aggregate productivity across ASEAN+3 may also fall in the long term, as older workers could be less productive than their younger counterparts—especially as some cognitive abilities required in many professions tend to decline with age. Some studies suggest that innovation is lower—and slower—in older cohorts, while a more aged workforce may induce less creative destruction (Weinburg 2004; Liang, Wang, and Lazear 2018; Engbom 2019). This negative impact from lower productivity is also likely to be more sizeable than the drag from the shrinking labor supply (Lee and Shin 2021). In the case of Asian economies, Park and Shin (2023) find that aging's negative impact on economic growth primarily occurs through reduced total factor productivity (TFP).<sup>14</sup> For some ASEAN+3 economies, this could be due to the higher tendency of elderly employment in informal work or in low-productivity sectors. More importantly, the lowering of TFP is harder to arrest through labor market interventions—such as by incentivizing immigration or raising the retirement age—and so could have a dampening effect on economic growth.

**Figure 2.34. Susceptibility Index: Selected Occupations**  
(Index, higher score = more susceptible to age-related decline in skills)




Source: Belbase, Sanzenbacher, and Gillis (2015).

Note: The Susceptibility Index "systematically assesses the physical and cognitive skills required for each occupation and the tendency of such skills to decline with age." According to the study, a higher index (score) indicates that the job "relies on many abilities that tend to decline early and can be used as an indicator of earlier retirement for individuals in certain occupations."


<sup>14/</sup> This is, according to Park and Shin (2023), especially because higher labor force participation rates (from encouraging older people to work) can completely offset any shortages in the labor force.

**Figure 2.35. ASEAN+3: Labor Force Participation Rates, by Age Bracket, 1990–2021**  
(Percent)

### Female




### Male



Source: International Labour Organization; AMRO staff calculations.


Note: Areas represent the range of average labor force participation rates from 1990 to 2021 in the region per age bracket.

**Figure 2.36. ASEAN+3: Contribution of the Change of the Share of the Working-Age Population to GDP per Capita Growth**  
(Percent)



Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. The decomposition methodology follows IMF (2019) and data refers to annual average during the period.

**Figure 2.37. Selected ASEAN+3: Workers-to-Consumers Ratio**  
(Index, 2020 = 100)



Source: National Transfer Accounts; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Data refers to the "Support Ratio" in the National Transfer Accounts project. The lower the support ratio, the fewer workers there are to finance consumers (young, prime age, and seniors) in the economy. Only economies with falling ratios to 2040 are included in the chart.

**Box 2.1:****Population Aging and Economic Growth: Stocktaking Evidence**

The impact of aging on economic growth has been the subject of numerous studies. Most of the existing literature tends to focus on developed economies, since many are already in advanced stages of the demographic transition. The general agreement in the findings is that population aging has a dampening effect on economic growth, and several studies have attempted to quantify this impact. A study by Maestas, Mullen, and Powell (2023) suggests that a 10 percent increase in the population share of those aged 60 and above results in a 5.5 percent decrease in per capita GDP growth in the United States (US). Similarly, Cylus and Al Tayara (2021)—in a global study across 180 countries—found that a 1 percentage point rise in the share of the ages 55 to 69 demographic is associated with a 0.67 percentage point reduction in real GDP per capita growth. Focusing specifically on Asian economies, Otsu and Shibayama (2016) estimated that population aging would reduce annual GDP per capita growth rates by 0.21 percentage points between 2015 and 2050, compared to a benchmark model without demographic effects.

In general, the negative consequences on growth can manifest through several channels, but primarily through (1) lower productivity growth, (2) a contracting labor supply, and (3) decreased savings.

**Lower productivity**

The predominant view is that population aging affects output growth by lowering productivity. Maestas, Mullen and Powell (2023) found that two-thirds of the slowdown in US GDP growth between 1980 and 2010 was driven by slower growth in labor productivity. The IMF (2017a), in a study of 32 Asian and European economies, found that a higher share of older workers is associated with a significant slowdown in labor productivity, which they then attribute to lower growth in total factor productivity (TFP). In the Asia sample, an aging workforce could lower TFP growth by as much as 0.3 percentage points annually. In line with this finding, Lee and Shin (2021) highlighted the reduced

TFP growth as the most significant channel through which the negative effects of aging operate. Linking population age structure and TFP growth, Feyrer (2007, 2008) identified a hump-shaped relationship between both variables. TFP growth appears to peak for workers aged 40 to 49, and a 5 percentage point increase in the share of this age group (to total population) over a decade is linked to a 1–2 percentage point increase in productivity growth in each year. Similarly, Werding (2008) found that age-related contributions to TFP growth peak for workers in their forties.

One possible mechanism in which an aging population could result in lower productivity growth is through lower innovation. Derrien, Kecskés, and Nguyen (2018) found a strong negative relationship between age and innovation in a US study: a younger labor force tends to produce more innovation. Their study showed that a 1 standard deviation decrease in mean age is associated with a 5 percent to 11 percent increase in the number of patents and a 2 percent increase in productivity. Aksoy and others (2019) similarly estimated that aging may lead to a 15 percent to 30 percent drop in per capita patent applications among OECD countries in the next two decades.

**Lower supply of labor**

In addition to lowering productivity, aging affects an economy's labor supply. As individuals surpass working age (typically up to 64), many choose to retire and the workforce could contract if the number of retirees exceeds the number of new labor force entrants. Even within the working-age population, labor force participation rates (LFPRs) across the world are lower for older individuals, compounding the effects of a shrinking workforce. In their 2023 study, Maestas, Mullen and Powell estimated that one-third of the slowdown in US GDP growth was due to the slower labor force growth. Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the share of population aged 60 and above leads to a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the growth rate of workers per capita. For OECD countries, Kotschy

and Bloom (2023) estimate that income per capita will grow at 2.5 percent annually between 2020 and 2050, if working-age shares were fixed at their 2015 levels. After accounting for the fall in working-age shares due to retirement, growth of income per capita will be lowered to 1.7 percent annually. Zooming into Asia, Park and Shin (2011) estimated that over 40 percent of the aging-induced decline in the growth of Singapore's GDP per capita between 2021 and 2030 can be explained by the decline in the ratio of workers to total population. Singapore exhibited the largest slowdown in GDP per capita in their sample.

However, aging's drag on labor supply can be partially compensated for by an increase in old-age LFPR. LFPRs for older individuals in high-income economies have increased substantially over the past two decades. Looking at OECD countries, Lee and Shin (2021) found that the slower growth in the share of the working population—due to the increase in the number of seniors—can be more than offset by the increase in the LFPR. In 13 Asian economies, a 6 percentage points increase in the LFPR could boost annual GDP growth by as much as 0.3 percentage points, as highlighted by the IMF (2017a).

### Lower savings

Aging also affects economic growth by reducing saving and investment rates. The life cycle hypothesis,

put forward by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), posits that individuals attempt to maintain the same level of consumption throughout their lives. As such, they increase their savings when their earnings are high to finance their consumption during retirement, when their incomes are low. Consequently, as a population ages, aggregate savings will also fall as individuals save less in their senior years.

The savings rate has been shown to be significantly correlated with an economy's age composition. Bosworth and Chodorow-Reich (2006) and Higgins (1998), for example, find that increases in youth and old-age dependency ratios are associated with lower saving rates. More crucially, the lower rate of saving leads to less capital accumulation and investment.<sup>1</sup> This then weighs on economic growth, as highlighted by Park and Shin (2011) in their study of 12 Asian economies. For example, nearly 30 percent of the projected aging-induced decline in Korea's GDP per capita—between 2021 and 2030—is due to reduced savings, which then translate into a decline in the economy's capital intensity. In a broader sample covering OECD countries, Aksoy and others (2019) project that demographic changes will, on average, reduce savings by 3 percentage points of GDP and investment by 2 percentage points, ultimately cutting output growth by 1.25 percentage points of GDP across the sample by 2030, when compared to initial growth in 2010.

<sup>1</sup> Aging's impact on national savings-investment patterns will also have bearing on economies' capital flows and current account positions. This is discussed in detail in IMF (2019), which point out that an economy that is experiencing a slower rate of aging relative to the rest of the world could expect its current account balance to deteriorate as they receive more capital from economies that are aging more rapidly (and thus saving more). This, of course, carries its own distributional effects within the recipient economy. See, for example, Krueger and Ludwig (2007).

## Box 2.2:

# Macroeconomic Consequences of Population Aging in China

China is undergoing a significant demographic transformation. Beyond the decline in total population, the age structure of its people has shifted rapidly. Sustained decreases in mortality and fertility rates since the 1970s have led to a transition from a youthful to an aging population structure, with the proportion of seniors—those aged 65 and above—rising from 8.9 percent in 2010 to 14.9 percent in 2022. These demographic trends are expected to persist and will continue to shape the population structure. According to the latest United Nations (UN) population projections (medium variant), the proportion of seniors is likely to double to 30.1 percent by 2050 from 2022, making China one of the most aged economies in the world by the middle of this century. This also reflects a likely 7.6 percent contraction of the total population between 2022 and 2050 (Figure 2.2.1).

A general equilibrium life-cycle model—following the approach of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)—is employed to assess the potential macroeconomic implications of China's demographic transformation. This dynamic model represents the world economy as two regions: China and the rest of world. Each region is populated by 70 overlapping generations of adult agents, with uncertain lifespans, who raise children and supply labor inelastically. The model assumes capital as fully mobile internationally, while labor is not, and also incorporates a stylized pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension plan to simulate the actual pension schemes in China and the rest of the world. Calibrated to economic and population data for 2020, the model spans from 2020 to 2300 to ensure a steady state is attained. A counterfactual “reference” scenario is first constructed, with a stationary population in China. The UN population projections (medium variant) are then introduced under a “demographic shock” scenario. The difference between these two scenarios helps unveil the macroeconomic effects of future demographic changes in China.

Demographic transition is estimated as reducing China's long-term economic growth. Simulation results indicate that the annual GDP growth rate over 2020–2050 would be trimmed by 0.79 percentage points as the population continues to age (Figure 2.2.2). Per capita GDP growth would also be slower as the supply of productivity-adjusted effective labor shrinks faster than the population.<sup>1</sup> Due to differences in labor productivity and workforce participation across age cohorts, the aging of the labor force will lead to a larger decline in effective labor. As capital substitutes for more expensive labor, the deceleration in the growth of the capital stock—induced by population aging—will be more modest than that of labor.

The severity of demographic shocks on China's economic growth will also vary over time. As post-famine baby boomers (those born between 1962 and 1970) reach the age of 65 and above, China's aging will accelerate thereafter, resulting in a reduction of about 0.75 percentage points in annual growth from 2026 to 2028 (Figure 2.2.3 and Figure 2.2.4, left panel). As fewer people then enter retirement age, this growth deceleration caused by demographic transition will moderate in the 2030s. However, GDP growth is likely to deteriorate significantly after 2040 as the continuous reduction in new, young workforce entrants leads to a rapid decline in labor supply (Figure 2.2.4, center panel). In 2050, demographic changes could lower China's growth rate by as much as 1.63 percentage points.

In addition, the evolving balance between investment and savings as the population ages could see China's current account position improve. As labor declines and output growth slows in a demographic shock scenario, investment growth will also be lower. However, as capital per worker increases, investment—as a share of GDP—will rise slightly compared to the reference scenario (Figure 2.2.4, right panel). Despite the higher proportion of elderly people amid the demographic transition, household savings as a share of GDP would

This box was written by Fan Zhai.


<sup>1</sup> Effective labor is the aggregate labor measured in efficiency units. It is defined as the sum of the labor force of each age cohort multiplied by its corresponding age-specific productivity.

also increase for two reasons: (1) lower fertility reduces spending on the consumption of children, and (2) the anticipated longer time in retirement (due to increased longevity) effectively lowers households' discount rate. As the increase in savings rate exceeds that of investment, China's current account balance, as a ratio to GDP, is estimated to be 2.2 percentage points higher on average than in the reference scenario during 2020–2050.

Population aging will also impose a significant pension burden for China. In 2050, pension


expenditure as a share of GDP is projected to expand by 3.7 percentage points, rising from 7.9 percent in the reference scenario to 11.6 percent amid demographic shocks (Figure 2.2.4, right panel). This increase would necessitate additional government financing—for example, by raising taxes or issuing more bonds—to fill the resulting gap. Under a defined-benefit PAYG scheme, the contribution rate for the current generation of workers must be increased to balance the pension fund, potentially exerting additional pressures on economic growth.

**Figure 2.2.1. China: UN Population Projections**  
(Millions of persons)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.  
Note: Data refers to medium variant projections.

**Figure 2.2.2. China: Growth Impact of Projected Demographic Changes, 2021–50**  
(Percentage points difference relative to the reference scenario)




Source: AMRO staff.  
Note: Data represents the percentage point change in average annual growth rates between the demographic shock scenario and the counterfactual reference scenario.

**Figure 2.2.3. China: Population Pyramid, 2020**  
(Millions of persons)



Source: The Seventh National Population Census, National Bureau of Statistics, China.

**Figure 2.2.4. China: Macroeconomic Impacts of Projected Demographic Changes, Relative to Reference Scenario**  
(Percentage points)



Source: AMRO staff.

Note: The "demographic shock" scenario does not take into account any policy responses.

On the other hand, the impact of aging on inflation dynamics is much more complex. Demographic changes cause relative price changes due to the differences in consumption preferences between the young and the old. For example, older people spend more on services, such as long-term care, and housing maintenance, whereas younger populations mostly spend on goods, like clothing, electronics, and motor vehicles (Lee 2016; Nerlich and Schroth 2018). Since the 1980s, favorable global demographics—leading to a large young workforce—have helped foster low inflation; however, as once-abundant labor shrinks in coming decades, this tailwind will soon be reversed and become inflationary (Carstens 2022). Yet, even as an aging population can drive up wages due to labor shortages, it can also lead to downward pressure on long-term prices from expectations of weaker future growth. Ultimately, the relative magnitude of these counteracting forces will influence the extent of aging’s impact on ASEAN+3 price stability (Table 2.2).

Aging populations will put pressure on public finances across ASEAN+3. Rapid aging can exacerbate fiscal vulnerabilities across the region’s economies. Moving forward, demand for health care services, pensions, and other elderly care facilities will increase across ASEAN+3 (Figure 2.38). Additional fiscal costs for health care spending in 2032—compared to 2022—are estimated to range from under 1 percent of GDP (in China, Japan, and Thailand) to more than 2 percent of GDP (in Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore) (AMRO 2023). However, tax revenues may not necessarily rise in tandem.<sup>15</sup> If governments need to borrow more to pay for old-age

benefits, this could also lead to a “crowding out” of private investment (Lee and Mason 2017). In addition, aging can lead public debt-to-GDP ratios to worsen over time by depressing aggregate output (Box 1.5). Various social protection programs for seniors are in place across the region’s economies, but their effectiveness tends to be undermined by structural challenges and questions on long-term financial sustainability (Box 2.3). For those with less developed social safety nets, this means significant reforms are needed to prevent fiscal imbalances while ensuring the welfare of the old-age population. Economies in the early stages of the demographic transition have more time to deal with these weaknesses than their peers, but the fast pace of aging underscores the need for rapid and timely action (Figure 2.39).

Aging can affect ASEAN+3 financial stability through its impact on (equilibrium) real interest rates and changing demand for financial assets. Aging impacts savings at the aggregate level, which means that the real equilibrium interest rate would have to adjust in response to the changes to demand and supply for savings.<sup>16</sup> Various empirical studies have identified demographic transition as a main driver of declining equilibrium real interest rates. As aging accelerates globally, low equilibrium interest rates could complicate central banks’ ability to manage inflation moving forward in cases where it is very low—as in Japan (Hong and Schneider 2020). The financial system will also not be immune to the impacts of aging. In the case of China, the shrinking cohort of individuals aged 25 to 39 years—typically first-time home buyers—could

**Table 2.2. Population Aging and Inflation—A Tale of Two Views**

| Impact              | Channels of transmission (from selected studies)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Inflationary</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aging affects consumption-savings decisions across an individual’s lifetime: working-age individuals save more to prepare for spending in retirement (net savers), and those who retire then spend their accumulated wealth for consumption (net consumers). A larger share of net consumers to total population creates, in turn, a demand-driven inflationary impulse (Lindh and Malmberg 2000; Juselius and Takats 2016).<sup>17</sup></li> <li>Labor shortages also push up real wages, which compounds the impact from the supply side.</li> <li>Aging, if driven by falling birth rates, can be inflationary—as the smaller tax base reduces the fiscal surplus, and could prompt the government to allow inflation to rise to erode the value of its debt and maintain solvency (Katagiri, Konishi, and Ueda 2020).</li> </ul>                                                                                                                             |
| <b>Deflationary</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An aging population feeds expectations of a growth slowdown and so exerts deflation pressures (Shirakawa 2012).</li> <li>Some services consumed more frequently by the older population—such as preventive visits—also tend to be more price-inelastic to higher demand, which could have a dampening effect on their respective price levels (Lis, Nickel, and Papetti 2020).</li> <li>Some studies suggest that seniors tend to favor low inflation due to redistributive effects, which suggests that a larger share of seniors to the total population may influence monetary policy to be biased toward low inflation (Bullard, Garriga, and Waller 2012).</li> <li>The abovementioned influence on policymaking is also suggested by Katagiri, Konishi, and Ueda (2020): if aging is driven by increased longevity—which increases the share of the older (voting) population—this can be deflationary as governments try to keep inflation low.</li> </ul> |

Source: AMRO staff compilation.

<sup>15/</sup> For example, as older people spend more on services such as health care, the direct tax revenues (collected from spending on durable goods) is unlikely to rise substantially.

<sup>16/</sup> This would also carry implications for economies’ current account dynamics and external positions (Box 2.1).

<sup>17/</sup> Goodhart and Pradhan (2017) also highlights that the production process, in itself, is disinflationary. Given that the senior population consists purely of consumers, this group generates an inflation impulse (which workers can offset through production).


further dampen long-term demand for real estate, with negative repercussions on banks with considerable linkages with the property sector (Magnus 2022).<sup>18</sup> Elsewhere, evidence from Japan finds that aging has encouraged more market-based finance (i.e., stock market activity) than bank financing—with long-term implications on bank profitability and soundness (IMF 2017b). A higher proportion of older individuals can reduce local demand for credit (due to their accumulated savings), which could push banks toward other (potentially riskier) sources of income, to lend with lower standards in order to extend credit, or to search for higher yields in overseas markets (Doerr, Kabas, and Ongena 2021). A confluence of these factors could complicate the long-term management of financial stability in ASEAN+3.

However, aging's consequences on macrostability are incremental over the long term. In the medium term, there remains room for economic gains. For economies like Malaysia and Vietnam, the still-stable share of economically active individuals in the next decade suggest that productive gains can still be had—even as the share of the elderly population grows rapidly. Further, expectations of labor shortages should encourage firms to undertake

labor-saving capital investment, which should translate into higher output per worker. An aging population also induces technology adoption, with growth-enhancing effects (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018). Automation and new technologies, such as robotics and artificial intelligence, can help offset the negative impact of shrinking workforces while augmenting the skills of older workers. The deepening of ASEAN+3 capital markets can also occur as pension assets rise—with corresponding development in individual capital markets that could allow for more effective accumulation and mobilization of retirement savings.


Positively supporting aging trends can open potential sources of growth for the ASEAN+3 region. The longevity dividend highlights how the older population is a latent resource that can be mobilized to support future growth. Advances in medicine have prolonged “biological” ages, extending years of productive life. Older cohorts also have an accumulation of experience and knowledge that increases with age (especially in expert fields) and can offer many competencies based on a wealth of experience. However, realizing this potential would first require a reframing of the issue of aging in the context of the ASEAN+3 region.

**Figure 2.38. ASEAN+3: Old-Age Public Expenditure and Old-Age Ratios**  
(Percent of GDP)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; International Labour Organization; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Old-age ratios are as of 2021. Government expenditure on old-age (as of 2020, or latest available year) includes expenditure on services and transfers provided to old-age individuals and expenditure on services provided on a collective basis (including contributory and non-contributory).

**Figure 2.39. ASEAN+3: Effective Old-Age Coverage versus Old-Age Ratios, 2030**  
(Percent of total population)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; International Labour Organization; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Effective coverage of old-age refers to ratio of persons above statutory retirement age receiving an old-age pension to the number of persons above statutory retirement age (including contributory and non-contributory).

<sup>18/</sup> Under medium-fertility variant projections, this age cohort for China is projected to be 20 percent smaller in 2030—relative to 2020—and will shrink by a further 10 percent by 2050.

## Box 2.3:

## Old-Age Social Protection in ASEAN+3 Economies

Old-age social protection systems across ASEAN+3 economies are very diverse and characterized by distinct stages of maturity and institutional arrangements. While the definition of “social protection” varies across economies, the term usually refers to three pillars that a society provides to protect its population against economic and social distress: (1) social assistance, (2) social insurance, and (3) labour market programs (OECD 2018). Social protection aims to promote aging with dignity by providing income security and access to essential social services for seniors, including to essential health services and long-term care. In ASEAN+3, legal frameworks across these three areas—old-age pension, universal health coverage (UHC), and long-term care (LTC) insurance—exist in varying degrees, with Japan, Korea, and Singapore having the most comprehensive scope of legal coverage (Table 2.3.1).

The structure and design of ASEAN+3 pension systems vary across economies, requiring care when undertaking a regional comparison (Figure 2.3.1).

Except for Lao PDR, all economies in the region offer some form of pension floor (Tier 0), which guarantees minimum income security for seniors.<sup>1</sup> The schemes can be categorized into (1) universal, (2) means-tested, and (3) pension-tested to determine recipient eligibility.<sup>2</sup> In terms of pension floor financing, Japan and China rely on a mixed financing arrangement (financed by member contributions and tax) while the rest rely on a tax-financed non-contributory scheme.

Tier 1 schemes, which aim to provide income replacement in old age, are either provident savings fund or pension funds with defined contribution or defined benefit schemes. At present, Myanmar is the only ASEAN+3 economy that has yet to introduce a national pension scheme for formal private sector workers, although legal provisions are in place. In terms of financing, China, Japan, and Korea—which have larger elderly populations—resort to a mix of fiscal subsidy and member contributions to finance Tier 1 schemes while member contributions finance the rest.

**Table 2.3.1. ASEAN+3: Social Protection Systems for Seniors**

|             | Existence of Legal Framework |                           |                          |
|-------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
|             | Old-age pension              | Universal health coverage | Long-term care insurance |
| Brunei      | ✓                            | ✓                         | None                     |
| Cambodia    | ✓                            | ✓                         | None                     |
| China       | ✓                            | ○                         | ◊                        |
| Hong Kong   | ✓                            | ○                         | None                     |
| Indonesia   | ✓                            | ○                         | None                     |
| Japan       | ✓                            | ✓                         | ✓                        |
| Korea       | ✓                            | ✓                         | ✓                        |
| Lao PDR     | ✓                            | ○                         | None                     |
| Malaysia    | ✓                            | ○                         | None                     |
| Myanmar     | ●                            | ○                         | None                     |
| Philippines | ✓                            | ✓                         | None                     |
| Singapore   | ✓                            | ✓                         | ✓                        |
| Thailand    | ✓                            | ✓                         | None                     |
| Vietnam     | ✓                            | ○                         | None                     |

✓ Program is anchored in national legislation

○ Backed by a national plan instead of legislation

● Program is yet to be fully implemented

◊ Program is under pilot trial

Source: World Health Organization; International Labour Organization; AMRO staff compilation based on officially published national documents.

Note: For universal health coverage (UHC), this refers to whether economies have an explicit UHC law.

This box was written by Dek Joe Sum.

<sup>1/</sup> This box considers the term “multi-tier” and “multi-pillar” to be broadly synonymous. The term “multi-tier” is used throughout rather than “multi-pillar” as the former better represents the overlapping nature of pension system components.


<sup>2/</sup> Vietnam uses a pension-tested scheme, where seniors aged 80 years and above who do not have access to the Vietnamese Social Security (VSS) system are qualified for a defined benefit and a non-contributory pension floor. It is called as such because qualification depends on access to the VSS.

Tier 2 and 3 schemes, which are fully-funded occupational and private schemes, are available in every economy except Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. In terms of effective old-age coverage, the ratio is broadly higher in economies that are projected to become aged and super-aged societies by 2030 (Figure 2.39 in this chapter). Brunei stands out, however, as it is likely to achieve 100 percent old-age coverage by 2030 despite having a much slower pace of aging than Japan, Korea, and China. Similarly, fiscal spending on pension and other old-age related benefits is higher in economies with a larger elderly population (Figure 2.38 in this chapter). A notable exception is Hong Kong. Its significantly lower level of spending compared to ASEAN+3 peers with a similar demographic pattern is because the pension system receives no government subsidies.<sup>3</sup>

Social protection for seniors also requires easy access to publicly provided, affordable social services, such as health care. In line with the objective of UHC, social protection systems are “expected to

guarantee access to health care without hardship by satisfying the criteria of availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality” (ILO 2022). However, given budgetary restrictions, governments often face a dilemma involving competing demands from expanding the population and service coverages and providing quality medical care. This underscores the importance of health financing policies. A balanced and well-designed system for financing health care can deliver quality health services, equitable utilization of resources, and financial protection for the vulnerable population, while achieving long-term financial sustainability. According to the World Health Organization (2021a), the success of health financing systems depends on the performance of three important functions: (1) revenue collection, (2) pooling and management of resources, and (3) purchasing of services and interventions. Hence, careful consideration needs to be given to budgeting frameworks of social protection and health insurance schemes to improve the sustainability and impact of health financing.

**Figure 2.3.1. ASEAN+3: Multi-tier Pension Systems**



Source: International Labour Organization; AMRO staff compilation based on officially published national documents.

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. This regional comparison excludes civil servant pension, including for military personnel, for brevity. Tier 2 refers to complementary schemes and Tier 3 refers to voluntary personal pension. Both are usually fully and privately funded, with limited exceptions, and as such are lumped together in this box.

<sup>3/</sup> This is attributed to the fact that old-age pensions in Hong Kong, China are mainly financed through the Mandatory Provident Fund.

In ASEAN+3, most economies have developed some form of contribution-based scheme to finance their health systems, either through social health insurance or a mix of social and community-based health insurance (Table 2.3.2). A contribution-based financing scheme brings the benefits of risk-pooling, stable revenue flows, and access to a broader range of services and products. However, administrative complexity can also make it challenging to manage. For example, the World Bank (2020) found that the fragmented intergovernmental transfers in Indonesia's decentralized system have created a fundamental disconnect between the level and geographic distribution of public health financing and the benefits offered, leading to implicit rationing and inequities in the incidence of social health expenditure. Contribution-based financing schemes are also vulnerable to exclusion and resource gaps, especially in economies with large informal sectors. For example, in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, out-of-pocket (OOP) payments—a modality considered inefficient and inequitable—remain the dominant source for current health expenditure financing, despite the existence of other various contributory schemes (Figure 2.3.2).

Other economies—Brunei, Hong Kong, and Malaysia—use a tax-based national health system as their financing method. While this method provides universal legal coverage and risk-pooling for the entire population, it is prone to unstable funding due to competing priorities for public expenditure. Malaysia's one-size-fits-all fee structure and reliance on a single source of tax financing have contributed to prolonged underinvestment in health and a health budget that no longer matches the reality of its changing demographics (Malaysia Ministry of Health 2023). These

outcomes underscore the challenge of achieving UHC across the ASEAN+3 region, and the need to undertake necessary policy reforms to provide adequate social health protection. Currently, the region's aged and super-aged societies generally enjoy a higher coverage in essential health services and tend to implement larger public health-related spending (Figures 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).

Increased longevity and decreased fertility rates in ASEAN+3 have raised concerns about who will provide care for the growing number of older people (who will have more long-term and complex care needs) and how to finance this long-term care. Japan and Korea are the early movers, having institutionalised LTC insurance schemes more than a decade ago, while China is undertaking a pilot trial for LTC insurance in 49 cities. In the ASEAN, Singapore is the only economy to have institutionalised LTC insurance through the CareShield Life and LTC Bill in 2019. The differing speeds in LTC institutionalization reflect demographic patterns across the region, as well as the speed of aging, and different levels of social protection development. While there has been no systematic data collection or estimates on how much informal care costs, the majority of LTC financing in ASEAN is from private financing—including through family care, unpaid family labor, and volunteer care—and OOP expenditure for health and social care services, or the employment of domestic workers to provide care (Wyse and Walker 2021).

Moving forward, the spectrum of maturity and institutional features of old-age social protection systems in ASEAN+3 will remain highly diverse, especially as each economy is confronted with unique challenges arising from population aging.


**Table 2.3.2. ASEAN+3: Health System Financing Mechanisms**

|                    | Health system                                                                  | Long-term care                  |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <b>Brunei</b>      | Tax-based national health system                                               | N/A                             |
| <b>Cambodia</b>    | Limited social/community-based health insurance coverage and social assistance | N/A                             |
| <b>China</b>       | Social health insurance                                                        | N/A                             |
| <b>Hong Kong</b>   | Tax-based national health system                                               | N/A                             |
| <b>Indonesia</b>   | Social health insurance                                                        | N/A                             |
| <b>Japan</b>       | Social health insurance                                                        | Social long-term care insurance |
| <b>Korea</b>       | Social health insurance                                                        | Social long-term care insurance |
| <b>Lao PDR</b>     | Limited social/community-based health insurance coverage and social assistance | N/A                             |
| <b>Malaysia</b>    | Tax-based national health system                                               | N/A                             |
| <b>Myanmar</b>     | Limited social health insurance coverage and social assistance                 | N/A                             |
| <b>Philippines</b> | Social health insurance                                                        | N/A                             |
| <b>Singapore</b>   | Tax-based public health system and social health insurance                     | Social long-term care insurance |
| <b>Thailand</b>    | Tax-based national health system and social health insurance                   | N/A                             |
| <b>Vietnam</b>     | Social health insurance                                                        | N/A                             |

Source: World Health Organization; International Labour Organization; AMRO staff compilation based on officially published national documents.

Note: The information refers to the scheme each member economy uses to finance its statutory health system and long-term care program. It is important to note that the statutory financing arrangement may not necessarily be the dominant source of financing. The classification of health system financing scheme used in this box follows ILO (2015) and OECD/WHO/Eurostat (2011), with necessary adjustments to reflect the latest arrangement in ASEAN+3 member economies. N/A = not available.


**Figure 2.3.2. ASEAN+3: Sources of Current Health Expenditure Financing, 2021**  
(Percent of current health expenditure)



Source: World Health Organization (2021a); national authorities.


Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Data for Hong Kong are not available. For further details on financing sources, refer to WHO (2021a).

**Figure 2.3.3. ASEAN+3: Old-age Ratios and Effective Coverage of Essential Health Services, 2030**  
(Percent)



Source: United Nations via Haver Analytics; International Labour Organization.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. The old-age ratio is defined as the share of people of ages 65 years and above in the total population. Coverage of essential health services is defined as the average coverage of essential services based on tracer interventions that include reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health, infectious diseases, noncommunicable diseases, and service capacity and access, among the general and the most disadvantaged population.

**Figure 2.3.4. ASEAN+3: Domestic General Government Health Expenditure and Old-age Ratios**  
(Percent of GDP)



Source: United Nations via Haver Analytics and International Labour Organization.

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. The old-age ratio is defined as the share of people of ages 65 years and above in the total population, and the data are as of 2023. General government expenditure on health—with data as of 2021—includes all public sources for health system such as domestic revenue (internal transfers and grants, transfers); subsidies to voluntary health insurance beneficiaries; nonprofit institutions serving households or enterprise financing schemes; as well as compulsory prepayment and social health insurance contributions.

## Rethinking Aging for ASEAN+3

*"Demography is destiny—really?"*

David Bloom, Harvard School of Public Health Professor, March 2020


Conventional measures of aging, such as the old-age boundary of 60 or 65 years, tend to overlook the dramatic increase in life expectancy. Global life expectancy (at birth) in 2021 is 71 years, 25 years longer than it was in 1950. In the ASEAN+3, an average person can expect to live at least three decades longer than someone born in 1950. Economies like Korea, Thailand, China, and Singapore have seen much higher gains in lifespan. In other words, while the region is aging, it is living longer and hence, biologically, it is aging more *slowly* than it did in previous generations. The longer lifespan brings into question what defines "old" and how it is measured. Conventional measures of aging—such as the median age and old-age dependency ratios—tend to consider and/or emphasize the *chronological* age, or how long one has lived. Many existing studies highlight the shortcomings of doing so: by ignoring the state of health and quality of life, these measures suffer from being backward-looking, narrow, and isolated from demographic realities (Gietel-Basten, Saucedo, and Scherbov 2020; Scott 2023). Comparisons across economies are less meaningful when using chronological ages, or even across time for a single economy.<sup>19</sup>

Prospective measures offer a more realistic way of thinking about aging—and how to respond. In contrast to the chronological measure of aging, prospective measures look at the *biological* age—or how many more years one has left. By considering whether people are aging well,

the issue of demographic transition shifts from a largely negative narrative (more older people requiring economic support) to one that recognizes the potential economic gains from longer productive lives, or the longevity dividend. This is especially relevant for several ASEAN+3 economies that are living longer and also healthier, compared to other peers, even advanced ones (Figure 2.40). Prospective measures remove the boundary to old age and allow it to change over time. Sanderson and Scherbov (2007, 2010) use life expectancy-equivalent ages to measure aging: an age group is considered to be old only when their average remaining life expectancy is less than 15 years. They also suggest that dependency must be viewed as a presence of disability rather than as a function of age. Beyond statistics, these proposals have important policy implications: prospective measures can offer more realistic fiscal costs of aging and affect future policies on pensions, elderly care, and old-age support (Gietel-Basten, Saucedo, and Scherbov 2020).<sup>20</sup>

From a prospective approach, the trajectory of aging in the ASEAN+3 region is more gradual than it is often perceived to be. Following Sanderson and Scherbov (2007), *prospective* old-age population shares suggest that the old-age population in ASEAN+3 will be about 26 percent of the total population by 2050, half of what conventional old-age population shares suggest (Figure 2.41). This lower share by 2050 is equivalent to about 200 million people "re-included" in the region's

**Figure 2.40. World: Healthy Life Expectancy, 2019**  
(Number of years)



Source: World Health Organization.

Note: BN = Brunei; CA = Canada; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States; VN = Vietnam. Healthy life expectancy refers to the average number of years that a person can expect to live in "full health" by taking into account years lived in less than full health due to disease and/or injury. Gray dots correspond to other economies. Data not available for Hong Kong.

<sup>19</sup> For example, the health status of a 90-year-old in an advanced economy cannot be the same as a similarly aged individual in another economy with a less-developed medical system.

<sup>20</sup> This is because health care expenditures tend to be more linked to life expectancy than chronological age.

workforce. The prospective measure also suggests that the working-age cohorts could still expand within the decade and peak by mid-2030s (Figure 2.42). Economies in advanced stages of transition, especially Singapore, Thailand, and China, are expected to benefit significantly from the potential longevity dividend. Smaller gains for late-transition economies imply that more older people are already part of their current labor force. For those in early transition, the impact will be small until 2050, but will increase thereafter as they enter the latter stages of aging. Similarly, *prospective* median age calculations suggest lower median ages, especially in Plus-3 economies (Figure 2.43). Longer life expectancies have led to a younger ASEAN+3 population, in biological terms, who can be productive for longer.

This carries several macroeconomic policy implications for ASEAN+3 economies. By considering biological aging, the inevitable demographic transition becomes less daunting and offers a more optimistic outlook on the region's long-term growth. A prospective approach reframes aging as a relatively more manageable policy challenge for ASEAN+3, while at the same time keeping the “demographic window of opportunity... open for longer,” (Basten, Yip, and Chui 2013). Implementing reforms aimed at encouraging older worker participation can help buffer against aging's negative impact on long-term growth. By enabling longer working careers beyond an old-age boundary as one option, individuals would—to some extent—need to accumulate less wealth (for retirement), and longer working careers would boost income, delay the age for dis-saving, and encourage more consumption. This, in turn, could ease downward pressure on real interest rates, with implications for the conduct of monetary policy. A prospective approach to aging also underscores the need to enhance pension systems to incorporate longer life expectancies across the ASEAN+3. By offering more refined estimates on future age-related spending, utilization of the


prospective measures could also minimize the risk of overestimating future fiscal liabilities, especially given ASEAN+3's multiple spending priorities.

This is not to say that population aging is no longer an issue of concern for the ASEAN+3 region. Reframing the issue of aging, however, allows policymaking to shift from merely responding to the challenges of aging to maximizing the benefits of a larger—and healthier—workforce. While many myths about aging—such that older workers compete with younger workers for job opportunities and that they are less productive—have already been found to be empirically untrue, ageism and ageist attitudes remain persistent globally even when these are economically costly (Gruber, Milligan, and Wise 2011; World Health Organization 2021b).<sup>21</sup> For ASEAN+3, policies that combat these hurdles and support longevity would become as crucial as policies that mitigate the economic burden of aging.

Rather, rethinking aging in ASEAN+3 beyond an age boundary highlights the need for a more nuanced policy approach. It is crucial to acknowledge that with older cohorts a highly heterogeneous group, some policies that work for one group—or one economy—may not work for another. For example, the “reskillability” of new retirees would likely be higher than those who have already retired for some time. Involuntary retirees—or those who retire early due to various reasons—would also require a different policy approach, given that they are unable to tap their pensions to finance consumption until they reach the requisite retirement age. Across the ASEAN+3 region, the policy challenge of reskilling (and upskilling) the older workers will be more urgent in aging economies that are also experiencing a faster pace of structural transformation. Deeper and more granular understanding of how longer life expectancies change workers' incentives, needs, and behaviors would be critical—however, this area, especially in ASEAN+3, still needs further empirical research.


<sup>21/</sup> That enabling older individuals to work for longer would reduce job prospects for younger workers—or alternatively, to encourage them to retire would provide more work to younger employees—is usually referred to as the “lump of labor” fallacy. It falsely rests on the assumption that there is a fixed amount of work to be done in an economy, discounting the reality that as workers increase, the economy (and economic activity) correspondingly expands and creates more work.

**Figure 2.41. ASEAN+3: Prospective versus Retrospective Measures of Old Age Population**  
(Ratio to total population)




Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.

**Figure 2.42. ASEAN+3: Prospective versus Retrospective Measures of Working-Age Population**  
(Percent of total population)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant).

**Figure 2.43. Plus-3: Prospective versus Retrospective Measures of Median Age**  
(Years)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Figures after 2021 use UN estimates (medium variant). While the median age is the age that divides the population into two numerically equal groups, the prospective median age for each year is the age in that year's life table where the remaining life expectancy is the same as the median age in the reference year (2010).

## Policy Considerations

*"The current difficulties come not from the continued population aging itself, but from the delayed response to it."*

Masaaki Shirakawa, Former Governor of the Bank of Japan

Various policy measures are already being implemented across the ASEAN+3 region to address the adverse impact of population aging. However, more needs to be done to mitigate its potential impact on growth and macroeconomic stability. The nature of policy responses will necessarily differ across member economies, in view of the varied speeds of aging, the diverse characteristics of the aging population, and the variety of domestic conditions. Nevertheless, successfully navigating the rapidly changing demographic realities requires all sectors of the economy to adapt, including industry and financial institutions. While the issue of an aging population may initially appear as primarily a domestic issue, it has significant cross-border implications and thus requires international cooperation.

Key to harnessing the longevity dividend are policies and structures that allow ASEAN+3 populations to age productively. An aging population does not need be to a significant headwind to ASEAN+3 long-term growth, especially if the population is allowed and able to remain engaged in productive activities for longer.

By aiming for "healthy" longevity, a state where years in good health—across physical, mental, and social dimensions—approach a person's chronological life span (NAM 2022), ASEAN+3 economies can leverage on the experience and knowledge of an older workforce and enhance their human capital, while reducing the negative macroeconomic consequences of aging. Without doubt, these will require a multipronged, multifaceted approach that encompasses all stakeholders and various aspects of public policy—from labor policy, health policy, industrial policy (to promote the development of elderly care industries), to urban planning, among others. These longevity-related policies—some of which are being gradually implemented, or explored, across ASEAN+3—must be pursued proactively, given the speed of aging across the region (Table 2.3). These would provide a solid foundation for the successful implementation of other aging-related policies: for example, increasing retirement ages will only exacerbate macroeconomic pressures if the population is characterized by long yet unhealthy lives.

Table 2.3. ASEAN+3: Selected Policy Actions to Respond to the Challenge of Aging, as of December 2023

| Policy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | BN | CN | HK | ID | JP | KH | KR | LA | MY | MM | PH | SG | TH | VN |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| <b>Longevity dividend</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Policies that enable and encourage older adults to remain in the workforce longer<br>(e.g., workplace policies to ensure worker health and safety; increasing opportunities for part-time work and flexible schedules)                                                                                         |    | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  |    |    |    | ●  | ●  | ●  |    |
| Support lifelong learning and retraining<br>(e.g., grants or tax breaks to promote upskilling of employees, grants to individuals for engaging in midcareer training)                                                                                                                                          | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  |
| <b>Social infrastructure</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Develop legal protections for the rights of older people and ending age-based discrimination                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |    |    |    |    | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |    |    | ●  | ●  |    | ●  |
| Public information campaigns that highlight the value of older people to society                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |
| Ensuring basic financial security for older people (e.g., through retirement income systems, or support for older people with no income)                                                                                                                                                                       | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |    | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |
| <b>Physical environment</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Updating physical infrastructure to address affordability, insufficiencies, and inefficiencies in housing stock, as well as support autonomy and social connection<br>(e.g., age-friendly community and housing design protocols that enhance access to food, transportation, social services, and engagement) |    | ●  | ●  |    | ●  |    | ●  |    |    |    |    | ●  | ●  |    |
| Promoting policy solutions for healthy longevity, intergenerational connection, and social cohesion<br>(e.g., public spaces that promote social cohesion and encourage physical activity; promoting individual savings and financial literacy)                                                                 | ●  |    | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  |    |    |    | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |
| <b>Health systems</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Investments in affordable, accessible public health care systems, including geriatric care models, for providing person-centered, integrated care for older people                                                                                                                                             | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |    | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  |
| Public policies to incentivize individuals to engage in prevention and wellness activities<br>(e.g., preventive screening, address risk factors for chronic conditions, promote positive health behaviors)                                                                                                     | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |    | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  | ●  |
| Providing financial and technological support, training, and career pathways for informal caregivers as well as the paid long-term care workforce<br>(e.g., support for families and caregivers)                                                                                                               | ●  |    |    |    | ●  |    |    |    |    | ●  |    | ●  | ●  |    |

● Policies are in the process of implementation

● Policies have already been implemented

Source: AMRO staff compilation.

Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Policies (and descriptions) have been selected/curated from the recommendations of the National Academy of Medicine (2022).

Raising old-age (and retirees') labor participation rate will be crucial to reduce the impact of the shrinking labor, but supportive enablers must be in place. ASEAN+3 economies can reap substantial benefits from promoting age-inclusive and gender-inclusive labor policies. Female labor participation rates in the ASEAN+3 have lagged those of men, but the discrepancy is even more pronounced in older cohorts: for ages 65 and above, female LFPR rates are nearly half those of males. Increasing overall female participation would require massive and long-term improvements on both the demand-side (such as subsidized childcare) and supply-side (such as re-entry programs). *Generally*, raising older workers' participation requires a well-targeted mix of incentives and reforms to remove barriers to work. Existing labor rules and structures that bar older people's ability to join or stay longer in the workforce would have to be reviewed, and incentives—such as flexible or part-time work arrangements—should be expanded in parallel. *Specifically*, enhancement of labor policies must take into account the heterogeneity of the older cohorts—new retirees versus old retirees, and the incidence of leaving the workforce involuntarily, among others—in tandem with domestic labor market conditions. In the same vein, technology can be utilized to make jobs more age-friendly and make them less physically demanding, especially for seniors (Section IV). As longer working lives in ASEAN+3 will require multiple rounds of learning and training, lifelong learning systems will be crucial for workers to improve their employability in their later years.

Faced with an aging workforce, ASEAN+3 economies must leverage technology to boost productivity. The COVID-19 pandemic has already spurred innovation in many sectors across the ASEAN+3—including retail, banking, and health care—which could help lift the region toward a higher productivity-driven growth (AMRO 2022). Economies would benefit from capitalizing on these post-pandemic trends. Amid population aging, many technologies can enhance economy-wide productivity by substituting for scarce labor, or by complementing existing human capital. Financial and fiscal support would be crucial to improve firms' access to these technologies, especially in sectors with a high exposure to age-susceptible jobs. Policymakers can play a role by fostering a competitive business environment, which would further spur innovation, and by facilitating the necessary reallocation of capital and labor to more productive sectors. Boosting the productivity of human capital would also require improvements in health that reduce age-related diseases and promote preventive health care, through advanced medical technology and life sciences.

Pension system reforms will augment the economy's ability to mitigate shocks from rapid aging. While some in the ASEAN+3 have well-developed pension systems, most are still beset by issues relating to coverage and adequacy of benefits. Coverage levels of mandatory pension schemes across the region vary from as low as 30 percent of the working population to as high as 90 percent (OECD 2022). Statutory retirement ages should be revised periodically to incorporate a more prospective view of aging, in particular by taking account of lengthening life expectancies across the region. In some ASEAN economies, where the definition of dependency is more complex, the concept of "pensionable" rather than "retirement" age could be more appropriate (Gietel-Basten, Scherbov, and Sanderson 2016; ADB 2019). For others in the region, the financial sustainability of social insurance programs would have to be strengthened by learning from peers (Box 2.3). In parallel, policymaking must be mindful of the distributional consequences of particular reforms—for example, when raising the retirement age, which can be an option to minimize fiscal risks. In ASEAN+3 economies where the informal sector is large and/or where the "gig economy" is rapidly expanding, an increase in pension eligibility age may not be as effective. Similarly, where older workers already constitute a high portion of the workforce, raising the retirement age may not necessarily be the priority option (NAM 2022).

International cooperation will help facilitate knowledge-sharing, technology diffusion, and people movement that can ease existing labor shortages. Migration of foreign workers can play a part in alleviating the labor supply shock from an aging (local) population. Additionally, long-term demand for jobs related to care-giving and elder care are likely to increase, especially in economies in the late and advanced stages of the demographic transition. To this end, regional cooperation can pave the way for freer movement of labor across the ASEAN+3 region to complement—not substitute—other measures in response to aging while balancing against other policy priorities. Nevertheless, many barriers to intraregional labor movement exist, including license standards, limited sectors that migrants can access, and costly pre-employment requirements. Further, only movement of skilled labor is allowed in ASEAN under the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, in contrast with the European Union that allows free movement for all types of labor (Lan 2022). Closer international ties would also be positive for technology diffusion and knowledge sharing, especially given rapid advancements in medical technology, automation, and artificial intelligence. Continuously addressing the digital divide within and across ASEAN+3 economies could be instrumental in creating new employment opportunities for the aging population.

### III. Navigating Trade Reconfiguration

Global trade is in the midst of significant change. This trend is not new: global value chains, or GVCs, and globalization in general, have gone through “ebbs and flows” as part of trade’s evolution (Aiyar and others 2023). Over their history, GVCs have become longer and increasingly complex, facilitated by the improvement in transportation and fall in global logistic costs.<sup>22</sup> Large multinational companies outsourced segments of their production to emerging market and developing economies to maximize efficiencies, helping boost growth and incomes especially in Asia (AMRO 2021). Since the global financial crisis, however, global trade in goods has grown slower than overall output. Alongside the moderation in cross-border lending and investment flows, these trends have been viewed by some as the beginning of the end of globalization. With the rise in anti-globalization sentiments and protectionism in recent years, this idea of globalization’s impending demise persists. Nevertheless, three major trends now dominate the ongoing changes in the global trade landscape:

First, international trade relations are increasingly being realigned, notably by geopolitical considerations. Various shocks of the last 10 years, especially during the pandemic, highlighted the merits of diversification to reduce risks of supply chain disruptions. They unveiled excessive reliance on only a few suppliers around the world, prompting many global companies to relocate some of their activities to minimize future disruptions to their supply chains. Yet, beyond these unpredictable events, the realignment in global trade is also now increasingly driven by policies—such as those arising from national strategic objectives—which is leading to growing concerns about geoeconomic fragmentation.<sup>23</sup>

Second, global trade is becoming more concentrated, especially within major trading relationships (UNCTAD 2023a). Generally, global trade concentration has been on an upward trend since the global financial crisis, reflecting, in part, the continued rise in trade corridors and preferential trading agreements. More recently, however, concentration patterns increasingly reflect a

reorientation of international trade flows between and among economies that are considered geopolitically “close” or “friendly” (UNCTAD 2023b). This is closely linked with rising friendshoring activity globally, especially given that these activities often redirect trade and investments toward economies that share the same geopolitical views or values. On the other hand, this also implies declining diversification in trade partners globally. In an environment increasingly beset by supply chain disruptions, highly concentrated trade carries risks to economic security and resilience.

Third, trade in services is playing a larger and more significant role than goods in driving global trade. Globalization skeptics tend to highlight that global goods trade has long peaked; however, this pattern does not hold true for cross-border services. Thanks to technology, many barriers to services trade have not only been overcome, but their removal has created new export opportunities—such as digitally enabled services—for many developing economies. Moreover, even traditional GVCs incorporate and increasingly rely on these traded services, in line with the “servicification” of GVCs (Mirodout 2017). The future of globalization, as Baldwin (2022) points out, is in the hands of services trade. In particular, services that are increasingly powered by technology to become tradeable across borders are set to become an important engine of growth for many in the ASEAN+3 region (AMRO 2018).

This section looks at these three global trends in ASEAN+3 and examines what they mean for the region’s future trade prospects. Without a doubt, the face of global trade is changing, and so will its role as a driver of ASEAN+3’s long-term growth and stability. While the ongoing shifts in global trade carry potential risks, they also present emerging opportunities for the region’s economies. How these three currents will influence GVCs—and ASEAN+3 economies’ role within them—remains highly complex. Ultimately, how the region adapts and responds to these trends will be crucial to ensuring the sustainability of its long-term trade and growth prospects.

<sup>22/</sup> “Global value chains,” as used in this section, refer to international production sharing, where production is broken into activities and tasks that are carried out in different economies.

<sup>23/</sup> Aiyar and others (2023) defines geoeconomic fragmentation as a “policy-driven reversal of global economic integration often guided by strategic considerations.” Some domestic policies, such as those undertaken to ensure domestic financial stability within an economy, do not necessarily fall under this definition, as the authors argue.

## Trade, Realigned


*"Let's build on and deepen economic integration ... with the countries we know we can count on."*

Janet Yellen, US Treasury Secretary, April 2022

Geopolitical relationships—especially between the United States and China—are increasingly reshaping international trade flows. Amid debate surrounding “decoupling” and “de-risking”, the threat of geoeconomic fragmentation has become more pertinent than ever (Figure 2.44). Ongoing Trump-era tariffs and reinvigoration of US industrial policy, through state and federal incentives, combined to drive US reshoring activity to an all-time high last year. Most of these are cases of “automatic reshoring,” where US firms increase their domestic investments and production as an alternative to relying on imports—consistent with the surge in manufacturing construction spending in the United States (Figure 2.45). Government incentives are cited as a key driver for US firms; as such, the electrical equipment and electronics sectors are the top contributors to reshoring activity (Reshoring Initiative 2023).<sup>24</sup> In ASEAN+3, the Plus-3 is especially affected. The same is true for US nearshoring activity, with “friendshored” projects to Mexico and Canada coming mostly from Asia (Figure 2.46). As the World Trade Organization [WTO] (2023) points out, such cross-border activity fuel signs that both international trade and investment patterns are becoming increasingly influenced by geopolitical proximity.

Trade flows between the United States and China, as expected, have slowed—with spillover effects to the rest of the world. Tariff rates between the two economies remain very high—US tariffs on Chinese products covered by Section 301 are six times higher than for the rest of the world (Brown 2023).<sup>25</sup> These continue to affect about 65 percent of US imports from China, a considerable portion of which are being pivoted to other trading partners. Thus, while bilateral trade flows between United States and China reached a record-high of USD 690.6 billion in 2022, trade expansion has slowed—from a monthly average of 4.2 percent in 2016–2018 to only 1.9 percent in 2019–2023 (Figure 2.47). In addition, bilateral trade growth has been slower, on average, compared to their respective trade with other partners. Consequently, China's share of US imports has been declining steadily since 2018—and replaced by other economies, with a few from the ASEAN+3 region (Figure 2.48). The fall in China's share is pronounced for advanced technology products, such as semiconductors and telecommunications equipment (Figure 2.49).

**Figure 2.44. United States: Geopolitical Risk of Top 10 Import Sources**




Source: Reshoring Initiative; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: The redder the map, the higher the geopolitical risk. Geopolitical risk, as defined by the Reshoring Initiative, is the “probability in one year of a major disruption in trade resulting in the cessation of imports from that economy to the United States as a result of an adverse geopolitical event”. Data in the bubbles represents the selected economy's share of US imports in 2022. Data for geopolitical risk is as of August 2023.

<sup>24/</sup> These incentives, for example, are covered by the US Inflation Reduction Act as well as the CHIPS and Science Act. Both were passed into legislation in August 2023.


<sup>25/</sup> Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the Trump administration began by imposing tariffs of 25 percent on products covering roughly USD 34 billion of US imports from China in July 2018. Subsequent increases were imposed in August 2018 (USD 16 billion), September 2018 (USD 200 billion), and lastly in September 2019 (USD 102 billion).

**Figure 2.45. United States: Reshoring Activities and Manufacturing Construction Spending**  
(Index, 2010 = 100; Index, Jan 2010 = 100)



Source: Reshoring Initiative; National authorities via Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data for reshoring activity is on an annual basis and refers to the number of jobs generated from these reshored projects. Data for construction spending is monthly.


**Figure 2.47. China and United States: Growth of Total Trade, by Partner**  
(Percent)



Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data refers to the average over the period of the monthly (year-on-year) growth rates. Latest data are up to September 2023.


Interestingly, several economies that have gained China's "lost" export share in the US market are also importing more from China. Several economies have seen their shares of the US market increase in the past five years—led by Vietnam, Taiwan Province of China, Canada, Mexico, India, as well as Korea. When it comes to strategic goods exports to the United States, the first two economies are also the biggest gainers of market share (Figure 2.50). Yet, while these other exporters are stepping in to fill China's previous role, US dependence on China may not be necessarily unwinding. Freund and others (2023) find that for electronics-related products in particular—a pain point for both economies—markets that have increased their exports to the United States over time have also increased their imports from China. In other words, supply chain linkages with China appears to be deepening at the same time that these exporters are increasingly catering to higher US demand.

**Figure 2.46. United States: Nearshored Projects to Canada and Mexico by Source, 2010–23**  
(Percent)



Source: Reshoring Initiative.

**Figure 2.48. Selected Economies: Change in Share to US imports, 2017–2022**  
(Percentage points)



Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Patterned bars indicate (non-China) ASEAN+3 economies.

As a result, some sectoral GVCs are "lengthening," with economies acting as additional "links" between the United States and China. Global GVC production has become longer in the past three to five years, largely reflecting the pattern seen in China's supply chains (Figure 2.51). Its average GVC production length has been rising since 2018, which implies that its value-added exports increasingly undergo additional production stages—in other economies—before reaching their final demand market. Qiu, Shin, and Zhang (2023) also highlight this trend of longer supply chains, especially as other economies—particularly from Asia—now increasingly "account for a greater portion of suppliers to US customers ... as well as accounting for a greater portion of customers to Chinese suppliers." Investors that shift supply chains away from China, more often than not, move production to locations where economic linkages with China are already strong (Curran and others 2023). Value-added trade measures are also consistent with the continued rise in these


indirect linkages between the two economies. One, value-added originating from China that is absorbed by US final demand has not fallen substantially over the years, despite calls of decoupling. This is also true for the US value-added imports of manufacturing goods, about a fifth of which continues to be derived from China, based on the latest available data (Figure 2.52). The rise of “additional links” also mean that US trade exposure to supply chains involving China, in other words, remains higher than what headline trade figures suggest—what Baldwin, Freeman, and Theodorakopoulos (2023) calls “hidden exposure.”

Within the region, ASEAN economies are increasingly accounting for a larger share of these indirect links between China and the United States. Given China’s extensive and key role in many GVCs, its total value-added manufacturing exports to the United States have increasingly gone through third-party economies: from 12 percent in 2000, the group’s share has nearly doubled to about 20 percent in 2020.<sup>26</sup> This proportion spiked in 2019, growing by about 18 percent from 2018, against its average annual growth of 3 percent in 2013–2018. Of China’s indirect value-added exports to the United States, about 35 percent is accounted for by ASEAN+3 (ex China) economies. This share has also been rising—implying the increasing role of the region as a link or “additional stop” between China and the United States, especially ASEAN (Figure 2.53, top panel). This holds true across various sectors, including electrical equipment, chemicals and non-metallic products, and rubber exports, among others. Economies that have been able to benefit from

the lengthening are those where China’s foreign investor presence is already strong or they have existing comparative advantage in affected industries—led by Vietnam, Thailand, and to some extent, Malaysia (Figure 2.53, bottom panel).<sup>27</sup> Strong existing manufacturing (and support) capabilities help facilitate “plug-and-play” for new FDI enterprises, rather than them having to build the necessary ecosystem from the ground up.

Regional economies benefitting from this lengthening of the China–US supply chains can also be gleaned from more granular, high-frequency trade data. Analysis of China’s exports to the United States at the 4-digit HS level show that China has lost market shares in about 800 different products over 2017–2022.<sup>28</sup> The ASEAN+3 region was able to “win” the substitution game for about a third of these products, absorbing the larger portion of China’s lost market share when compared to the rest of the world. ASEAN economies benefitted the most, led by Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Note that these markets have, over time, welcomed a significant amount of Chinese foreign direct investments (FDI), and also considers China as their top source of imports. Vietnam’s foothold—accounting for about 60 percent of ASEAN’s overall gains—is in part due to the structure of its manufacturing sector having similarities with China, as well as the latter’s investment reach across the industry (Box 2.4) (Zhao and Ho 2023). Similarly, Thailand’s advantage stems from its deepening linkages with China, coupled with a strong comparative advantage in auto manufacturing (Hinojales 2023).


**Figure 2.49. China: Change in Share to US Imports, by Product Type**  
(Index, 2017 = 100)



Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: “Strategic products” corresponds to the 644 commodities listed by US Census Bureau (2022) as “Advanced Technology Products.” Numbers in boxes correspond to China’s respective shares (in percent) for each product type for that period.

**Figure 2.50. Selected Economies: Change in Share to US Imports of Strategic Goods, 2017–2022**  
(Percentage points)



Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.


Note: “Strategic products” corresponds to the 644 commodities listed by US Census Bureau (2022) as “Advanced Technology Products.” Note: Patterned bars indicate (non-China) ASEAN+3 economies.

<sup>26/</sup> In 2020, 80.8 percent of China’s total value-added exports to the United States were exported directly by China, and the remaining 20 percent exported indirectly by the rest of the world. Of the indirect exports, 35.8 percent was accounted for by ASEAN+3 economies (ASEAN: 23.8 percent; Plus-3 ex China: 12.0 percent). AMRO’s analysis utilizes OECD’s Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 2023 database, with the latest data as of 2020.

<sup>27/</sup> Other economies in ASEAN have increased their shares in other specific sectors. For example, Cambodia for textiles and textile products (including leather and footwear) and wood and paper products; the Philippines for other non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, as well as computers, electronic and electrical equipment; Indonesia for fabricated metal products and other manufacturing (corresponding to ISIC rev 4 categories 31–33); and Singapore for food and beverage products and basic metals.


<sup>28/</sup> In total, there were 1,227 different types of commodities analyzed at the HS 4-digit level.

**Figure 2.51. World and China: Length of GVC Production**  
(Number of stages)



Source: Asian Development Bank Multiregional Input-Output Tables; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Forward (backward) linkages refers to the average number of stages separating the source (consumption) of the value-added (final goods) and its final consumption (value-added origin) for the portion of the production that is involved in global value chains, as defined by ADB (2023). Individual economy figures are export-weighted to derive the worldwide production length.


**Figure 2.52. China: Domestic Value-Added Absorbed by the United States**  
(Percent of US demand)




Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trade in Value-Added database 2023; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: "Total final demand" refers to the share of China's value-added (both direct and indirect) to the total foreign value embodied in US final demand. "Manufacturing" refers to China's manufacturing value added (both direct and indirect) that is imported by the United States, as percent of US total manufacturing value-added imports. Latest data on value-added trade is 2020.

**Figure 2.53. ASEAN+3: China's Domestic Value-Added Exported to the United States via the Region, Selected Sectors**

Share  
(Index, 2000 = 100)



Contribution to Share, by Economy  
(Percent)



Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Trade in Value-Added database 2023; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; OTH = others; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. "Share" corresponds to the value-added of China that is exported by ASEAN (ASEAN+3) to the United States, as percent of the value-added of China that is exported via all third-party economies to the United States. Horizontal bars in the top panel correspond to 2008 (global financial crisis) and 2018 (US-China trade tensions). Latest data on value-added trade is 2020.


In addition, regional economies' role as an additional "link" between China and the United States appears more evident in medium- to high-tech sectors. China's exports of electrical machinery and electronics have been those most affected by US trade policy, followed by chemicals, as well as optical and other precision instruments. For these products, ASEAN economies were able to substantially increase their exports to the United States; at the same time, corresponding imports from China also rose (Figure 2.54). When analyzed at the 4-digit commodity level across the region, this observation appears to be more evident in medium- to high-technology manufacturing sectors, but less so for those considered as low-technology (Figure 2.55). ASEAN economies' gains in these low-technology—and labor-intensive—industries are most likely because of their cost advantage amid growing US demand for these products, and less so because of global supply chains being reconfigured due to US–China tensions.<sup>29</sup>

Investment intentions toward ASEAN+3 economies also point to this "trade link" effect. New FDI announcements from China to the rest of ASEAN+3 suggest that China-based investors are now mostly taking advantage of neighboring economies' "manufacturing hub" potential, rather than to primarily serve the domestic market. The latter was, historically, China-based investors' primary FDI motive—until 2019 (Figure 2.56). Over 2020–2023, about 37 percent of announced FDI intentions from China were for serving the domestic markets in the ASEAN+3, while those for serving external markets (in and outside the region) stood at 63 percent—about 25 percent higher than the share in 2019. This also emerges in non-China FDI flows into ASEAN+3, although to a smaller extent

(Figure 2.57), consistent with the view that a few in the region could indeed become "connector" economies—especially if geoeconomic fragmentation were to deepen further.<sup>30</sup> This stems from their ability to attract greenfield investments—Vietnam for electronics, Indonesia for electric vehicle batteries—and position themselves as strong manufacturing hubs.


In sum, lengthening global value chains is one way that the realignment in global trade is manifesting and, so far, is tilted favorably toward the ASEAN+3. However, while the region seems to be receiving windfall benefits through additional trade and new investments, this does not imply that it will be a straightforward win-win situation. The shift in international trade flows driven by US–China geopolitical dynamics is, in reality, more nuanced, requiring continuous analysis and policy attention. At the current juncture, trade opportunities can still be gained, especially for developing economies with strong comparative advantage in products highly affected by changing US–China bilateral relations. Country-specific factors—such as the availability of labor, wage conditions, and infrastructure capabilities, among others—would also play a role in whether an economy will (or continue to) benefit from the ongoing trade realignment. However, global trade overall could be less efficient and costlier in the long term. Resilience against shocks is also not a guaranteed success: Qiu, Shin, and Zhang (2023) highlight that the lengthening of China–US supply chains has not been accompanied by greater diversification. In the case of future shocks, the overall hit to growth—including in the ASEAN+3—could be larger than potential gains as investment and trade flows operate less along economic considerations.

**Figure 2.54. ASEAN: Change in Exports to the United States and Imports from China of Selected Commodities, 2017–2022**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data refers to 71 HS codes (4-digit level) that fall under subheadings 84, 85, 28, and 90.

**Figure 2.55. ASEAN: Change in Exports to the United States and Imports from China by Technology Type, 2017–2022**  
(Percent, year-on-year)




Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Low-technology manufactures include food, beverages and tobacco; textiles and textile products; leather, leather products and footwear; wood and products of wood and cork; pulp, paper, printing and publishing; and rubber and plastics. All other manufacturing are classified as medium- to high-technology manufacturing.

<sup>29/</sup> ASEAN's biggest gains in the US market in the past five years were mostly on agricultural products and foodstuff. In addition, Zhao and Ho (2023) find that more than half of the increase in ASEAN's overall share of the US market is concentrated in labor-intensive sectors.


<sup>30/</sup> These economies are defined by Curran and others (2023) as those that can act as new links between China and the United States and Europe, among others. They have identified five countries: Vietnam, Poland, Mexico, Morocco, and Indonesia.

**Figure 2.56. China: FDI Announcements Destined for ASEAN+3, by Target Market**  
(Percent of total announcements)



Source: Orbis; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Orbis classifies a project as “domestic” if it is primarily designed to serve the local market of the area where the investment will be, “regional” if the project stipulates that it will serve multiple economies, or “global” if it will serve a number of regions or several regions across different continents.

**Figure 2.57. ASEAN+3 ex China: Non-Chinese Inward FDI Announcements, by Target Market**  
(Percent of total announcements)



Source: Orbis; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Orbis classifies a project as “domestic” if the project is primarily designed to serve the local market of the area where the investment will be, “regional” if the project stipulates that it will serve multiple economies, or “global” if it will serve a number of regions or several regions across different continents.

**Box 2.4:****Where Do China and ASEAN Stand in the Ongoing Trade Reconfiguration?**

China has managed to maintain its position as a global trade hub despite its trade conflict with the United States (US). Uncertainties arising from the trade tensions and concerns about supply chain security post-pandemic have raised questions about trade relocating outside China, potentially diminishing its leading role in global trade. In aggregate, China's share of global exports ceased its upward trajectory around 2015 and then stabilized, with a temporary reversal in 2020.

A detailed analysis of sectors by Zhao and Ho (2023) at the HS 4-digit level reveals a decline in China's export shares in certain, mainly labor-intensive sectors such as clothing and footwear. Among its medium- to large-sized sectors, about 30 percent experienced a decrease in their global export share from 2015 to 2022, accounting for about 26 percent of China's total exports.<sup>1</sup> The global export share in the top half of these "declining" sectors fell from 39 percent in 2015 to 29 percent in 2022 (Figure 2.4.1, left panel). The decline coincided with China's industrial upgrading strategy and deliberate offshoring efforts to address rising costs.

Nevertheless, China continues to gain advantage in a majority of industries. In about 70 percent of medium- to large-sized sectors, which contribute to more than half of China's total exports, China's global export shares increased from 2015 to 2022. The global export share in the top half of these "ascendant" sectors surged from 18 percent in 2015 to nearly 29 percent in 2022 (Figure 2.4.1, right panel). A significant portion of these are medium- or high-skill and technology-intensive industries, aligning with China's economic development and policy direction.

The significance of the US as a major trade partner to China has been impacted by the ongoing trade conflict. Following the tariff hikes in 2018, bilateral trade between the world's two biggest economies experienced a reduction in absolute value terms, with

a temporary reversal during the pandemic period. The share of China's exports to the US as a percentage of its total exports declined to 16.7 percent in 2019 from 19.3 percent in 2018. Despite a slight rebound in 2020, the importance of the US as a destination for China's exports continued to diminish in 2021 and 2022 (Figure 2.4.2). Moreover, the US contribution to China's total export growth in 2022 was only 0.1 percentage point (out of the 7 percent overall growth), a significant contrast to the period prior to 2018. China's imports from the US exhibited a similar performance (Zhao 2024). Although China's export shares to the US in China's declining sectors remained relatively stable, growth of its exports to the US in its ascendant sectors—where China is gaining global market shares—has been slower relative to exports to other trade partners.

ASEAN economies, with Vietnam at the forefront, have gained global market shares and attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) amid the ongoing trade reconfiguration. In sectors where China's global export shares have fallen, ASEAN has partially substituted for China's losses—though to a lesser extent than the European Union. Vietnam, in particular, has benefited not only from the rise in export share in China's declining sectors, but also achieved modest gains in its ascending sectors (Figure 2.4.3). This trend is underscored by substantial and growing FDI inflows. Vietnam has become a preferred destination for FDI from economies such as Korea, Singapore, Japan, and China, due to its cost-competitive and abundant workforce, growing domestic market, and stable political environment, among other factors. The country's increasing appeal as a favorable alternative manufacturing location has occurred together with widespread adoption of the "Plus One" strategy by manufacturers. As a result, the US has been increasing its investments in Vietnam, particularly in high-tech sectors (del Rosario and Zhao 2023). Meanwhile, China has extended its FDI flows to Vietnam toward more advanced sectors such as electronics, semiconductors, and energy storage (batteries).


This box was written by Hongyan Zhao, and is largely based on Zhao and Ho (2023).

<sup>1</sup> The medium- or large-sized sectors refer to those with export shares exceeding the average share of each sector in China's total exports. At the HS 4-digit level, there are more than 1,000 sectors. The average share is about 0.08 percent, with 226 sectors at the HS 4-digit level exceeding this threshold.


Despite navigating trade reconfiguration relatively well so far, ASEAN economies face limitations in increasing their domestic value added in trade. China and ASEAN have enhanced their participation in global value chains (GVCs), leading to a rise in their shares of global exports and global domestic value-added. However, although domestic value-added in ASEAN has grown over the years, its proportion to ASEAN’s gross exports is considerably lower than that in China, at about 60 percent compared to China’s 80 percent over 1995–2020.

Among ASEAN economies, Vietnam’s figure is even lower and continues to decrease (from 68 percent in 1995 to 45 percent in 2020). This is due to the slower growth in domestic value-added than for gross exports, indicating limited spillovers from international trade to domestic production. Cultivating a robust domestic industrial ecosystem will be crucial to incorporate more stages of production within the economy and capture greater value-added along GVCs (Zhao and Ho 2024).


**Figure 2.4.1. China: Share of Global Exports, by Sector**  
(Percent of global exports of sectors)



**Figure 2.4.2. China: Export Shares to the United States, 2011–2022**  
(Percent of total exports)



**Figure 2.4.3. Selected Economies: Global Export Shares in China’s Declining and Ascendant Sectors, 2015–2022**  
(Percent)



## A Less Diversified Trade Landscape

*"It's OK to have your eggs in one basket, as long as you control what happens to that basket."*

Elon Musk, Tesla Chief Executive Officer

Despite lengthening global supply chains, international trade has only become more concentrated in the last decade (Figure 2.58). Market concentration refers to whether an economy imports (exports) a particular commodity from (to) only a few or many trading partners. Lower concentration measures—such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)—suggests that an economy's trading activity is relatively well-distributed across several partners.<sup>31</sup> The World Trade Organization (WTO 2023) estimates that the number of products exported by an average of only four economies—corresponding to an HHI value of 2,500—has increased from 14 percent in 2000 to 20 percent of all traded goods by 2021. The share of these “bottleneck products” to global trade values have also more than doubled during the period, with China the single largest source of these products.<sup>32</sup> A narrower definition that only considers goods with three exporters or less—or an HHI of 3,000—covers a tenth of global trade in 2021 (White and others 2023). However, this increases to 40 percent when including goods that are imported from only a few suppliers—even when multiple potential sources exist—due to trade policy incentives or other market considerations.<sup>33</sup>

Trade concentration carries both costs and benefits. Supply chain disruptions of recent years have underscored the downsides of highly concentrated import sources or suppliers. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which escalated into a crisis, exposed the critical role that these two economies played in the global supply chains of many food staples, including wheat, maize, and oilseeds (del Rosario and Wynn 2023). Sanctions and agricultural export restrictions also highlighted the risks of importing from only a few producers, as well as its second-round effects.<sup>34</sup> Exporting to only a few trading partners likewise carries its own risks. High concentration can sharpen the effect of a disruption in a key market, such as from slower growth or the introduction of a new regulation. However, high concentration can also bring economic benefits, including lower overhead costs and other efficiency gains that can lead to higher profits, especially in a stable trade environment (Wickes, Adams, and Brown 2022). Market concentration allows for the development of long-standing and deeper trade relationships,

which could act as a buffer to short-term trade disruptions, price fluctuations, or higher external uncertainty.

The global mining and electronics sectors have especially become more concentrated over the last decade. While the increase in concentration is relatively broad-based, trade in primary resources (minerals, agriculture, and energy) are relatively more concentrated than that of manufactured goods (Figure 2.59). At a more granular view, the most concentrated industries globally are minerals, agriculture, electronics, as well as textiles—with minerals and electronics having risen the most over the years (McKinsey & Company 2023). The underlying drivers of supply concentration vary across sectors. High concentration in international minerals trade is mainly due to very few suppliers with the natural endowments, especially for processed and refined mineral products. For agriculture, on the other hand, concentration is mostly being driven by economy-specific considerations. For example, since 2020, about 80 percent of Philippine rice imports is sourced from a single supplier (Vietnam) despite the presence of many other rice exporters, such as India and Thailand. For electronics, the concentration arises from the strong competitive advantage of key producers such as China, Korea, and Japan. The most concentrated electronics products globally are laptops and mobile phones (McKinsey & Company 2023). Latest trade data suggests that for both products, between 70 percent and 80 percent of global imports are supplied by China.

Reflecting the global trend, ASEAN+3 import markets have become less diversified. In 2021, about 40 percent of the region's top 20 imports were sourced from three global suppliers or fewer (Figure 2.60). The trend in ASEAN+3's import concentration since the 2000s reflects two diverging paths experienced by GVCs in the past 30 years: the expansion in international trade and supply chains in the early 2000s helped facilitate lower trade concentration, but this was reversed after the global financial crisis as global trade and financial flows slowed. Between 2010 and 2021, nine of the region's economies experienced higher trade concentration, led by the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Japan; only Hong Kong registered

<sup>31/</sup> The HHI is a traditional method for measuring industry concentration and market competitiveness, but it can also be transformed to measure export and import diversification, whether for a specific sector, product, or trading partner. An economy with trade concentrated in a very few markets will have an index value close to 10,000. On the other hand, one with a perfectly diversified trade portfolio will have an index close to zero.

<sup>32/</sup> China is estimated to provide about 36 percent of these bottleneck products, followed by the US, with about 6 percent (WTO 2023).

<sup>33/</sup> Seong and others 2022 highlights that there are two types of concentration in global trade. In the first type, concentration can occur because a particular commodity is only produced by a small group of trading partners—owing to their natural endowments or because the trading partner is able to specialize, achieve economies of scale, and thus attain significant comparative advantage in that particular commodity—the so-called “global concentration.” In the second type, concentration could also arise even if there are multiple suppliers of one product. In this case, other factors such as supplier proximity (i.e., transport costs), the structure of the domestic industry or the market (for example, the prevalence of foreign direct investment), and trade policies like preferential trading agreements can influence the pattern of trade concentration. This is what Seong and others (2022) called “local concentration.”

<sup>34/</sup> While ASEAN+3's direct linkages to both economies are not huge, the indirect hit to the region through higher global commodity prices and, consequently, domestic inflation has been quite substantial.

a decline (Figure 2.61). This increase also reflects that trade has become more concentrated for sectors where ASEAN+3 economies have substantial GVC participation, including in the manufacturing of garments, textiles, rubber products, and electronics (Figure 2.59).

The increase in trade concentration across ASEAN+3 economies has been largely driven by economy-specific considerations, not from the lack of suppliers. On aggregate, ASEAN+3 imports with fewer than three global suppliers are mostly concentrated in five products/commodities, in terms of value: (1) soybeans, (2) iron ores and concentrates, (3) synthetic rubber, (4) automatic data processing machines (i.e., laptops), and (5) mobile or wireless phones.<sup>35</sup> ASEAN+3's


high trade concentration in these commodities results from a lack of alternative suppliers. For example, about 86 percent of ASEAN+3's iron ore imports in 2022 were supplied by two economies: Australia and Brazil.<sup>36</sup> However, many in the region also choose to source their key imports from only a few, select trading partners, even when many suppliers exist (Figure 2.62). This concentration "by choice" reflects, in part, the proliferation of preferential trading agreements (within and outside the region) that have substantially reduced tariffs, as well as lower logistics and transportation costs that naturally arise from trading with geographically close economies. More importantly, this suggests that ASEAN+3 economies have still-untapped import sources and substantial room for import diversification to help increase resilience to external shocks.

**Figure 2.58. World: HH Market Concentration of Trade**  
(Index, 2000 = 100; number)




Source: World Integrated Trade Solution, World Bank; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: The HH (Herfindahl-Hirschman) index is a measure of the dispersion of trade value across an exporter's partners. An increasing index value represents increasing concentration. Data covers 118 economies in the World Bank database that reported concentration data from 2020 to 2021.

**Figure 2.60. ASEAN+3: Import Concentration**  
(Percent, trade-weighted)




Source: McKinsey Global Trade Explorer; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Individual economy concentration rates have been aggregated using export shares as weights. Data refers to the share of imports that only have three or fewer suppliers globally (Herfindahl-Hirschman index greater than 3,000) to each economy's total imports.

**Figure 2.59. World: Most Concentrated Sectors, 2000 versus 2021**  
(Percent of sector imports)



Source: McKinsey Global Trade Explorer; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: The sector category follows McKinsey Global Trade Explorer (2023) based on their analysis at the HS-6 digit level. For each sector, data refers to the share of products that only have three or fewer suppliers globally (Herfindahl-Hirschman index greater than 3,000) to the world's imports of that sector.

**Figure 2.61. Selected ASEAN+3: Import Concentration, by Economy**  
(Percent)



Source: McKinsey Global Trade Explorer; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Data refers to the share of imports that only have three or fewer suppliers globally (Herfindahl-Hirschman index greater than 3,000) to each economy's top 20 imports.

<sup>35/</sup> AMRO's analysis is based on data extracted from McKinsey's Global Trade Explorer, and refers to HS codes 120190, 260111, 400251, 847130 and 847180, and 851712.

<sup>36/</sup> The third source is South Africa, but it accounts for only 5 percent of total imports.

Within ASEAN+3, the intensity of concentration varies—and so do their underlying drivers. Economy-level concentration ranges from about 30 percent to 60 percent (Figure 2.61). Vietnam, Japan, and Indonesia are considered the most concentrated economies, with most of their top 20 imports sourced only from three suppliers. About 95 percent of intermediate inputs for mobile phone manufacturing in Vietnam come from China and Korea, despite the presence of other major suppliers.<sup>37</sup> This reliance is interlinked with the heavy presence of Korean and Chinese multinational firms that use Vietnam as a final processing hub. In Japan, about 70 percent of coal imports are supplied by Australia, as most of its domestic infrastructure (e.g., boilers) have been designed to function best with high-grade coal. Similar to Vietnam, Indonesia is also highly concentrated in imports of intermediate goods for mobile phone manufacturing; however, this is because of the dominance of Chinese firms in the industry, primarily to cater to the large domestic market (Na 2023). In contrast, Malaysia, China, and Singapore are the most diversified economies in the ASEAN+3 region.


Like its import market basket, ASEAN+3's exports have become concentrated in fewer destination markets in the past 10 years. ASEAN+3 economies, in general, already have some of the most diversified trading relationships in the world. As expected, the region's smaller economies are the least diversified, as smaller manufacturing capabilities and lower export volumes mean they are only able to cater to fewer buyers. Nevertheless, the pace of export market diversification in most economies has also slowed in the past decade (Figure 2.63). Only China, and the smaller

economies of Brunei, Cambodia, and Myanmar, have moved in the opposite direction. China's broader export reach over the years reflects, in part, the changing nature of its participation in GVCs: its increasing involvement in more upstream production and the lengthening of its GVCs (Figure 2.51).<sup>38</sup>

The decline in export diversification in other ASEAN+3 economies reflect their increasing reliance on the massive and growing Chinese market. China has intensified its position *within* each economy's top export partners. Its growing share of ASEAN+3 total exports suggests that diversification in the region is only happening partially, and only with regards to non-Chinese markets (Figure 2.64). China has held on to the position of being ASEAN's largest trading partner for more than a decade (Xinhua 2022). ASEAN exports—especially in value-added terms—is also now increasingly shifting toward meeting the growing *final* demand in China: in 2021, 20 percent of ASEAN's total domestic value-added exports was absorbed by China, compared to only 6 percent in 2000 (Hinojales, Kho, and Tan 2023).

In sum, the ASEAN+3 region's trade relations are gradually becoming less diversified. Further, a confluence of factors suggest that this could be the status quo in the medium term. One, the lengthening of China–US value chains is likely to further deepen the region's reliance on China as a source of raw materials and intermediate inputs. This, alongside China's growing importance as an export market—while an outcome of the massive size of its economy—raises concern about overreliance on any one partner. Second, attention to the commodities

**Figure 2.62. ASEAN+3: Import Concentration Map, 2021**  
(HH Index)



Source: McKinsey Global Trade Explorer; AMRO staff calculations.


Note: . HH = Herfindahl-Hirschman. The top 20 imports of each of the 10 ASEAN+3 economies in 2021 has been aggregated to derive the regional concentration map. The bubbles represent the total import value of that commodity. Map excludes Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Lao PDR.

<sup>37/</sup> Other suppliers include Taiwan Province of China, Singapore, United States, and Japan.

<sup>38/</sup> This is also seen in the fact that China's GVC linkages with East Asia (including Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea) are mostly being driven by backward linkages, while its GVC linkages with Southeast Asia, by forward linkages (Park 2023).

that are essential to the region’s future growth—such as for clean energy transition and digitalization—suggests that ASEAN+3 economies could be facing even high(er) concentration. The shift to clean energy and electric vehicles especially will drive a huge increase in requirements for critical minerals (AMRO 2023). Yet, substantial portions of critical mineral supply chains


**Figure 2.63. ASEAN+3: Export Market Concentration, 2021 (HH Index)**



Source: World Trade Integrated Solutions, World Bank; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; HK = Hong Kong; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. For ease of reading, the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index values are transformed to range from 0 to 1 in this chart.

are currently concentrated in a few economies, and the complexity of restructuring suggest that many of these are likely to remain concentrated in the medium to long term (International Renewable Energy Agency 2023). Unfortunately, these supply chains are also among the most vulnerable to geopolitical risks, such as those arising from resource nationalism.

**Figure 2.64. ASEAN+3: Top 10 Export Markets (Percent of total exports)**



Source: IHS Markit; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data consists of the shares of top 10 export partners/markets for each subregion for that particular year. As such, the composition of regional groupings (e.g., Europe) changes over time. The subregional aggregates were calculated using simple averaging of partner shares.

## Rising Importance of Services Trade

*“Services offshoring is the new globalization frontier.”*


World Trade Organization, October 2023

In contrast to global goods trade, cross-border trade in services continues to grow at a robust pace. Trade in services stands at a fraction of global goods trade: at about 15 percent of global GDP in 2022, this is less than half the share of goods (Figure 2.65). The heavy weight of goods in global trade masks the diverging growth trajectories between the two, with the brisk expansion in services trade serving as a counterweight to the argument that globalization has already peaked (AMRO 2018, 2019). Globally, Europe remains the largest services trader—accounting for nearly half of total services trade in the past 10 years—and is also the biggest net service exporter. Asia comes in second, followed by the Americas (Figure 2.66). The Asian region has traditionally been a net services importer, although its services trade deficit has continuously shrunk since 2014. It first became a net exporter in 2022, owing to the robust expansion in exports of information, computer, and telecommunications services.

Global services trade has been dominated by developed—rather than developing—economies. Over two-thirds of global trade in services is largely driven by advanced economies, primarily as the largest service flows are linked to knowledge-intensive activities and intellectual property. In 2022, about 60 percent of global services traded across the world are categorized as “other services”: these are dominated by professional and management consulting services, as well as services that are required in highly technical fields.<sup>39</sup> Service flows that are knowledge-intensive tend to be largely concentrated in developed economies, where “superstar effects ... reinforce the persistence of knowledge hubs” (Seong and others 2022). In fact, the top 10 exporters of services—led by the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany—are also the top importers (Figure 2.67). Nevertheless, supply (and demand) from emerging market and developing economies have increased over the years. Asia, in fact, is the fastest-growing region for cross-border trade in services—mostly led by China and India (Figure 2.68).


<sup>39</sup> “Other services” as defined by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is comprised of the following categories: construction; insurance and pension services; financial services; charges for the use of intellectual property not included elsewhere; telecommunications, computer and information services; other business services; personal, cultural and recreational services; government goods and services not included elsewhere; and services not allocated elsewhere.

**Figure 2.65. World: Goods and Services Trade**  
(Percent of GDP; index, 2005 = 100)




Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data refers to exports and imports.

**Figure 2.66. World: Services Trade, by Region**  
(Percent of world trade)




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.

**Figure 2.67. Top Services Traders, 2018–2022**  
(Percent of world services trade)



Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CN = China; DE = Germany; FR = France; IN = India; IR = Ireland; JP = Japan; NL = Netherlands; SG = Singapore; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States. Patterned bars represent ASEAN+3 economies.

**Figure 2.68. World: Growth in Services Trade, by Region**  
(Index, 2005 = 100)



Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.

The momentum behind digitally deliverable services is particularly strong. Digital delivery is empowering skilled workers to export their services and expertise to anywhere and anyone in the world (UNCTAD 2023c). The COVID-19 pandemic especially induced a quicker adoption and consumption of digital services globally, and specific segments—such as e-commerce and digital financial services—are expected to thrive well into the future as new growth drivers (AMRO 2022). Many types of services can be delivered digitally over ICT networks, and more so because advances in technology have rapidly lowered many barriers to their trade.<sup>40</sup> In 2010, less than 45 percent of total services trade globally are considered digitally tradeable, and this rose as high as over 60 percent during the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>41</sup> Consequently, developed economies—with their much more advanced ICT capabilities, better access to technological goods and

services, and larger financial resources—also dominate trade in digitally deliverable services, although this dominance is slowly being eroded. In particular, trade in intermediate services—many of which are and can be digitally provided by developing economies—is poised to become the next growth driver of cross-border services (Baldwin 2022).

Currently, trade in services comprise a small portion of the ASEAN+3 economy, despite growing much faster than the region's merchandise trade. Nearly a fifth of global services trade originates from ASEAN+3 economies. However, cross-border trade in services still account for less than 10 percent of the region's GDP in 2022, a not-so-significant share. Services exports, for example, have grown faster than goods exports since 2006—helped by advances in technology and favorable regulations—even when considering the impact of the

<sup>40/</sup> Digitally deliverable services (a subset of "other services") is a combination of insurance and pension services; financial services; charges for use of intellectual property not included elsewhere; telecommunications, computer, and information services; research and development services; professional and management consulting services; architectural, engineering, scientific, and other technical services; trade-related services; other business services not included elsewhere; audio-visual related services; health services; education services; and heritage and recreational services (IMF-OECD- WTO 2023).


<sup>41/</sup> However, trade that is *actually* delivered digitally is much smaller than this ratio (UNCTAD 2023b).

pandemic (Figure 2.69). The more technologically-advanced economies in the ASEAN+3—like the Plus-3 and Singapore—are the most involved in international services trade. This reinforces the concentration patterns observed globally when it comes to knowledge-intensive flows (Figure 2.67).

Most economies in the ASEAN+3 region have yet to fully harness the potential of modern—and digitally deliverable—services as a growth driver. In contrast to traditional services, modern services can be traded “without proximity between buyer and supplier” (Loungani and others 2017). Hence, they are not subject to the same constraints faced by traditional services, and they tend to employ skilled workers and more technology (Alege and Ogundipe 2013).<sup>42</sup> In ASEAN+3, there appears to be a mild positive relationship between the volume of an economy’s services trade activity and its ability to leverage on modern services. Singapore, being a global business hub and leading financial center, is the biggest regional trader in international services, with its total trade (services exports and imports) accounting for about 126 percent of its GDP. The next biggest is Hong Kong—with trade in international services at 40 percent of GDP—owing to its large financial services sector (Figure 2.70). For nearly half of the ASEAN+3 economies, however, trade in services accounts for less than 10 percent of total output, highlighting a significant untapped potential for export growth. Most of the ASEAN+3 economies are also net importers of services—except for Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Figure 2.71).

Among the modern services sector’s advantages is its resilience to various external shocks. Despite various shocks in recent years—for example, the global financial crisis and especially the COVID-19 pandemic—ASEAN+3’s modern services sector has grown faster than both traditional

**Figure 2.69. ASEAN+3: Goods and Services Exports**  
(Index, 2005 = 100)



Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data refers to imports and exports.


<sup>42/</sup> ASEAN+3 service exports generally fall into four categories: (1) travel; (2) transport; (3) goods-related services—collectively, “traditional” services—and (4) other business services, under which “modern” services fall. Modern services and digitally deliverable services are sometimes used interchangeably.

<sup>43/</sup> These include licensing quotas, professional qualifications, as well as immigration rules, among others, that make it difficult for service providers to enter a market.

and nondigitally deliverable counterparts (Figure 2.72). A significant portion of the region’s modern services are related to professional, technical, and financial services, and those related to the use of intellectual property. This pattern reflects the attractiveness of several ASEAN+3 economies as global business service centers, powered by their highly competitive, skilled, multilingual workforces. The region, in fact, has become a net exporter of these skilled services since 2017 (Figure 2.73). While China continues to experience rapid growth in its exports of modern services, some ASEAN economies—led by Singapore and the Philippines—have also robustly grown them by leveraging on their comparative advantage (Figure 2.74).


In sum, services trade—especially modern services—is a silver lining for the ASEAN+3 region amid a shifting trade environment. There is, however, a requisite precondition to reaping its benefits: minimizing constraints to trade. However, these remain pervasive globally—including in the ASEAN+3 region—as national trade and regulatory policies in individual services sectors are “often made with limited regard for economy-wide impacts” (OECD 2023).<sup>43</sup> Trade in services are mostly limited by domestic regulations or bureaucracy; for modern services, the hurdles are mostly due to technology (Baldwin 2022). OECD data suggests that ASEAN+3 economies are among those with the highest barriers to cross-border services trade, particularly when it comes to foreign entry and the movement of people (Figure 2.75). Digital services trade, on the other hand, is hampered primarily by the quality of infrastructure (Figure 2.76). While ASEAN+3 economies have managed to ease the number of barriers to overall services trade over time—especially by improving regulatory transparency—the constraints on its digital service trade has not substantially improved, reflecting the long-standing and persistent challenges in scaling up ICT-related infrastructure.

**Figure 2.70. ASEAN+3: Total Services Trade by Category, 2022**  
(Percent of GDP)




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; national authorities; World Bank; and AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; HK = Hong Kong; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam.

**Figure 2.71. ASEAN+3: Net Services Trade, 2018–2022**  
(Percent of GDP)




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; national authorities; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; HK = Hong Kong; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; MM = Myanmar; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. Data for Singapore has been sourced from SingStat.

**Figure 2.72. ASEAN+3: Services Trade, by Category**  
(Index, 2005 = 100)




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: "Modern services" is a subset of "Other services".

**Figure 2.73. ASEAN+3: Net Services Trade, by Category**  
(Billions of US dollars)




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.

**Figure 2.74. Selected ASEAN+3: Modern Services Exports**  
(Index, 2005 = 100)




Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CN = China; PH = the Philippines; Plus-3 ex CN = Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea; SG = Singapore; VN = Vietnam.

**Figure 2.75. Selected ASEAN+3: Services Trade Restrictiveness, 2023**  
(Score, most restrictive = 1)



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. The OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index measures regulations affecting trade in services in 22 sectors. Data for other ASEAN+3 economies are not available.

**Figure 2.76. Selected ASEAN+3: Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness, 2023**  
(Score, most restrictive = 1)



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; LA = Lao PDR; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam. The OECD Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index measures cross-cutting barriers that inhibit or completely prohibit firms' ability to supply services using electronic networks. Data for other ASEAN+3 economies are not available.

## Macroeconomic Implications of Shifting Global Trade

*"The raw fact is that every successful example of economic development this past century.... has taken place via globalization."*

Paul Krugman, 2008 Nobel Prize Winner for Economics

The consequences of ongoing changes in the global trade landscape depend on the motivations that drive them. To the extent that the search for growth, resilience, and economic security drives these changes, the global economy would be better off, albeit with some loss in efficiency. However, global trade realignments that are primarily geopolitically motivated, manifesting as higher protectionism on grounds of strategic rivalry, will reverse many of the economic gains that trade openness has brought to many, with substantial impact on developing economies—including in the ASEAN+3.

The cost of geoeconomic fragmentation could be substantial. Notwithstanding the still-growing body of empirical work quantifying its consequences, geoeconomic fragmentation's transmission channels are relatively well-identified: rerouting and potential distortion of trade flows, redirection and possible slowdown in capital investment, barriers to labor mobility, as well as reduced diffusion of knowledge and technology. Depending on the severity of the hypothetical decoupling across blocs, current estimates on overall economic losses from geoeconomic fragmentation range from 1.2 percent to 6.9 percent of global GDP (Aiyar and others 2023).<sup>44</sup> Across various studies, the cost of fragmentation increases as the scope of restrictions widens and the more the products involved are of strategic value. More importantly, the resulting economic losses could be permanent. Country-level estimates of geoeconomic fragmentation tend to be greater—going as high as 12 percent of GDP—as these net out any substitution gains that may arise when economies are forced to trade within or across preferred blocs (Goes and Bekkers 2022). Bolhuis, Chen, and Kett (2023) show that losses would be most severe for emerging market and developing economies, especially since they are more reliant on global trade for many key commodities.


Such a scenario would be economically costly for ASEAN+3 economies, which are highly integrated with the rest of the world. Cerdeiro, Kothari, and Redl (2022), for example, estimated that Asia's permanent output loss from a two-bloc world will be twice that of the world economy. This is mostly due to the loss of export markets (as trade is eliminated between rival blocs) and

breakdown or disruption of production networks, where ASEAN+3 economies are entrenched. However, this is an extreme scenario. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many emerging market and developing economies may be able to reap the benefits of trade diversion—as long as they are still able to trade freely with the larger economies. Nevertheless, even short of full-on decoupling scenarios, some estimates suggest that export losses for the ASEAN+3 region could be substantial (Figure 2.77). This reflects ASEAN+3's extensive participation in GVCs, trade linkages with distant economies, and its reliance on the United States and Europe as markets. Geoeconomic fragmentation could also lead to rising ASEAN+3 unemployment as trade restrictions constrain demand, as well as a lower-than-average rise in employment and real wages, thereby amplifying the overall potential economic costs (Petri and Plummer 2023).

Increased geoeconomic fragmentation could lead to more volatile inflation in the ASEAN+3. Decades of globalization have, in many ways, acted as a positive, inflation-reducing supply shock. The overall increase in productive capacity and competition, as many economies were able to join GVCs, increased efficiency and reduced costs. Geoeconomic fragmentation runs the risk of reversing this trend, especially in an increasingly concentrated trade environment. This could occur in various ways: (1) through lower shares of imports of raw materials from lower-wage economies, (2) higher prices of products that are only supplied by a few producers (such as critical minerals), and (3) through higher costs that multinational companies need to shoulder to operate in fragmented markets. Price volatility is also likely to increase, especially if abrupt shifts in trade patterns lead to market imbalances—especially in highly concentrated commodity markets (IMF 2023). With ASEAN+3 economies among the largest commodity importers, this makes them more sensitive to commodity price swings. Estimates put the prices of several commodities as rising by more than 150 percent if economies were forced to trade within hypothetical blocs (IMF 2023). These products include lithium, iron ore, and copper—all of which ASEAN+3, especially China, imports in substantial quantities (Figure 2.78). The region is particularly sensitive to iron ore market dynamics, as only two economies provide most of its supply (Figure 2.62).

<sup>44</sup> In most studies, geoeconomic fragmentation is defined as total elimination of trade between two competing or non-aligned blocs. Some studies take a more conservative approach and limit the "decoupling" to a particular sector, such as electronics or specific food commodities.

**Figure 2.77. World: Export Losses from Selected Geopolitical Scenarios in 2035, by Regions**  
(Billions of US dollars)



Source: Petri and Plummer (2023); AMRO staff calculations.

Note: MENA = Middle East and North Africa; ROW = rest of world. Detailed scenarios are as in Petri and Plummer (2023). Data refer to export changes from baseline, and follow the groupings in the original publication, except for ASEAN+3 (aggregated using individual economy results), Other Asia (aggregated using individual economy results), and Europe not elsewhere specified (nes). United Kingdom is included in Europe nes, while it was a separate item in the original publication.

Geoeconomic fragmentation will make it more difficult for ASEAN+3 to address “perennial” risks to macroeconomic stability—such as those coming from climate change and a rapidly aging population (Figure 1.48 in Chapter 1). Even without the challenge of geoeconomic fragmentation, the road to net zero already necessitates an unprecedented amount of investments, and is also expected to lead to higher energy and food prices in the long-term (AMRO 2023). In the face of a rapidly aging population, overall health care costs are also expected to rise (Section II). Geoeconomic fragmentation not only exacerbates these cost pressures but also makes it challenging to solve problems of mutual interest. If trade fragmentation ultimately leads to financial fragmentation (Aiyar and others 2023), the options for additional financing to undertake the necessary responses to ASEAN+3’s perennial risks would be greatly reduced.


More broadly, the ongoing trade realignment may challenge ASEAN+3’s export competitiveness. Longer average distances between firms across different regions have implications for trade costs.<sup>45</sup> Alfaro and Chor (2023) estimate that US buyers may have to pay about 2 percent to 10 percent more for imports from ASEAN+3 economies that replace imports from China in the US market (Figure 2.79). This implies that, to some extent, ASEAN+3 exports could even be more expensive than other competitors (such as Mexico and emerging Europe), which could raise questions about the future competitiveness of the region’s exports despite recent gains. In addition, the higher

uncertainty in a fragmented environment pushes up the costs for multinational companies, which in turn weighs down local currencies as investors price in the higher risk (Engel and West 2005). As currency depreciation pushes up prices of imports—including intermediate inputs for the manufacturing sector—this could further erode ASEAN economies’ cost advantage against alternative markets, especially those that are geographically closer to the United States and offer cheaper transport costs.

Lastly, ASEAN+3 needs to be mindful of too-high trade concentration—whether driven by geoeconomic fragmentation or otherwise—in its search for economic security. Well-diversified trading relationships have, and will continue to, form a critical cornerstone of economic resilience. The ability of ASEAN+3 economies to swiftly tap into alternative import sources during times of crises—like the COVID-19 pandemic—was crucial in mitigating the overall growth impact of the shock, which would otherwise have been larger if the region only had fewer trading partners. High concentration with a particular trade partner also acts as an amplifier of shocks, both positive and negative. In the current global trade environment beset by major secular shifts, and thus higher uncertainty, slowing or declining diversification can exacerbate trade vulnerabilities in ASEAN+3 economies. The higher the number of trading relationships, the higher an economy’s immediate options in the event of a crisis. This can be especially useful in an environment where the “source of future shocks is unknown” (WTO 2023).


<sup>45/</sup> That there is no corresponding increase in network density, and diversification, suggests that costs are unlikely to be substantially reduced with the lengthening of GVCs (Qiu, Shin, and Zhang 2023).

**Figure 2.78. ASEAN+3: Imports of Geopolitically Sensitive Commodities, 2022**  
(Percent of world imports)



Source: IMF (2023); AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: "Geopolitically sensitive" commodities are defined as those estimated in IMF (2023) to experience a price increase of above 150 percent due to fragmentation in individual commodity markets.

**Figure 2.79. United States: Import Unit Values by Source Market, 2017–2022**  
(Percent change in import price)



Source: Alfaro and Chor (2023); AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data refers to the change in the unit price for US importers, for every 5 percentage point decrease in China's share to the US market.

## A Balanced View for ASEAN+3

*"A crisis is a terrible thing to waste."*

Paul Romer, former Chief Economist of the World Bank

Fortunately, there are mitigating factors for ASEAN+3 against the downside risks arising from shifting global ties. First, the likelihood of a security-based fragmentation between China and the United States must be viewed in perspective (Box 2.5). While bilateral relations remain highly complex, the Biden-Xi meeting in November 2023 at the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit underscored both economies' willingness to cooperate, or "recouple," in areas where they can (Cheng 2023). Considering that mutual interests for both economies—such as climate finance and health security—are high, this suggests that US-China competition could be self-limiting (Grimes 2023). The possibility of a full-on decoupling is made more challenging by China having increasing supply chain participation across many key manufacturing sectors, and that the US remains exposed—through indirect links—to these supply chains (Figure 2.52). While reconfiguration of such complex chains away from China are possible in theory, doing so will entail considerable time as well as significant transition and adjustment costs (AMRO 2021).

Second, the ASEAN+3 region's deep and diverse free trade agreements provide some degree of certainty in a highly uncertain landscape. WTO rules and commitments help contribute to a more stable trade policy environment (Jakubik and Piermartini 2023). The region's deep and dense trading relationships have helped minimize shocks from sudden demand-supply fluctuations following recent external shocks. The pursuit of more free trade agreements will open up opportunities to non-traditional markets and expand options for economic diversification.

They can also provide ASEAN+3 economies with buffers against commodity price shocks, which are amplified by geoeconomic fragmentation and smaller international markets (IMF 2023). Large and advanced free trade agreements—like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—offer ready counterweight to the negative effects of geopolitically-motivated trade realignment and should thus be maximized. Mutual trade cooperation provides benefits in the face of higher uncertainty: for example, export gains within the RCEP bloc may be able to offset about 18 percent of member economies' likely export losses under a high global friendshoring scenario (Petri and Plummer 2023).

Third, the ongoing trade realignment is an opportunity for "reindustrialization"—especially for the larger ASEAN economies. Beyond the recent gains in trade for ASEAN (some of which could be short-term in nature), longer value chains provide a window of opportunity for ASEAN economies to not only deepen their GVC participation—especially in medium- to high-productivity sectors—but also to reverse years of deindustrialization. The decline in the manufacturing sector's share of GDP in most economies in the ASEAN-5 has been attributed to a variety of factors: slow industrial upgrading in high-value added activities, limited spending in infrastructure and innovation, as well as prevalence of low-skilled labor in the workforce. Adopting a strategic, longer-term view for industrial and FDI policies, while tackling these structural bottlenecks, will help the region's economies successfully position themselves as additional nodes in evolving global supply chains, discover and leverage new sectoral

sources of growth in manufacturing—especially for the smaller ASEAN—and simultaneously navigate increasing competition from other emerging economies (Figure 2.53).

Fourth, rising services trade—especially digitally deliverables ones—offer new and inclusive drivers of growth. Underpinned by ongoing technological advancements, the outlook for global services trade is bright. Technological barriers to trade are falling rapidly alongside increasing digital modes of delivery. Further, the entry point for many developing economies into the services value chain is not as steep: digitally deliverable services do not require the massive physical capital required by manufacturing and merchandise trade. Deepening services trade especially within the ASEAN+3 region can unlock new avenues for growth and provide opportunities for broader segments of society—especially for women, youth, and small and medium-sized enterprises. The role of new-generation trade agreements such as RCEP and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, cannot be understated, especially as it further liberalizes “modern

services” including financial, telecommunications, and professional services—demand for which is expected to remain robust into the future.

Fifth, ASEAN+3 can leverage technology to help mitigate risks from geoeconomic fragmentation. Amid the specter of more prohibitive international trade policies because of security-based fragmentation, technology will play a crucial role in dampening the overall impact by helping reduce costs—for example, through operations optimization (Section IV). On the other hand, the threat of bifurcated technology—or emergence of competing technologies between blocs—is a legitimate concern for ASEAN+3 economies (AMRO 2021). Technology bifurcation can result in a loss of economies of scale due to incompatible standards, slowing the economic gains that new technology is meant to create. Still, rapid developments in technology itself—such as tech interfaces—mean that divergent technology standards will not stymie the global economy for long, especially as global tech leaders develop the solutions that could overcome such bifurcation.

## Box 2.5:

## Globalization at a Crossroads: Where Does ASEAN+3 Go From Here?

Authorities in the ASEAN+3 region have identified the reconfiguration of global trade and investment flows as the most pressing challenge to their economies' long-term growth (Figure 2.8 in this chapter). This is not surprising. At the core of the remarkable success in economic development achieved by many regional economies is a trade-driven, export-led model of industrialization (AMRO 2018). Further, the region collectively recognizes that greater economic interdependence, both within ASEAN+3 and with the global economy, has been integral to fostering shared prosperity and stability. However, current trends point to considerable uncertainty over the future of globalization. Having stalled since the global financial crisis, rising geopolitical tensions and protectionist pressures in advanced economies now threaten to unwind existing global economic integration.

Despite escalating rhetoric in some quarters, empirical evidence does not yet indicate that significant deglobalization is under way. Nevertheless, looking at the share of world trade to global GDP and broader foreign direct investment trends, globalization has stalled after reaching a peak just prior to the global financial crisis (Figures 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). This was driven by multiple factors, including slower economic growth in the major advanced economies following the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, slower expansion of global value chains (GVCs), China's expanding domestic supplier base ("localization"), maturing economic development more generally, and diminishing trade cost reductions from technological advances (WTO 2023).

However, evidence is beginning to point to a fundamental reconfiguration of global trade and investment flows. The composition of trade is being reshaped along geopolitical lines, with countries increasingly trading with strategic partners and political allies. Reshoring and friendshoring trends have gathered pace, driven partly by geopolitical tensions, especially the US–China economic competition, and also by

desires to improve supply chain resilience since the pandemic. Moreover, recognition has grown that global trade concentration has increased in the past decade, further threatening supply chain resilience and stoking reshoring instincts. Overall, the current period is defined by elevated geopolitical uncertainty, with national strategic interests taking priority over economic rationale alone.

Exploring different potential scenarios of the future of globalization can help highlight policy options that could reinforce growth and resilience regardless of how events unfold. If prevailing trends continue unchecked, they could lead toward a more fragmented global economy. One plausible, though unfavorable, future scenario is a *security-based fragmented world*, where global economic ties are completely reshaped along geopolitical lines (Figure 2.5.3). In such a future, the overall global economic environment would be weaker, with emerging markets and developing economies especially vulnerable to diminished trade and investment opportunities, and weakened flows of technology and knowledge. It would also be a less secure world, with reduced international cooperation on challenges that require collective action, such as climate change, cybersecurity, and pandemics. Essentially, this trajectory represents one hypothetical extreme if present trends worsen, resulting in a world less resilient to economic shocks, with more places excluded from progress, and weaker collective efforts on global challenges.


However, this path of fragmentation is not inevitable. An alternate vision, as championed recently by the World Trade Organization, entails renewed commitment to *rules-based economic integration*, or "reglobalization." This could involve extending economic openness to more peoples, economies, and issues. Rather than countries retreating into isolated blocs, this scenario envisages a reinvigorated multilateral trading system that enables deeper and broader global integration, providing a stronger foundation to resolve current concerns surrounding globalization. Diversifying supply chains to engage more economies would enhance resilience against

future shocks. Expanding trade-centric growth to additional emerging market and developing economies could foster wider prosperity. Reinforcing economic interdependence would better facilitate collective action on shared challenges. In short, this reglobalization path offers a future with markets better insulated from disruptions, reduced possibility of the weaponization of trade, and more equitable distribution of its gains, with exciting growth opportunities in new areas of trade, especially in services.

These two scenarios present stylized versions of what could unfold. The actual trajectory remains highly uncertain but will likely fall somewhere in


between. Given this uncertainty, what can ASEAN+3 economies do to reinforce growth and resilience? In an ideal scenario, the region could collectively leverage its influence to steer toward reduced fragmentation, through leadership in strengthening multilateral cooperation and trade. However, it is also prudent for ASEAN+3 economies to consider and implement “robust” strategies that would strengthen their economic foundations and promote continued development—regardless of the future face of globalization. By being open to strategies and approaches that could remain viable across multiple possible futures—rather than assuming any single outcome—ASEAN+3 economies can prudently navigate this globalization crossroads.

**Figure 2.5.1. World: Total Trade, by Region**  
(Index, 1990 = 100)




Source: Asia Regional Integration Center, Asian Development Bank; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean.

**Figure 2.5.2. World: Growth of FDI**  
(Percent)



Source: Asia Regional Integration Center, Asian Development Bank; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean. Data represents compounded annual growth rates.

**Figure 2.5.3. Globalization at a Crossroads: Potential Scenarios**



Source: AMRO staff.

## Policy Considerations

*"The more complex the world becomes, the more difficult it is to complete something without the cooperation with others."*

Alexander Fleming, 1945 Nobel Prize Winner for Physiology/Medicine

The risks from the ongoing trade reconfiguration may not be fully avoidable, but they can be managed. The trajectory of globalization remains highly uncertain (Box 2.5). What is certain, however, is that in an unclear landscape, policies and approaches that perform reasonably well under various contingencies will be invaluable for ASEAN+3 economies. At the current globalization crossroads, the region could pursue several such "weakly dominant" options with a degree of optimality, regardless of how events unfold. These responses are not mutually exclusive, allowing for a combination of complementary measures that reinforce each other. Strong policy signals that attest to open regional and international engagement, coupled with targeted domestic policy adjustments, would allow ASEAN+3 economies to navigate the geoeconomic currents with the least damage.

Intensifying regional cooperation on cross-border challenges will be key. Cooperation creates a wider set of policy options that benefit all ASEAN+3 economies. On some policy areas preferences will never be aligned across economies—yet this is exactly where international coordination can be most fruitful. More importantly, strong commitments to tackling shared challenges will allow ASEAN+3 to integrate more deeply regardless of broader global trends. Progress on these challenges—such as supply chain resilience, climate change, health security, and the digital divide—will help unlock further trade and investment opportunities within the region and reinforce connectivity with the global economy. Regional contractual arrangements can help smooth the impact of sudden market disruptions of highly concentrated products, including in agriculture and semiconductors (AMRO 2022). Cooperation on the digital economy and digital integration will advance ASEAN+3 e-commerce and the growth of digitally deliverable services trade. Overall, by jointly tackling common challenges, ASEAN+3 members can foster greater economic interdependence and integration. This provides a robust foundation for shared prosperity, tapping gains from exchange and specialization while building resilience against external shocks.

Expanding the region's cross-border trade in services necessitates coordinated efforts to liberalize the sector. With appropriate policies, services trade can enable inclusive, resilient growth even amid uncertainty. Prioritizing services trade integration—both within the region and with other markets—will allow ASEAN+3 economies to tap new areas of export-oriented growth that complement existing strengths. However, services trade barriers have remained quite elusive to Asian policymakers (Stephenson 2017). Several ASEAN+3 economies

are considered highly restrictive economies globally, especially in trade of market-bridging and digital network services.<sup>46</sup> While RCEP's provisions form a crucial foundation, the greater challenge for ASEAN+3 members would be adhering to the rules, disciplines, and commitments of the agreement to undertake necessary—and often challenging—reforms (Hinojales 2022).

Domestically, policies that enhance competitiveness will enable different sectors of the economy to adjust to the pressures of global trade reconfiguration. This strategy involves emphasizing industrial capacity building and creating an enabling environment for investment and entrepreneurship—especially to take advantage of new areas of growth such as clean energy transition, the digital economy—and in view of an aging world—biotechnology and life sciences, among others. Strengthening domestic manufacturing capabilities also provides a useful buffer against high import dependency and stimulates value-added creation by local enterprises. Supply-side reforms will be crucial to develop more competitive industrial capabilities across the ASEAN+3 region and to enable the workforce to adapt successfully to new demand. Such reforms will facilitate advancing up the value chain, and for some key sectors—such as electronics—doing so could help shield the economy against short-term boom-bust cycles. With stronger industrial foundations and an adaptable workforce, economies can tap new sources of foreign demand and integrate into future GVCs on their own terms—regardless of whether the reconfiguration of trade and investment flows occur due to geoeconomic fragmentation pressures or opportunities from broader reglobalization (Box 2.5).

Broader economic integration will be crucial to managing concentration risks. Pursuing further trade expansion and diversification, especially with new markets, will reinforce growth and economic security of each ASEAN+3 economy and the region as a whole. Diversifying import sources will enable the sourcing of required goods and services from a wider base of partners and minimize risks arising from economy-specific shocks. Expanding the destination of exports—by tapping into rising consumer demand in other emerging market and developing economies—reduces overreliance on traditional advanced economy markets impacted by fragmentation pressures. Thus, existing barriers to diversification must be minimized through supportive regulation at the country-level through proactive removal of administrative bottlenecks and greater trade facilitation, among others. By deepening trade ties in more directions, ASEAN+3 members can drive growth through accessing new opportunities, while building resilience against rising concentration risks and future supply disruptions.

<sup>46</sup> The top 10 services sectors where ASEAN+3, on average, is ranked as highly restrictive are, in order: legal services, accounting services, rail freight transport, air transport, telecommunication, broadcasting, courier services, maritime transport, insurance, and commercial banking. The first two and last two categories are "market-bridging" services (OECD 2022).

## IV. Navigating Technological Change

The ASEAN+3 region's growth and development in the past decades have been associated with significant technological advances. Technology has long driven productivity increases across the region's economies, helping create a solid foundation for high-quality jobs and economic growth. Going forward, the role of technology and innovation-driven development will be more salient, given the slowing productivity growth across the region since the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 and the anticipated moderation in global growth (Figure 2.6). While most economies in the region are now at least in the middle-income category, they are also facing multiple structural challenges—including the aging and trade reconfiguration issues featured in this chapter and could be caught in a “middle-income trap” if they do not rise above the challenge. As home to some of the most innovative and technologically productive economies in the world, the ASEAN+3 region has tremendous potential to leverage new technologies to deal with these structural challenges and ensure the realization of its long-term growth prospects. However, heterogeneity in technological capabilities across

member economies underscores the need for continued innovation and subsequent diffusion of this knowledge. In addition, economies have to prepare for the changes that new technology can bring. The shift to automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI), for example, can lead to short-term job displacement—but it also presents ASEAN+3 with numerous opportunities for new employment and reskilling of workers to handle more complex, uniquely human tasks.

The next section provides a brief discussion on ASEAN+3's strengths as a technology center. Technology's critical role in helping alleviate longer-term structural issues that impact ASEAN+3 long-term growth and stability also features. Recognizing that new technological advances are also strong catalysts of change—and as such can be initially disruptive—the section looks at the implications of the emerging domain of generative AI in creating and displacing jobs. Combined with supportive policies, technological progress can enable the region to successfully navigate the rapidly changing economic environment and sustain dynamic growth in the long-term.

### ASEAN+3: A Technology Powerhouse?

*“And so not only is Asia benefiting from the uses of new technology, Asia will increasingly be the source of advances in technology.”*

Bill Gates, Co-founder of Microsoft Corporation


The ASEAN+3 region is home to some of the most innovative and technologically productive economies in the world (Figure 2.80). The region accounts for over 60 percent of patents, having overtaken the rest of the world since the early 2010s, mainly contributed by China, Japan, and Korea (Figure 2.81). ASEAN+3 has the highest number of science and technology clusters globally, with the five biggest located in Plus-3 economies: Tokyo-Yokohama (Japan) leads as the largest global cluster, followed by Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Guangzhou (China and Hong Kong), Seoul (Korea), and China's Beijing and Shanghai-Suzhou clusters (Figure 2.82). The Plus-3 economies, alongside Singapore and a few large ASEAN economies, also rank well worldwide in other innovation-related indicators, reflecting the significant resources they have devoted to research and knowledge-building. For example, Korea is one of the top economies in the world for research and development (R&D) spending and in the number of researchers as share of the population (Figure 2.83).

However, there is significant heterogeneity across the region, with different technological and innovative capabilities

within and between economies. Despite increasingly robust innovation activity in leading ASEAN+3 economies—evident in their R&D spending and patent activity—its broader impact on the rest of the region remains limited (Figures 2.84 and 2.85). Most economies in the region underperform when it comes to adopting existing technologies and inventing new ones, relative to global benchmarks (World Bank 2021). The diffusion of new technologies and innovation capabilities remains highly uneven, with the most innovative firms far ahead of the rest of the economy.<sup>47</sup> Since the global financial crisis, innovation appears to have become more concentrated in a handful of companies, further exacerbating the divergence in productivity across firms (Dabla-Norris and others 2023). Across sectors, innovation is also more common in manufacturing than in services, despite the latter's increasing role as a driver of growth for many ASEAN+3 economies. These dynamics limit the economy-wide impacts of innovation and constrain overall productivity growth. For ASEAN+3 to maximize technological progress, pushing the innovation frontier through prominent players needs to be accompanied by accelerating technology diffusion to other firms, sectors, and economies.


<sup>47/</sup> Dabla-Norris and others (2023) also emphasizes lags in diffusion to small and medium enterprises and domestic firms beyond export-linked ones.

Figure 2.80. Selected Economies: Global Innovation Index, 2023  
(Score)



Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (2023).  
Note: Figures indicate the ranking of the economy. The Global Innovation Index provides performance measures and ranks 132 economies on their innovation ecosystems. The index is built on 81 indicators from international public and private sources.

Figure 2.81. World: Patent Applications  
(Percent of world total)




Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (2023).  
Note: Data refers to total number of patent applications by applicant's origin.

Figure 2.82. World: Top 10 Science and Technology Clusters, 2023

| Rank | Cluster Name                 | Economy          |
|------|------------------------------|------------------|
| 1    | Tokyo–Yokohama               | Japan            |
| 2    | Shenzhen–Hong Kong–Guangzhou | China, Hong Kong |
| 3    | Seoul                        | Korea            |
| 4    | Beijing                      | China            |
| 5    | Shanghai–Suzhou              | China            |
| 6    | San Jose–San Francisco, CA   | United States    |
| 7    | Osaka–Kobe–Kyoto             | Japan            |
| 8    | Boston–Cambridge, MA         | United States    |
| 9    | San Diego, CA                | United States    |
| 10   | New York City, NY            | United States    |

Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (2023).  
Note: Science and technology clusters are ranked based on the number of applications under WIPO's Patent Cooperation Treaty, and scientific publications from the Web of Science's Science Citation Index Expanded.


Figure 2.83. ASEAN+3: Selected Innovation Indicators, 2021



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; SCImago AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: BN = Brunei; CN = China; HK = Hong Kong; ID = Indonesia; JP = Japan; KH = Cambodia; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = the Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; VN = Vietnam.  
For the left panel, gross domestic spending on research and development (R&D) is defined as the total expenditure (current and capital) carried out by all resident companies, research institutes, universities, and government laboratories, and so on, in an economy. It includes R&D funded from abroad but excludes domestic funds for R&D performed outside an economy. Expenditure on R&D data are as of 2021, except for China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (2020), Vietnam (2019), Brunei and the Philippines (2018), and Cambodia (2015). Researchers in the center panel refer to full-time equivalents; data as of 2021, except for China, Singapore, and Thailand (2020), Vietnam (2019), Malaysia and the Philippines (2018), and Cambodia (2015). The H-index (right panel) measures the journal's number of articles (H) that have received at least H citations. It is tabulated from the number of citations received in subsequent years by articles published in a given year, divided by the number of articles published that year. Citations data are as of 2022.

**Figure 2.84. World: Innovation Inputs and Outputs Subindexes, 2023**

(Score)




Source: World Intellectual Property Organization (2023).

Note: Vertical axis refers to the innovation outputs subindex score, while the horizontal axis refers to the innovation inputs subindex score. The Innovation Inputs Subindex consists of five input pillars capturing elements of the economy that enable and facilitate innovation: (1) institutions, (2) human capital and research, (3) infrastructure, (4) market sophistication, and (5) business sophistication. The Innovation Outputs Subindex provides information about outputs that result from innovative activities within the economy. There are two output pillars: (1) knowledge and technology outputs and (2) creative outputs. Data excludes Myanmar due to data unavailability.

**Figure 2.85. ASEAN+3: Economic Complexity Index, 2021**

(Score)



Source: The Atlas of Economic Complexity.

Note: Numbers next to the bars refer to the economy's global ranking out of 133 economies. The economic complexity of an economy is calculated based on the diversity of exports it produces and their ubiquity, or the number of the economies able to produce them (and those economies' complexity). Data are not available for Brunei and Hong Kong.

## Technology, as a Solution

*"Innovation is the driving force behind sustained economic growth.  
Without new ideas, economies stagnate."*

Robert Solow, 1987 Nobel Prize Winner for Economics

ASEAN+3 can leverage new areas of technology to help generate growth opportunities. Technological progress has long been reshaping the economic development of the region and will continue to do so (AMRO 2021, 2022). Automation, digitalization, data analytics, and smart devices, are driving innovation and creating new areas of growth. Advancements in robotics and artificial intelligence, for example, are propelling the region's manufacturing sector into high productivity and enhanced efficiency. Digitalization enables businesses to streamline operations, enhance customer experiences, and develop new, innovative business models. Cloud computing, data analytics, and smart devices, on the other hand, are increasingly being used to improve efficiency and explore


new revenue streams, while advanced manufacturing technologies—such as 3D printing—have led to reduced prototyping costs, accelerated production, and enabled more product customization (AMRO 2022).

More importantly, advances in technology can help to alleviate pressing structural challenges in the region. Discovery and development of new technologies will continue to play a key role in helping ASEAN+3 economies navigate the challenges of aging, climate change, and food security, as well as in promoting equitable and sustainable growth (Figure 2.86). During the pandemic, the use of digital technology was given a boost as e-commerce, online delivery services, and video conferencing provided innovative

solutions to immobility for economies under lockdown (AMRO 2022). Through the lens of an aging population, technology offers tools and options to help mitigate the macroeconomic risks from a shrinking workforce, while potentially enabling economies to reap significant dividends from longer and healthier lives. Similarly, amid ongoing global trade reconfiguration, technology can be a critical

tool for improving the resilience of ASEAN+3 supply chains and for diversifying into new sources of growth. Within the region, Singapore, Korea, and Hong Kong are considered global leaders in the use and adoption of these emerging and “frontier” technologies, with all three ranking particularly high when it comes to using advanced and innovative technology for industrial activity (Table 2.4).

**Figure 2.86. Selected New Technologies and their Likely Implications on ASEAN+3 Economies**



Source: AMRO staff.

**Table 2.4. ASEAN+3 and Selected Economies: Frontier Technology Readiness Index, 2022**  
(Index score ranking)

|                                | Total score (Rank)    | Index Components                 |        |              |                   |                   |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|                                |                       | ICT deployment                   | Skills | R&D activity | Industry activity | Access to finance |
| <b>Top 10 economies</b>        | <i>1.00 = highest</i> | <i>Rank out of 166 economies</i> |        |              |                   |                   |
| United States                  | 1.00                  | 11                               | 18     | 2            | 16                | 2                 |
| Sweden                         | 0.99                  | 6                                | 2      | 16           | 11                | 18                |
| Singapore                      | 0.96                  | 7                                | 8      | 17           | 4                 | 17                |
| Switzerland                    | 0.94                  | 21                               | 13     | 12           | 5                 | 5                 |
| Netherlands                    | 0.94                  | 4                                | 9      | 15           | 10                | 31                |
| Korea                          | 0.94                  | 15                               | 26     | 3            | 9                 | 7                 |
| Germany                        | 0.92                  | 24                               | 17     | 5            | 12                | 40                |
| Finland                        | 0.92                  | 22                               | 5      | 21           | 20                | 30                |
| Hong Kong                      | 0.91                  | 9                                | 23     | 29           | 2                 | 1                 |
| Belgium                        | 0.91                  | 13                               | 4      | 23           | 19                | 48                |
| <b>Other ASEAN+3 economies</b> |                       |                                  |        |              |                   |                   |
| Japan                          | 0.88 (19)             | 10                               | 51     | 7            | 13                | 3                 |
| Malaysia                       | 0.76 (32)             | 30                               | 64     | 28           | 7                 | 16                |
| China                          | 0.74 (35)             | 117                              | 92     | 1            | 8                 | 4                 |
| Thailand                       | 0.64 (49)             | 40                               | 90     | 46           | 41                | 10                |
| Philippines                    | 0.62 (54)             | 94                               | 79     | 52           | 3                 | 80                |
| Vietnam                        | 0.58 (62)             | 69                               | 117    | 41           | 23                | 11                |
| Brunei                         | 0.55 (69)             | 54                               | 38     | 95           | 97                | 93                |
| Indonesia                      | 0.49 (85)             | 102                              | 107    | 50           | 47                | 97                |
| Cambodia                       | 0.34 (112)            | 122                              | 123    | 121          | 95                | 14                |
| Myanmar                        | 0.26 (133)            | 132                              | 143    | 107          | 101               | 118               |
| Lao PDR                        | 0.25 (134)            | 130                              | 134    | 152          | 56                | 133               |
| <b>Other economies</b>         |                       |                                  |        |              |                   |                   |
| India                          | 0.66 (46)             | 95                               | 109    | 4            | 22                | 75                |
| Mexico                         | 0.58 (61)             | 70                               | 73     | 45           | 31                | 96                |

Source: UNCTAD (2023d).

Note: The greener the color, the higher the score or rank. The 2023 index measures 166 economies' "use, adoption, and adaptation" of 17 frontier technologies: artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, big data, blockchain, 5G, 3D printing, robotics, drones, gene editing, nanotechnology, solar PV, concentrated solar power, biofuels, biomass and biogas, wind energy, green hydrogen, and electric vehicles. There were 9 indicators used across the 5 index components. ICT deployment uses internet usage and mean download speed indicators; Skills uses years of schooling and high-skilled employment as share of the working population; R&D activity uses number of scientific publications and patents filed on frontier technologies; Industry activity uses high-tech manufacture and digitally deliverable services exports; while Access to finance uses domestic credit indicators.

## Reaping the Longevity Dividend with Technology

Rapid advancements in life sciences, medicine, and biotechnology will enable longer, healthier, and high-quality lives. The potential gains from addressing morbidity and tackling aging-related illnesses could be “dramatically significant” (Chia 2019). Scott, Ellison, and Sinclair (2021) estimate that by targeting aging—that is, delaying the onset of age-related chronic diseases—to achieve one more year of *healthy* life expectancy, the gains to the US economy can be as much as USD 38 trillion. Breakthroughs in pharmaceutical medicine could eventually see ASEAN+3 populations being able to easily access affordable drugs that could help prevent or delay aging-related diseases (Barzilai and others 2018).<sup>48</sup> More advanced techniques in life sciences, such as limb regeneration treatments and gene therapy, could enable the sustainable replacement of aged body parts as well as correct genetic defects that could prolong and improve the quality of life. These technologies that help augment longevity and improve health can be gamechangers for ASEAN+3’s workforce potential, especially if made accessible to wider segments of society. Currently, advanced economies—such as the United States, Germany, and Switzerland—are mostly at the frontier of these health care technologies, underscoring the need for close collaboration to enable knowledge-sharing and technology diffusion.

Through automation, robotics, and other intelligent machines, technology can complement human capital in an aging environment. While rapid technological progress may ultimately lead to job displacement, labor-saving technologies will become increasingly important as the working-age population shrinks. An aging workforce can, in turn, be a driver of automation and high robot adoption (Acemoglu and Restrepo 2018). Five ASEAN+3 economies that are further ahead in the demographic transition are among the world’s largest markets for industrial robots: Japan and Korea (late transition), and China, Singapore, and Thailand (advanced transition). Together, they accounted for nearly 94 percent of industrial robot installations in the world in 2023, with China taking the largest share (Figure 2.87). Most of these are utilized in the electronics, automotive, and semiconductor sectors, and mostly for physically demanding tasks such as handling and welding (IRF 2023). Strong growth in collaborative robots highlights how technology can complement an aging workforce: for example, “cobots” are cleaning robots used for larger areas while humans do “edge cleaning” (Figure 2.88).<sup>49</sup> Outside of labor-saving solutions, artificial intelligence and machine learning can also augment workers’ existing capabilities. As the use of these technologies lifts sectoral productivity (i.e., value added per worker),

promoting sectors with greater opportunities for automation could go a long way to increasing economy-wide productivity.

Transforming the nature of work through technology can be a strong incentive for workers to extend their working careers, boosting overall employment. Along with supportive labor policies, technological solutions and devices can transform the nature of work. Several survey-based studies suggest that older workers—many of whom increasingly assume caretaking responsibilities as they age—value certain occupational characteristics, including flexible working hours, adjustable scheduling, and the ability to work remotely (Scott 2023; Choi-Allum 2023) (Figure 2.89). Remote work technologies, “virtual” offices, and collaborative software tools can be utilized to retain or attract the older workforce—given the high value they place on work flexibility (Figure 2.90). These can also incentivize those challenged by the daily commute to work and other age-related mobility issues. Complementing this, workspaces and offices can be transformed to become “age-friendly”—for example, by implementing indoor air and sound quality improvements, as well as lighting adjustments (ADB 2019). Further, the utilization of assistive (and adaptive) technologies—such as hearing aids, screen magnifiers, or wheelchairs—not only help maintain older workers’ ability to function independently, but can also improve their access to employment (WHO 2024).


Technology will be a critical enabler of lifelong learning and skills development. Online learning (and related platforms) continues to expand globally, providing a massive opportunity for older workers to acquire new skills at their own pace to make the most out of longer life expectancies. Three in five 45-plus adults in Asia say that “age does not limit their ability to work” and more than half recognize the need to update their skills to acquire a (new) job (Figure 2.91). Successful lifelong education, especially for an aging population, requires a deep understanding of how people learn (Jung 2019). Digitally deliverable education, including massive open online courses, caters to older workers’ preference for flexibility and greater autonomy (in the learning process). Technology can also be used to personalize delivery to adapt to older workers’ different learning curves: “smart” learning environments, as well as smart devices and applications, can make “adaptive adjustments through specific programs to help with efficient learning” (Blake 2020).<sup>50</sup> Simulation tools, such as virtual and augmented reality, are now increasingly being used in leading ASEAN+3 economies to enhance the learning experience of the elderly population.

<sup>48/</sup> A key example of this is the United States’ Targeting Age with Metformin (TAME) study. Metformin is a cheap, widely-used first-line of treatment drug for diabetes, but appears to hold some potential to delay the onset of age-related diseases and conditions including cancer and Alzheimer’s disease, by intervening into their underlying aging process. The TAME trial is an ongoing large-scale human to test Metformin for this purpose (Barzilai and others 2018).

<sup>49/</sup> With service robots, the humans still typically stays in the process—for example, by clearing things away from the robot or putting objects onto it (IRF 2023).


<sup>50/</sup> Cheung and others (2021) define a smart learning environment as “one that emphasizes learning flexibility, effectiveness, efficiency, engagement, adaptivity, and reflectiveness” and improves the learning experience “based on learning traits, preferences and progress, features increased degrees of engagement, knowledge access, feedback and guidance, and uses rich-media with a seamless access to pertinent information, real-life and on-the-go mentoring with the use of technologies to continuously enhance the learning environment.”

**Figure 2.87. Top 15 Economies: Annual Industrial Robot Installations, 2023**  
(Thousand units)




Source: International Federation of Robotics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CA = Canada; CN = China; DE = Germany; ES = Spain; FR = France; IN = India; IT = Italy; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; MX = Mexico; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand; TR = Türkiye; TW = Taiwan Province of China; US = United States.

**Figure 2.88. World: Collaborative Robots**  
(Thousand units; percent)




Source: International Federation of Robotics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Industrial robots are comprised of (1) traditional and (2) collaborative robots.

**Figure 2.89. Selected Economies: Older Workers' Preference for Flexibility**  
(Percent of respondents)




Source: American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) Research, Global Survey Issue Brief 2023.  
Note: Respondents are aged 45 and above. Economies included are Australia, Japan, and Korea (East Asia/Pacific); Canada and the United States (North America); Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Northern/Western Europe); Brazil (South America); and Italy and Spain (Southern Europe).

**Figure 2.90. Selected Economies: Older Workers' Engagement in Some Type of Remote Work**  
(Percent of respondents)




Source: American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) Research, Global Survey Issue Brief 2023.  
Note: Respondents are aged 45 and above. Economies included are Australia, Japan, and Korea (East Asia/Pacific); Canada and the United States (North America); Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Northern/Western Europe); Brazil (South America); and Italy and Spain (Southern Europe).

**Figure 2.91. Selected Economies: Older Workers' Post-Retirement Plans**  
(Percent of respondents)



Source: American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) Research, Global Survey Issue Brief 2023.  
Note: Respondents are aged 45 and above. Economies included are Australia, Japan, and Korea (East Asia/Pacific); Canada and the United States (North America); Finland, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (Northern/Western Europe); Brazil (South America); and Italy and Spain (Southern Europe).

**Figure 2.92. Top 10: Leading Digital Health Platforms Globally, as of January 2023**  
(Millions of users)



Source: Statista.

Lastly, the future of health care in ASEAN+3 will be increasingly data-driven. With populations across the region aging, pressures on ASEAN+3 health care systems are only set to increase. Health care priorities in the region would have to transform *from* treatment to prevention, given the likely rise in aging-related illnesses. Data will underpin this transformation. As highlighted by the COVID-19 experience, tech-enabled solutions can provide new models of health care and modes of delivery to help cope (Figure 2.92). Smart wearable devices can help older individuals monitor their own health, act as “nudges” for favorable behavioral

changes that can improve longevity, and may serve as alert systems. Other technologies, such as remote patient monitoring—or the use of technology to gather patient data for transmission to health professionals—harness data and cloud computing with the goal of improving access to health care and its quality. Machine learning, for example, can be utilized on vast amounts of clinical data to generate “actionable insights” and facilitate more efficient health care delivery (McCann 2019). In the ASEAN+3 region, Singapore is at the forefront of the ongoing data-driven transformation of the health care industry (Philips 2023).

## Achieving Trade Resilience with Technology

Technology can also be a critical tool to navigate a highly fluid trade environment and increase trade resilience. As companies around the world try to reduce risks from geoeconomic shocks and other unforeseen events, global supply chains of the future are likely to be more complex—shaped by various iterations of reshoring, friendshoring, nearshoring, as well as other resilience strategies. Multiple suppliers, as well as manufacturing locations, are likely to be the norm to reduce concentration risks and adapt to sudden fluctuations in demand and supply—a lesson learned from crisis events like the COVID-19 pandemic.

As supply chains of the future become longer, technologies and systems that enable real-time data collection, analysis, and optimization of operations will become increasingly important. Such “smart” supply chains—utilizing blockchain, big data, and artificial intelligence—allow for higher transparency, thus making them more agile, efficient, and resilient in a rapidly changing environment. Robust data infrastructures across various nodes would provide real-time visibility of any emerging supply and demand risks, allowing GVC players to identify vulnerabilities and proactively adjust operations at very short notice to avoid overruns or shortages. Visibility, along with data standardization, should allow multinational enterprises to quickly select alternative or more sustainable suppliers. Predictive algorithms could help identify possible supply chain bottlenecks before they materialize, minimizing the risk of disruptions and negative spillovers to wider economic activity.

Amid ongoing changes in global goods trade, technology will also propel strong growth in ASEAN+3’s cross-border (digital) services. International services trade could be at the core of the next wave of globalization. Digitally deliverable services—such as ICT services, business services, and those related to intellectual property—continue to grow over two to three times faster than overall goods and services trade activity. While the current size of services trade may not fully cushion ASEAN+3’s aggregate trade performance in the event of a shock, it holds massive opportunities—especially for ASEAN economies—in terms of income generation, job creation, and export diversification. This is especially as the outlook for global services trade remains highly positive, with continued income growth in developed economies generating higher demand for

services. Newer technologies could also see more specialized services being developed (PwC 2020). Faster and cheaper internet connections will make them much easier to trade internationally, opening ASEAN+3 to new exports and markets. Global regulatory developments that set rules and standards on the digital economy should spur momentum on digital services trade—both as a new growth driver for ASEAN+3, and as an additional buffer should geopolitics spark disruption to the goods trade landscape.

Technology will continue to drive down the cost of trade, offsetting the likely increase in trade barriers that could arise in a security-based fragmented world. Heightened geopolitical tension is the enemy of trade cooperation, which could manifest as an increase in unilateral trade policies and nontariff barriers imposed on “non-aligned” economies. Resulting distortions in trade flows and higher costs of goods and services globally are among the key concerns of ASEAN+3 economies, especially for imported intermediate inputs (Figure 2.8). Technology may be able to mitigate some of the additional costs, especially as new advancements continue to improve the production process. For example, blockchain technology—increasingly employed in trade logistics and customs processes—can help reduce bottlenecks and clerical errors that cost the shipping and retail industries at least USD 500 billion in losses every year (Daley 2019). 3D printing can substantially reduce order backlogs in the automobile sector, due to its faster turnaround and at a fraction of the normal cost (Cohen, Sargeant, and Somers 2014). Powered by the Internet of Things (IoT), digitalization of logistics can address cost overruns across multiple dimensions of the supply chain. It can do so by optimizing delivery routes (saving on transportation costs), by managing inventory levels through IoT-sensors and devices (saving on warehousing and inventory costs), and by increasing efficiency through process automation (saving on labor costs and potential human error). Similarly, financial technology has potential to ease financial constraints across ASEAN+3 manufacturers. By doing so, especially for smaller Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers of leading manufacturers, financial technology can increase resilience throughout the supply chain (AMRO 2021).

## Technology, as a Catalyst of Change

*"Artificial Intelligence is the New Electricity."*

Andrew Ng, Co-founder of Google Brain and Stanford University Professor

New technological breakthroughs mean that ASEAN+3 region could be peering at a new industrial revolution. Technology brings the possible onset of a fundamental change to ASEAN+3 economies: a new industrial revolution, driven primarily, but not solely, by the advancements in artificial intelligence (AI). AI's evolution mirrors the disruptive nature of general-purpose technologies like steam, electricity, and telecommunications, which defined previous industrial revolutions, with its potential to reshape entire industries. Yet, it is AI's ability to foster innovation that is one of its most promising aspects, positioning it as a new method of invention (Craft 2021). A true industrial revolution involves not only technological progress but also the invention of new methods of invention. By enhancing the productivity of research and development, AI has potential to revolutionize the way ASEAN+3 economies create and innovate, driving further technological progress.<sup>51</sup>

Alongside AI, advancements in deep sciences also herald significant potential to reshape the future of ASEAN+3 economies. Waves of innovation in life sciences and health, energy and clean tech, and agri-food technology represent a parallel frontier. Breakthroughs in areas like genetics, nanotechnology, and new materials are transforming

understanding and capabilities in many of the region's key sectors. These scientific advancements complement the transformative potential of AI. Their combined impact could lead to a holistic revolution, not only in digital and data-driven innovation but also by making groundbreaking strides in fundamental understanding and manipulation of the natural world. Altogether, this presents possible solutions to address some of the world's most pressing challenges (World Intellectual Property Organization 2022). The unprecedented pace in which COVID-19 vaccines were developed and deployed offers a window on what is possible.

As the region navigates this complex interplay of technological progress, it is vital to approach the future with a sense of cautious speculation. The potential for a new industrial revolution, marked by continued progress in AI and advances in deep sciences, seems tangible, yet the future remains inherently unpredictable. The ASEAN+3 region stands at the precipice of a new era, rich with possibilities but also fraught with uncertainties and risk. Preparing for this future is not just about adopting new technologies. It is also about fostering a conducive environment for innovation, addressing ethical considerations, and ensuring that the benefits of this technological transformation are distributed equitably.

<sup>51/</sup> This aligns with the idea that an industrial revolution is more than just a collection of technological advancements; it is a fundamental change in how humans generate and implement technological ideas (Perez 2010; Craft 2021).

## Special Feature: ASEAN+3 and the Economic Impact of Generative AI

*"First Law: Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral."*

Melvin Kranzberg, American Historian

In recent years, AI has steadily transformed from a niche technical domain to a potential agent of transformational economic change. Generative AI (Gen AI)—a branch of AI known for autonomously creating novel content, solutions, or strategies—garnered widespread attention in 2022 (Figure 2.93). This was notably influenced by the emergence of consumer-facing Gen AI tools since late-2022, catalyzing a shift in public discourse around AI's capabilities. A pivotal moment was the launch of ChatGPT, which brought AI tools closer to the end-user: it demonstrated practical applications of Gen AI, for example through interactive chat functionality.<sup>52</sup> This development ushered Gen AI from research laboratories into daily life interactions, fostering a range of customized applications and innovations that could have significant benefits to the economy and society.

With ASEAN+3 navigating a dynamic digital transformation, the interaction between Gen AI and the region's economic development is an important area of exploration. Amid these advancements, concerns about potential job displacement have resurfaced, rendering the economic discourse around Gen AI both timely and pertinent. This Special Feature aims to delve into the emerging discussion by offering insights into the current understanding of Gen AI and its potential economic impacts in ASEAN+3. Through a synthesis of existing literature and recent developments in this space, the subsequent discussion seeks to provide a nuanced appraisal of the unfolding economic dialogues surrounding Gen AI, setting the stage for more comprehensive and exhaustive inquiries.

### Gen AI: A Primer

Gen AI represents a distinct branch within the broader domain of AI, characterized by its ability to autonomously generate new content, such as text, images, audio, video, or even complex solutions based on patterns and relationships identified within existing data. In contrast to non-generative AI approaches, which rely heavily on "supervised" learning and primarily respond based on preexisting or predefined information, Gen AI employs "unsupervised" or "semisupervised" learning techniques, leveraging underlying data patterns to create original, and often unique, outputs. This capacity of Gen AI extends the potential of AI beyond mere reactive or predictive responses to a realm of proactive and innovative outputs, significantly augmenting the scope of what AI can achieve (Goyal, Varshney, and Rozsa 2023; NVIDIA 2023).

One key defining characteristic of Gen AI is its use of "foundation" models. These models learn by analyzing large, often unstructured, data sets to discern patterns and relationships autonomously, without the need for explicit labeling.<sup>53</sup> Trained on extensive data sets, these "foundation" models then form a base layer upon which further machine learning models or applications can be built. A prime example is GPT-4, the model underlying ChatGPT, which can generate human-like text by identifying and utilizing patterns in the data. The general-purpose learning and transferability features of foundation models serve as a significant advantage for Gen AI: it can operate in a more open-ended

exploratory learning environment, fostering the generation of novel content and solutions, and offering a solid and adaptable baseline for a wide range of applications across different domains (Stanford HAI 2021; Amazon 2023). More broadly, Gen AI expands the range of potential AI applications, especially with innovations that enhances its accessibility of use (Data Hacker 2022; Gough 2023).

As such, Gen AI has captured strong interest from both public and private sectors—despite it being in its relatively nascent stage. An April 2023 survey by McKinsey (2023a) showed one-third of responding firms were regularly using Gen AI in at least one business function. Of these, 40 percent planned to undertake more AI-related investments. Similarly, IDC (2023) highlighted that more than 30 percent of its surveyed organizations in Asia-Pacific intended to invest in Gen AI technologies, while close to 40 percent were already exploring use-cases. At present, most use-cases of Gen AI primarily involve marketing and sales, product and service development, service operations such as customer care and back-office support, and software engineering (McKinsey 2023b). The use of Gen AI is also being explored for providing public goods and services. In ASEAN+3, for example, the Singapore government is exploring how Gen AI can raise the productivity of public service officers and improve the delivery of digital services to citizens (Pillai 2023).

<sup>52/</sup> On the other hand, non-generative AI necessitates a structured learning environment, where the model learns to make predictions or decisions based on the provided labeled data.


<sup>53/</sup> ChatGPT, developed by OpenAI (an artificial intelligence research laboratory), is an advanced AI model that specializes in generating human-like text. Based on the GPT (Generative Pre-trained Transformer) architecture, ChatGPT utilizes deep learning algorithms to understand and produce contextually relevant text. ChatGPT's training involved analyzing vast amounts of text data, enabling it to respond to a wide range of prompts with coherent and contextually appropriate replies.

As the technology continues to evolve, Gen AI is likely to expand its applications and integrate more deeply into various business and industrial domains (Ng 2023). Developments in this field could lead to more sophisticated and beneficial uses of Gen AI, influencing how businesses operate, innovate, and compete. Its use could extend significantly beyond current capabilities, with multimodality and multi-agent systems in Gen AI possibly transitioning platforms—such as ChatGPT—toward more capable, interactive, and adaptive systems that can better navigate and operate within complex, real-world scenarios. Its enhanced ability to process diverse data types and collaborate through multi-agent frameworks could significantly impact various sectors, driving innovation and efficiency in unforeseen ways (Nath and others 2023; Wang and others 2023).

At present, any discussion on the eventual economic impact of Gen AI invariably treads into speculative territory. The technology's rapidly evolving nature means that its interplay with socioeconomic realities is in constant flux, including the development of complementary technologies and the role of regulations in mitigating risks from its use. Despite the excitement over the revolutionary potential of Gen AI, many experts believe that more traditional, non-generative AI technology is expected to continue to unlock more economic value in the next few years. This is especially true when it comes to improving prediction accuracy, optimizing logistics networks, and providing next-purchase recommendations, such as in e-commerce (McKinsey 2023a; Ng 2023).

Figure 2.93. Decades of Progression: From Rule-Based Systems to Advanced Generative AI

Generative AI, as we understand it today, is the culmination of a rich tapestry of developments, discoveries, and paradigm shifts across the timeline of AI research.



Source: AMRO staff compilation; Lawlor and Chang (2023); Lawton (2023), Singh (2023).

## Gen AI and the Future of Work

Akin to previous waves of technological change, concerns over potential job displacement have resurfaced along with the strong interest in Gen AI. The current macroeconomic discussion of technology's impact on labor markets has largely evolved through a task-based lens. Tasks are categorized as either “routine” or “non-routine” based on their level of codifiability and procedural specification. Routine tasks, which can be codified and automated, are typically associated with middle-paid occupations, while non-routine tasks are prevalent in both low and high-paid occupations. Earlier frameworks discussed in the literature, such as skills-biased and routine-biased technological changes, posited that technological advancements primarily threaten routine tasks, often leading to job polarization whereby demand for middle-paid occupations will shrink (“hollow out”) faster than for low and high-paid ones.<sup>54</sup> More recent studies also acknowledge both task-displacement and task-reinstatement effects, indicating that technology can also create demand for a broader spectrum of labor-intensive tasks.<sup>55</sup>

However, AI is complicating the task-based framework of understanding the impact of technological change on the labor market. Contrary to conventional digital technologies, AI—with its inductive learning capabilities—broadens the scope of tasks that can be automated to encompass non-routine tasks. The potential to automate non-routine tasks across both low and high-paid occupations introduces a scenario of uncertain employment dynamics within these occupational categories, contingent on how much of non-routine tasks can be done using AI (Autor 2022). Further, the advancement of Gen AI into creative tasks—previously not imagined possible for machines—further obfuscates the delineation between the two task categories, thereby challenging the conventional frameworks used to analyze technology's impact on labor markets.

There, however, could be a case for qualified optimism. Technologies such as AI can augment workers' capabilities by facilitating enhanced efficiency, the delivery of higher quality work, or the undertaking of tasks that were previously unattainable.<sup>56</sup> Ultimately, the consequences of Gen AI on the overall macroeconomy, including in the ASEAN+3, hinges on whether it will perpetuate the automation trend at the expense of valuable job creation (particularly for non-high skilled workers), or whether it

will lead to the creation of new labor-complementary tasks accessible to a diverse set of workers. In other words, Gen AI can be a potential asset, especially in labor markets where many routine tasks have already been automated. In these economies, it can be applied for non-routine problem-solving and decision-making. In this case, Gen AI—by surfacing pertinent information in a timely manner—not only can complement worker skill and expertise but also counteract the modern dilemma of information overload, helping workers make better-informed decisions.

Further, Gen AI could reduce barriers to labor productivity. By improving information translation, Gen AI can significantly boost human expertise and support workers in unfamiliar situations: for example, in the case of a highly trained immigrant who needs help to overcome a language barrier. While there is potential for Gen AI to assume more operational tasks in certain professions—such as accounting, financial analysis, or computer programming—its development could also lead to higher demand for tasks that require human expertise and judgment. Human intervention, in this case, would entail overseeing automated processes, enhancing communication with customers, and facilitating more sophisticated services that leverage AI tools. Thus, increased AI use will not only retain but also potentially expand the scope and value of human contribution in various professional domains.

Some recent studies highlight its potential in enhancing—rather than displacing—workers. While comprehensive macro-assessment of Gen AI's impact on the labor market is not yet possible, existing micro-level studies showed that Gen AI tools demonstrated a dual role: it can both *automate* and *augment* human work. For example, automation contributed to time efficiency in initial draft creation, and augmentation arose as workers applied expertise and judgement to refine the AI-generated drafts into final products. This observation holds true whether in software development, text creation, or customer support (Figure 2.94). Other studies have also explored the intersection between AI capabilities and the tasks performed by workers across different occupations at a more conceptual level.<sup>57</sup> These studies are typically not intended to assess or predict the precise impact of AI on jobs, but to provide estimates of jobs' “exposure” to AI given their task composition. These, in turn, provide

<sup>54/</sup> See, for example, Autor (2022).

<sup>55/</sup> Autor (2022) provides an excellent review of the vast literature of technological change and the labour market, and the uncertainty introduced by advancement in AI. Seminal references for the task-based framework include Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), and for task-reinstatement, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019).


<sup>56/</sup> See, for example, a detailed discussion in Acemoglu, Autor and Johnson (2023), as well as Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019) and Autor and others (2022).

<sup>57/</sup> McKinsey & Company (2023a), Eloundou and others (2023), and Gmyrek, Berg, and Bescond (2023) are examples of studies focusing on GenAI capabilities.

insights on how the nature of specific jobs could evolve given wider adoption of AI technology. The common theme across such studies is that exposure to Gen AI—at the task level—varies *within* an occupation but can affect a very broad spectrum of occupations. Further, contrary to past automation technologies, high(er)-skilled and high-income occupations are likely to become more exposed to Gen AI capabilities.

However, given that each job is a compilation of multiple tasks, it remains unlikely in the near future to come across any occupation where AI tools can execute nearly all the tasks. In line with these studies, AMRO’s analysis also shows that more jobs in the ASEAN+3 region are likely to be augmented by AI rather than automated, lending optimism to the use of Gen AI as a tool to improve overall productivity (Box 2.6).

**Figure 2.94. Selected Findings on Gen AI’s Impact: Augmenting Rather than Displacing Workers**



Source: AMRO staff compilation.

## Box 2.6:

# Gen AI: Augmenting or Displacing Jobs in ASEAN+3?

Gmyrek, Berg, and Bescond (2023) from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) analyzed the potential exposure of various occupations and tasks to Gen AI. They specifically looked at large language models (LLMs), and how this exposure might affect employment.<sup>1</sup> In the study, an occupation is classified as having automation potential if most of its tasks can be automated.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, a job has augmentation potential if some tasks are difficult to automate while others can be automated more easily. Overall, the study, along with others, finds that LLMs are more likely to augment jobs than automate them. Further, the impact is more pronounced in high- and upper middle-income economies—where occupations with clerical tasks make up a relatively higher proportion of employment—than in low- and lower-middle-income economies. The effects of LLMs are also highly gender-biased, with a larger proportion of women’s jobs facing both automation and augmentation potentials compared to men.

AMRO staff, using estimates by the authors, have approximated the potential effects of LLM exposure on jobs in the ASEAN+3 region.<sup>3</sup> The intent is not to have precise estimates of LLM’s effects on employment, but to provide broad insights of the direction and distributional impacts of possible changes. Overall, a higher proportion of jobs across ASEAN+3 have potential to be augmented by Gen AI rather than automated (Figure 2.6.1).<sup>4</sup> This suggests that LLMs are more likely to enhance jobs than replace them. However, Japan stands out: given the structural composition of its employment, which has relatively higher proportion of clerical tasks, the economy

could be more affected by job automation than job augmentation.<sup>5</sup>

The results vary when employment effects are classified according to ASEAN+3 economies’ income group and job skill levels.<sup>6</sup> Across all income groups, a greater proportion of high-skilled jobs than medium-skilled jobs have the potential to be augmented, with lower-income economies benefiting more. High-skilled workers in lower-middle-income economies are likely to benefit the most from augmentation (Figure 2.6.2). On the other hand, a greater share of medium-skilled jobs could be exposed to automation potential than high-skilled jobs, especially in higher-income economies. Meanwhile, LLM technology is unlikely to affect low-skilled jobs, which involve tasks that require considerable physical effort such as cleaning and manual labor.

Disaggregating the results by gender also reveals different impacts on employment. The share of women’s jobs that could be affected by LLM technology—both in automation and augmentation—is higher than for jobs held by men and increases with economies’ income levels (Figure 2.6.3). This disparity is most evident in high-income economies, where the proportion of women’s occupations exposed to automation are more than double that of men. Nonetheless, while women may be disproportionately affected by job automation, they also stand to benefit more from job augmentation.

This box was written by Megan Wen Xi Chong.

<sup>1/</sup> LLMs refer to AI algorithms designed to understand, interpret, and generate human language based on extensive training data. These models, such as the GPT series developed by OpenAI, are characterized by their vast number of parameters and deep learning techniques, allowing them to generate coherent and contextually relevant text. LLMs are utilized in a variety of applications, including language translation, content creation, and conversation simulations, demonstrating significant advancements in natural language processing and AI research.

<sup>2/</sup> Using the GPT-4 model, a score of exposure to GPT technology is generated for each task defined according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08). Considering occupations as a collection of tasks with different exposures, jobs are then classified as having automation or augmentation potential based on the mean and standard deviation of task scores generated.

<sup>3/</sup> The authors have provided data on augmentation and automation potential for jobs at the ISCO-08 4-digit level. Since employment data for most economies are only available at the 2-digit level, AMRO staff calculated the proportion of occupations in each 2-digit category that are classified as having automation or augmentation potential. The share of occupations with automation or augmentation potential are then applied to country-level employment data to estimate the potential employment effects. For economies with data at only the 1-digit level, a weighted mean is calculated based on the economy’s income level classification.

<sup>4/</sup> AMRO staff use the most recent data available for employment by ISCO category; however, for some economies, these are still quite dated (e.g., China and Indonesia). Interpretation of economy-specific estimates warrant some degree of caution, especially if employment trends or structure have changed over time.

<sup>5/</sup> Among ASEAN+3 economies, Japan has the highest proportion of employment that fall under the ISCO category of Clerical Support Workers at 20 percent. For the rest of the region, the proportion of jobs in this category range from 1 percent to 12 percent.


<sup>6/</sup> Income groups are defined per the World Bank’s income group classification. Skill levels are defined according to the International Labour Organization and based on the ISCO-08 classification.

It is important to stress that these results are not meant to be taken as precise estimates. In addition, this exercise only covers the effects of LLM-based technology, and not broader AI technology. Nevertheless, it provides insights regarding the potential impacts of Gen AI technology on the region's employment. First, more jobs in the ASEAN+3 are likely to be augmented rather than automated, providing a more positive outlook about the use and application of Gen AI technology. However, the distributional impact on employment varies with skills and gender. Medium-skilled jobs face a higher risk of automation, especially those with a larger share of clerical tasks, while high-skilled jobs could benefit more from Gen AI's augmentation potential. Meanwhile, given the types of

occupation that women are more involved in compared to men, they could be more disproportionately exposed to both augmentation and automation potentials.<sup>7</sup>


These preliminary findings suggest that the effect of Gen AI on ASEAN+3 employment will likely be uneven. The general-purpose nature of this particular technology is likely to have broad effects across many industries and jobs, bringing both opportunities and challenges. To deal with job displacement concerns, policies can be shaped to create a supportive environment for retraining and upskilling workers likely to be most affected. This way, the ASEAN+3 workforce will be prepared to make the most of Gen AI's capabilities—and while ensuring that no sector, group, or economy gets left behind.

**Figure 2.6.1. ASEAN+3: Share of Employment with Automation and Augmentation Potential**  
(Percent)



Source: Gmyrek, Berg, and Bescond (2023); AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data refer to the proportion of jobs with automation and augmentation potential as a share of total employment within each economy. Data are as of 2022 (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), 2021 (Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines), 2020 (Japan, Myanmar, Malaysia), 2017 (Lao PDR), 2010 (Indonesia), and 2005 (China).


**Figure 2.6.2. ASEAN+3: Share of Employment with Augmentation and Automation Potential, by Income Group and Skill Level**  
(Percent of jobs within each skill category)



Source: Gmyrek, Berg, and Bescond (2023); ILO Labour Force Statistics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: High-skilled jobs include categories 1 to 3 of the ISCO-08; medium-skilled jobs include categories 4 to 8. The high income group includes Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Brunei, and Singapore; the upper-middle-income group includes China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand; the lower-middle income group includes Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

<sup>7</sup> Job categories that have a higher percentage of women than men include professional services, as well as service and sales workers.

**Figure 2.6.3. ASEAN+3: Share of Occupations with Automation and Augmentation Potential, by Income Group and Gender**  
(Percent of jobs within each gender)



Source: Gmyrek, Berg, and Bescond (2023); ILO Labour Force Statistics; AMRO staff calculations.

Note: Data refer to percent of total employment within each sex. The high income group includes Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Brunei, and Singapore; the upper-middle income group includes China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand; the lower-middle income group includes Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

## Gen AI for the ASEAN+3: Future Direction

Gen AI carries credible promise of boosting productivity growth, yet it is important to maintain a realistic perspective of its macroeconomic impact, especially for the ASEAN+3 region. Major technological innovations in the recent past, such as the internet and the smartphone, serve as cogent reminders: even as these innovations were revolutionary, they did not precipitate substantial surges in growth potential and productivity on a global scale. While their economic impacts are not immaterial, they did not herald a massive boost to overall productivity growth.<sup>58</sup> In the same vein, Gen AI—in tandem with developments of complementary technologies—could have the potential to unlock significant economic value, transforming the modalities of work and livelihoods in ASEAN+3 economies. However, if past technological epochs are a reliable compass, it is prudent not to anticipate a rapid acceleration of macroeconomic growth as a result of Gen AI adoption. The journey to realizing the economic dividends of Gen AI is likely to be gradual, necessitating a balanced view of its opportunities and risks to adeptly navigate the unfolding economic reality.

Gen AI will exhibit uneven impacts both across and within economies in ASEAN+3, and could risk diverging growth trajectories. Most economies—especially those with lower technological capabilities—could be more exposed to the potential disruption that comes with the broader adoption of AI technology. For example, given the relatively large size of the business process outsourcing service industry in the economy, the Philippines could face a greater risk of worker displacement—primarily those engaged in more routine work—as AI gradually reshapes ICT operations, unless it can move into more knowledge-based services. More fundamentally,

a concern with widespread Gen AI adoption is its potential to amplify productivity—and growth—divergence within and between ASEAN+3 economies, resulting in slower economic growth in some relative to others. The region's existing digital divide could skew the distribution of economic benefits from Gen AI, with more developed economies and privileged groups possibly reaping most of the rewards. This underscores the need for regional cooperation to bridge the digital divide, ensuring that the economic value generated by Gen AI and associated technologies is shared equitably while minimizing the risk of exacerbating existing inequalities.

Lastly, rapid progress and use of Gen AI and broader AI-related technologies raise important questions about governance, ethics, and values. As the ASEAN+3 region seeks to harness the potential of these technologies and continue to encourage innovation, policymakers and all other stakeholders must come together to develop the right governance frameworks, norms, and standards. This will help steer AI development in a direction that puts human interests first. Some key elements of a human-centric governance approach include (1) principles of transparency, accountability, and bias mitigation in AI systems; (2) managing data privacy risks; (3) monitoring for harmful applications; (4) building capacity to understand AI impacts; and (5) mechanisms for meaningful public consultation and participation. Regional cooperation will also be vital for ASEAN+3 economies to align on shared values, pool expertise and experiences, and develop a unified stance to help shape global norms. Given its diverse makeup, the ASEAN+3 region has the opportunity to offer a model for the ethical deployment of AI technologies, directed toward the common good.

<sup>58/</sup> Nobel Prize Winner for Economics Robert Solow famously quipped in 1987 that "...you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics." In a global meta-analysis of the impact of ICT on economic growth, Stanley, Doucouliagos, and Steel (2018) found that it does have positive but small- to modest- impact to overall economic growth, especially for advanced economies. The effect is more muted for developing economies.

## Policy Considerations

*"AI must benefit everyone, including the third of humanity who are still offline."*

António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General

Technological progress, supported and complemented by the right policies, can provide immense socio-economic benefits to ASEAN+3. Technological advances can help unlock solutions to pressing structural issues confronting the region's economies, from demographic shifts, changing global trade dynamics, to environmental challenges, among others, while propelling long-term growth and stability through enhanced productivity and expanded economic opportunities. While the precise, optimal policy mix will differ across the region's diverse economies, sustained efforts to drive technological progress and productivity growth—through openness, capability-building, and support for appropriate types and levels of innovation—will pave the path to more sustainable, inclusive, and innovation-led growth.

ASEAN+3 must take advantage of the opportunity to build on its strengths as a global technology powerhouse. However, the realization of this promising future calls for concerted, cooperative, and adaptive efforts—at both the domestic and the regional levels—to maximize the power of technology. While a granular discussion on policies is beyond the scope of this section, economies could focus on the following areas to best leverage technology as an instrument for achieving their long-term growth objectives:

Firstly, continued commitment to openness and closer regional integration will be paramount. Economic openness not only drives economic growth, but it also serves as a critical avenue for technological diffusion. By attracting leading multinational enterprises and participating in high value-added GVCs, economies could have better access to positive spillovers from global advances in technology. These positive externalities are especially vital for ASEAN+3 economies that are at lower development levels and with varying degrees of technological capabilities. Industrial policies aimed at building local suppliers' capabilities to absorb technology from leading (foreign) firms and innovate, as well as cluster- or network-based policies to encourage the diffusion of technologies within sectors, will be critical to drive the economy up the productivity value chain. Policy frameworks that support cross-border collaboration and reduce trade barriers can amplify these spillovers, fostering a fertile environment for innovation and economic dynamism. Such strategies will not only help economies maximize benefits from GVC participation, but also enhance their capacity to innovate and grow in a technologically driven global economy.

Secondly, prioritizing investment in both hard and soft infrastructure will ensure ASEAN+3's readiness to reap the benefits

of technological progress. Future growth strategies for the region will increasingly require a multifaceted approach that includes (1) strengthening infrastructure to support long-term digitalization, (2) developing human capital, (3) scaling up R&D efforts, and (4) fostering a competitive business environment. Investments in education across the region must consider the need for advanced skills programs that are necessary for innovation-led growth, as well as the need to make these programs attractive. For example, industry demand for graduates in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) often exceed the supply (Buchholz 2023).<sup>59</sup> R&D efforts can be scaled up by fiscal incentives, robust institutional support, strong talent attraction and retention programs, and by facilitating access to finance for innovative firms, especially for start-ups. Wider technology diffusion and adoption will be enabled by policies that foster competition and reallocate resources to their most efficient use, alongside stronger collaboration among firms, academia, and government to reduce the costs of searching for technology. Such comprehensive investments and policy measures are key to preparing the ASEAN+3 region for current and future technological demands.

Thirdly, reducing the digital divide, and "humanizing" technology will ensure inclusive progress. Advancing digital literacy, improving access to advanced digital tools and resources, and delivering essential ICT training would be essential to support groups of individuals, sectors, enterprises, and communities that are lagging in digital capabilities. Promoting widespread internet connectivity and digital service access across the ASEAN+3 region, while considering the local context—including socioeconomic, geographical, and educational disparities—is key. Humanizing technology means to develop it with a specific group of end-users in mind: if technology becomes too generalized, adoption can be sluggish over time, and certain groups will fall behind as a result (Tan 2019). As the digital divide narrows on the back of increasing connectivity, cyber resilience across ASEAN+3 must be simultaneously strengthened to reduce cyber risks, scams, and potential cross-border spillovers from such threats. Ultimately, innovation policies—including technology safeguards and security frameworks—must evolve with each economy's technological progress: shifting from broad technology adoption to encouraging more advanced innovation activities, while ensuring that all ASEAN+3 economies benefit safely from new technological advancements.

<sup>59/</sup> Latest data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2023) suggest that in the ASEAN+3 region, only four economies have over a third of their tertiary education degree recipients coming from the STEM field. These are Malaysia (2022: 40.2 percent), Brunei (2020: 38.4 percent), Singapore (2021: 35.9 percent), Thailand (2023: 31.7 percent), and Korea (2021: 30.4 percent).

## V. Summary and Concluding Discussion

The ASEAN+3 region's growth landscape has never been more complex. Thanks to years of solid macroeconomic fundamentals, improvements in governance and regulations, as well as enhanced external resilience, all ASEAN+3 economies have progressively moved up the income ladder, lifting millions of people out of poverty and significantly improving their quality of life. With its growing affluence and rapid industrialization, the ASEAN+3 region has become the biggest driver of global growth (Hinojales, Kho, and Tan 2023).<sup>59</sup> However, concerns are rising that the various tailwinds behind the region's remarkable growth are dissipating. In the next five years, the global economy is projected to grow at an annual rate of 3.1 percent—down from 3.7 percent in the decade prior to COVID-19—with key implications for the expansion of global trade (IMF 2023). Productivity growth has either slowed or stalled in several ASEAN+3 economies, further endangering the region's speed of catch-up with high-income peers. Looking ahead, the ASEAN+3 region is projected to expand by 4.5 percent per year on average this decade, decelerating from its long-term average annual growth of 5.3 percent in 2010–2020.

This deceleration is occurring in an environment that is increasingly overcast by shocks and higher uncertainty. Health crises, natural and climate-related disasters, and geopolitical conflicts are not new phenomena. However, these events have now become increasingly prevalent and will continue to become more common in the medium- to long-term. Moreover, ASEAN+3 economies have yet to fully overcome the scarring effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on their physical, financial, and human capital, as well as overall productivity. As highlighted in AMRO (2022), a “full reckoning of the extent and areas of scarring ... can only be achieved years after it is over.” Thus, while each of these global events will affect some ASEAN+3 economies more than others, the region as a whole could be navigating these various global forces from a relatively weaker position compared to the pre-pandemic period.

ASEAN+3's long-term growth prospects and development trajectory will be premised on its ability to navigate major global shifts: by managing their risks and leveraging the opportunities they offer. This year's thematic chapter delves into three key secular trends that are of utmost concern to ASEAN+3 policymakers (Figure 2.8). These ongoing shifts will continue to shape—and reshape—not only the ASEAN+3 region's long-term growth path, but also its future role in the global economic order. The

chapter looks at each of these secular trends in the region's unique context and experience, and by doing so, offers a few options that will help the region's economies navigate the uncertainties as well as emerging opportunities ahead.

- As highlighted in Section II, Navigating Aging, two-thirds of ASEAN+3 economies are already in advanced- to late-stages of the demographic transition. The strong growth in the region's working-age population—the source of the “demographic dividend” that has helped propel economic growth in the past—is projected to reverse in the second half of this decade. Given its growth implications, the rapid speed of aging across ASEAN+3 economies is raising doubts about the region's macroeconomic prospects. However, when viewed *prospectively*, the ASEAN+3 region, in fact, has a new and largely untapped resource: an expanding older population, who are healthier and can live longer, more productive working lives. As the section highlights, leveraging this resource requires society and policymakers to view aging as not just something to *cope with*, but something to *reap benefits from*. By rethinking aging, the region can successfully turn the “demographic dividend” of the past into the “longevity dividend” of the future.
- Section III, Navigating Trade Reconfiguration, focuses on the key forces underpinning changes in the global trade landscape and how they manifest in ASEAN+3 trade and investment flows. *First*, trade relations globally are being increasingly realigned by geopolitical considerations, resulting in longer value chains especially between China and the United States. In global supply chains where this reconfiguration is occurring, a few ASEAN+3 economies have been able to position themselves as additional nodes. *Second*, global trade is becoming increasingly concentrated. ASEAN+3's import and export market partners have become less diversified compared to previous decades. While this reflects stronger intraregional linkages, such an increase in trade concentration can amplify the propagation of future shocks. *Third*, international trade in services—facilitated by rapid technological advancements—is becoming more important than trade in goods as the driver of globalization. ASEAN+3's exports of modern (and digitally deliverable) services have shown resilience against past economic shocks; but their potential as a growth driver is yet to be fully harnessed.

<sup>60/</sup> At market exchange rates, the ASEAN+3's share of world GDP is at 28 percent, higher than the United States (25 percent) and the euro area (14 percent). Between 2008 and 2022, the region's contribution to global growth was more than double the combined contribution of both advanced economies.


- Lastly, Section IV, Navigating Technological Change, highlights the dual role technology plays in ASEAN+3's long-term growth. While unlocking solutions to the structural challenges to the region's economies, many new technological breakthroughs—such as digitalization, smart technologies, and artificial intelligence—are fundamentally changing business models and the ways that economies utilize their factors of production. In a *Special Feature*, AMRO staff takes an initial, balanced view on generative artificial intelligence (Gen AI) as a domain that is gathering increasing attention globally, and explores what it implies for the region's workforce. Instead of regarding the technology with concern on its potential to displace jobs, ASEAN+3 economies may benefit from an approach of “qualified optimism.” With the proper policies and safeguards in place, Gen AI can be a tool to complement, enhance, and augment the region's labor force.

Well-designed and timely policies, unique to each economy's circumstances, can transform potential risks from these three secular trends into opportunities. The objective of the thematic chapter is to provide context for AMRO's future in-depth research work and help guide domestic and regional policy discussion. For each of the trends, the optimal strategy and policy mix (and

timing) will differ across ASEAN+3 economies, but each policy mix can be improved and/or strengthened by the presence of certain key “ingredients” (Figure 2.95). For example, implementing policies and structures that allow for productive aging, accompanied by pension reforms to reflect current demographic realities, will be critical to successfully navigating aging—regardless of whether an economy is in the early or late stages of the demographic transition. Resisting security-based fragmentation and protectionism, while continuously enhancing the ease of doing business domestically, will enable an economy to find a path through the ongoing trade reconfiguration—regardless of the stage of its economic development. Lastly, promoting innovation and technological diffusion, as well as continuously narrowing the digital divide, will ensure that no groups are disproportionately burdened or left behind by rapid technological change.

Among these policies, four common themes emerge that will make for “robust” growth strategies for ASEAN+3, no matter how the future economic order unfolds. Notwithstanding each economy's policy priority—whether rapid aging, trade reconfiguration, technological disruption, or other (domestic) issues—these underlying principles will help reinforce the foundation upon which more specific policies can be built.

**Figure 2.95. ASEAN+3: Key Policy Options for Navigating Major Secular Shifts**



Source: AMRO staff.

Note: A detailed discussion of each policy recommendation can be found in each section.

- **Expanding and deepening quality infrastructure.** Past issues of the AREO have consistently underscored the critical role of good infrastructure—both hard and soft—in invigorating growth and ensuring long-term macroeconomic stability. Reaping the benefits of aging and strengthening the longevity dividend requires a holistic, “whole-of-society” approach to infrastructure development across four domains: physical, social, health systems, and labor markets (NAM 2022). With trade and commerce a lifeblood for ASEAN+3, improving logistics interconnectivity to make regional trade as cost-efficient and seamless as possible will ensure the smooth functioning of regional supply chains in good times, and allow for swift adjustments in times of crisis. The need for widespread digital infrastructure will continue to remain high among the region’s spending priorities, especially in a world that is increasingly driven by technological advancement. However, these should not displace the priority put on basic infrastructures like roads, hospitals, schools, utilities, and telecommunications, especially in the region’s developing economies (AMRO 2021).
- **Encouraging innovation and knowledge diffusion.** Creative and disruptive innovation is a characteristic of a dynamic and resilient economy (AMRO 2022). It will be all but impossible for ASEAN+3 to collect the longevity dividend without innovation in health and work: from the discovery of new medicines, treatments, and other therapeutics, to transforming the nature of work to adapt to an older workforce. New and existing tech-enabled tools—such as “smart supply chains”—and financial technologies can increase the region’s overall trade resilience. Embracing and opening up access to these technologies and advanced processes—still concentrated in the hands of a relative few—require a supportive policy environment, one that combines targeted fiscal incentives, robust institutional support, and financing access, especially for innovative firms. Where domestic technological capabilities are still lacking, improving the business environment and investing in local talent will help attract leading multinational enterprises, in turn fostering domestic competition and cultivating technology transfer through FDI.
- **Promoting inclusivity.** Discrimination and negative stereotypes toward different groups of society—such as based on age and/or gender—hinder an economy’s climb toward higher productivity. A deliberate focus on hiring younger people that arises from misinformed conceptions about older individuals not only leads to additional costs to the hiring firm, but also reduces its future growth and resilience (OECD 2020). Policies that

prevent ageism from being pervasive will minimize these economic costs, while allowing the economy to fully unleash the economic potential of a healthy older workforce. By growing the services trade, policy can open massive growth opportunities to a higher share of the ASEAN+3 workforce—especially for women (ADB 2013). Ultimately, ensuring that services trade translates into inclusive growth necessitates addressing gender disparities in all dimensions, such as in education, job types, earnings, and retirement, among others. Capitalizing on the growth opportunities offered by technology—and the growing digital economy—needs to be undertaken alongside the goal of universal digital inclusion in ASEAN+3.

- **Championing multilateral cooperation.** Aging, security-based geoeconomic fragmentation, along with climate change and pandemics—these are just some of the long term, common existential challenges to the global economy. Effective responses to these shared challenges require continuous inclusive dialogue among ASEAN+3 economies, as well as cooperation with those outside the region. Upgrading the quality of trade and technological infrastructure will hinge on ASEAN+3 economies’ ability to pool regional financing resources and expertise, and to mobilize them. Accelerating technology diffusion to more economies will magnify positive spillovers of innovation, through region-wide productivity gains. Freer movement of people could offer temporary solutions to economies faced with a rapidly shrinking labor force, while more fundamental, domestic adjustments are being made. At a time when the world is increasingly divided, it is imperative that ASEAN+3 stays even more united. Resisting creeping protectionism, remaining committed to the rules-based multilateral trading system, and staying unified will secure the region’s long-term growth resilience.

Aging, global trade reconfiguration, and rapid technological changes all interact to make the ASEAN+3 region’s long-term growth trajectory more opaque and uncertain. Their associated risks and opportunities could bring forth difficult policy trade-offs for individual ASEAN+3 economies, as well as need firm-handed, domestic adjustments that would have intertemporal and multigenerational consequences. A long-term growth strategy that aligns with the principles highlighted in this chapter will be crucial to enhancing each individual economy’s resilience and competitive edge in a highly fluid environment. Simultaneously leveraging the strength of collective action—through stronger regional cooperation—will be key to navigating toward a robust, sustainable, and high-quality future for the entire ASEAN+3 region.

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An aerial, high-angle photograph of a city at night. The central focus is a large, red, octagonal building with a complex internal structure, possibly a shopping mall or office building, illuminated from within. It is surrounded by a dense network of roads and other modern buildings. The streets are filled with cars, and the city lights create a vibrant, glowing effect. The overall scene depicts a bustling, modern urban environment.

Annex:

# Developments in ASEAN+3 Economies

# Brunei Darussalam

Brunei's economy recovered strongly in 2023, with real GDP expanding by 1.4 percent. Growth was mainly led by the services sector, notably the transport and financial services. A larger volume of passenger and cargo traffic contributed to a significant improvement in air transport activities, which increased by 75.8 percent in 2023. Similarly, in the finance subsector, growth surged to 37.4 percent in 2023, buoyed by higher income receipts from banking activities. However, the oil and gas (O&G) sector continued to contract by 2 percent in 2023, albeit at a slower pace compared to -7.3 percent in 2022, partly reflecting the progress made in rejuvenation efforts. Meanwhile, the downstream activities subsector declined by 2.8 percent, due to the planned facility maintenance of a major petrochemical refining plant.

The labor market condition was generally stable. However, in certain sectors such as accommodation/food services, wholesale/retail trade, and construction, labor market conditions remained challenging, given the dependency on migrant workers. Encouragingly, the number of returning migrant workers continued to increase as reflected in the increased number of foreign worker license applications for clearance letter by 323.4 percent to 171,197 applications in 2022. Latest data in 2022 showed that the unemployment rate remained stable (at around 5 percent).

Headline inflation fell sharply to 0.4 percent in 2023, reflecting lower commodity prices and post-pandemic supply chain normalization. Food prices, however, remained higher than pre-pandemic levels, driven largely by higher prices of cereals, meat, and dairy produce.

The external position stayed strong, with the overall balance of payments (BOP) surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP in 2022. The positive BOP reflected the surge in the current account surplus to 19.6 percent of GDP, which helped offset the outflows in the financial account. In 2023, the current account surplus is expected to have sustained, albeit narrowing to 16.0 percent of GDP, given the softer export outlook and lower production in both the upstream and downstream O&G sectors. International reserves are estimated at around USD 5 billion in 2023.

Credit growth continued to be robust, reflecting strong domestic and offshore financing activities. Total outstanding banking sector credit expanded by

11.3 percent in 2023, mainly due to robust growth of foreign lending and loans to household and other services sectors. Foreign lending firmed, mainly in the finance and commercial property sectors. In the household sector, credit demand was stronger in 2023, mostly for property financing and general consumption.

The banking sector's financial soundness continued to be preserved. The capital adequacy ratio stood at 20.1 percent in 2023, well above 10-percent minimum regulatory requirement. Overall asset quality generally improved, with the nonperforming loan ratio falling further to 2.6 percent in 2023 from 3.3 percent in 2022. Profitability wise, the banking sector benefited from the rising interest rate environment, resulting in a better-than-expected return on equity of 13.6 percent in 2023.


Higher oil revenue has helped restore fiscal buffers. The fiscal balance registered a better-than-expected surplus of 1.3 percent of GDP in Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, as the spike in energy prices helped offset lower O&G production and exports. The overall fiscal balance is estimated to weaken to a deficit of 9.8 percent of GDP in FY2023, due mainly to lower O&G export receipts relative to 2022. The fiscal outlays are also estimated to increase, albeit slightly, due to the planned increase in spending for the remaining development projects (RKN11).

Risks to Brunei's growth outlook are tilted toward the downside. Near-term risks stem from a worsening external environment, with a potential sharp decline in global energy prices and weaker economic growth in Brunei's major trading partners being the key risks. Sustained high global interest rates could amplify the risk of financial distress in major global economies, which could potentially trigger a credit crisis and/or heightened risk aversion with global and regional spillovers. Over the longer term, challenges stem from the potential setback to economic diversification as some domestic growth engines, including the tourism sector, could take longer to recover from the pandemic. Climate change transition risk is also becoming more salient, underscoring the urgency to accelerate the transformation of Brunei's economy toward one that is less carbon-intensive, while nurturing new and emerging growth areas to safeguard future economic prosperity.

## Brunei Darussalam: Selected Figures

*Brunei's economy recovered strongly in 2023.*


**Contributions to Real GDP Growth (Production)**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)



Source: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics; AMRO staff calculations.

*Labor market conditions are generally stable.*


**Unemployment Rate and Youth Unemployment Rate**  
(Percent)



Source: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics.

*Inflation has moderated sharply since early 2023.*


**Contributions to Consumer Price Inflation**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)



Source: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: HH = household; Misc. = miscellaneous.

*External position remains strong, supported by a sustained current account surplus.*


**Balance of Payments**  
(Percent of GDP)



Source: Department of Economic Planning and Statistics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: p denotes AMRO staff projection. Brunei's BOP follows BPM6. The financial account sign is reversed for charting purposes.

*Credit growth has recovered, led by stronger domestic demand and offshore lending.*


**Contributions to Banking Sector Credit Growth**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)



Source: Brunei Darussalam Central Bank; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: ICT = information and communication technology.

*Fiscal position strengthened in FY2022, driven mainly by better-than-expected O&G revenue.*

**Fiscal Balance, and Oil and Gas Prices**  
(USD/barrel; percent of GDP)



Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy; AMRO staff estimations.  
Note: Brunei's fiscal data are in fiscal year (FY) starting from April to March. e denotes AMRO staff estimates.

## Brunei Darussalam: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                                           | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                                            | 1.1                                             | -1.6  | -1.6  | 1.4   |
| Private consumption                                                 | 5.3                                             | 21.9  | 8.3   | 11.1  |
| Government consumption                                              | -9.6                                            | 2.6   | 6.9   | -2.4  |
| Gross fixed capital formation                                       | -9.3                                            | -13.9 | -1.8  | 0.2   |
| Imports of goods and services                                       | -2.1                                            | 29.5  | 9.5   | -7.8  |
| Exports of goods and services                                       | 7.5                                             | 8.8   | 6.9   | -2.2  |
| <b>External sector<sup>1</sup></b>                                  | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                             | 4.5                                             | 11.2  | 19.6  | 16.0  |
| Trade balance                                                       | 4.4                                             | 14.2  | 25.8  | 22.1  |
| Capital and financial account balance                               | 2.2                                             | -0.9  | 14.3  | 12.4  |
| Direct investment                                                   | -4.8                                            | -1.5  | 1.8   | -1.5  |
| Portfolio investment                                                | 9.9                                             | -1.7  | 2.7   | 2.5   |
| Other investment                                                    | -2.9                                            | 2.3   | 9.8   | 11.3  |
| Errors and omissions                                                | -6.0                                            | -4.2  | -4.8  | -5.4  |
| Overall balance                                                     | -3.7                                            | 7.8   | 0.5   | -1.8  |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) <sup>2</sup> | 4.0                                             | 5.0   | 5.1   | 4.8   |
| <b>Fiscal sector<sup>3</sup></b>                                    | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                                  | 12.6                                            | 24.3  | 27.4  | 19.7  |
| Expenditure                                                         | 32.6                                            | 29.4  | 26.1  | 29.5  |
| Fiscal balance                                                      | -20.0                                           | -5.2  | 1.3   | -9.8  |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                               | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money                                                         | -0.4                                            | 2.7   | 1.3   | 2.7   |
| Domestic credit <sup>4</sup>                                        | 18.3                                            | -19.6 | -15.6 | 51.7  |
| Private sector credit                                               | 0.2                                             | 2.7   | 6.0   | 3.9   |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                                            |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in BND billion, calendar year)                         | 16.6                                            | 18.8  | 23.0  | 20.3  |
| Nominal GDP (in BND billion, fiscal year)                           | 16.2                                            | 19.7  | 22.9  | 20.5  |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)               | 1.9                                             | 1.7   | 3.7   | 0.4   |
| Exchange rate (in BND/USD, period average)                          | 1.38                                            | 1.34  | 1.38  | 1.34  |

Source: National authorities via CEIC/ Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> Brunei's balance of payments follows BPM6. A negative (positive) financial account balance indicates net inflow (outflow).

Overall balance = Current account balance - Capital and financial account balance + Errors and omissions.

<sup>2/</sup> Gross international reserves includes gold.

<sup>3/</sup> Refers to fiscal year, which is from April to March.

<sup>4/</sup> Refers to domestic claims from Depository Corporations Survey.

# Cambodia

The economic recovery is likely to have continued in 2023. A robust tourism recovery alongside pent-up domestic consumption sustained ongoing improvement in the services sector. Although growth in the garment sector is estimated to have decelerated due to persistently subdued US and EU demand, the non-garment manufacturing sector continued experiencing high growth in 2023. GDP growth is estimated to reach 5.3 percent in 2023, from 5.2 percent in 2022.

Consumer price inflation should ease significantly in 2023, thanks to the moderation of global oil and food prices. During the first half of 2023, headline inflation continued its decline, averaging 1.2 percent, reflecting a 6.3 percent reduction in energy prices. However, starting from July 2023, the inflation trend picked up, partly reflecting the base effect of last year as well as a tightening of global rice supplies. Throughout 2023, inflation declined to 2.1 percent from 5.3 percent in 2022.

The external position is expected to turn to a surplus in 2023, mainly reflecting improvement in trade balances. The current account deficit narrowed significantly to 25.7 percent of GDP in 2022 from 40.4 percent in 2021, and turned into a surplus of 2.7 percent of GDP in the first three quarters of 2023 on the back of a sudden stop in gold imports, sustained remittance inflows and a recovery in tourism. The current account balance is set to show a small surplus at 1.0 percent of GDP for the whole year of 2023 due to the resumption of gold imports since July.

The riel depreciated against the US dollar in 2023 on average. The depreciation, particularly from May to September, prompted the National Bank of Cambodia's to spend USD 50 million to support the riel in September, its first 2023 foreign exchange (FX) intervention, followed by USD 40 million more in October. After these interventions, the Khmer riel gradually appreciated to 4,085 to the US dollar at the end of 2023, a slight improvement from the 4,118 recorded a year earlier.

The real estate sector remained weak due to a combination of a cyclical downturn and oversupply. The oversupply stemmed primarily from the construction boom and increases in foreign investments during 2018–2019. The contraction in demand in 2022 further exacerbated the oversupply problem, while slower sales and downward pressure on property prices resulted in liquidity problems for developers. In response to this weakness, the government implemented real estate sector support measures in April 2023, mainly by postponing or

exempting tax payments for Borey (gated community) developers and home buyers.

Credit expansion slowed down, and the banking sector saw a surge in the nonperforming loan ratio, but the financial sector remained sound with sufficient capital buffer and liquidity. Credit growth moderated from 18.2 percent in 2022 to an average of 13.4 percent from January to November 2023, driven mostly by real estate-related lending, as well as in the wholesale and retail trade sectors. Nonperforming loans increased sharply to 5.4 percent of bank loans in November 2023 from 3.1 percent in December 2022. That said, the banking sector remains well buffered with a capital adequacy ratio of more than 20 percent. The liquidity coverage ratio for banks stood at 168 percent in November 2023.

The fiscal deficit is expected to have widened to 6.9 percent of GDP in 2023, before steadily declining as plans for fiscal consolidation take effect. The widened fiscal deficit was mainly driven by the slowdown of revenue collection as well as higher fiscal stimulus due to expansion of the cash transfer program to “near-poor” households and flood-hit communities, a civil service wage increase, and investment in digital and green infrastructure projects. Moving forward, the fiscal deficit is set to shrink in line with the government's consolidation plan, while remaining higher than the pre-pandemic level given the integration of the COVID-19 cash transfer program into a permanent “Family Package” program targeted at vulnerable households.

Cambodia's path toward a strong economic recovery could be mainly derailed by several external risks. External short-term risks stem from a faltering of economic growth in China, which is the largest contributor to Cambodia's FDI and a major source of tourism, as well as a sharper slowdown of major economic partners such as the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). A spike in global oil prices driven by heightened geopolitical tensions, or a surge in global food prices triggered by severe El Niño conditions, could cause inflation to spike.


Domestically, a prolonged weakness in the real estate sector could put pressure on the financial sector and the broader economy, particularly through unregulated shadow banking activities. Cambodia's financial account faces potential reversal risk in short-term funds due to a growing reliance on short-term external debt and nonresident bank deposits.

## Cambodia: Selected Figures

*The economy is likely to continue its recovery in 2023 on the back of a robust tourism recovery and domestic activity.*

### Contributions to Real GDP Growth

(Percentage points, year-on-year)




Source: National Institute of Statistics of Cambodia; AMRO staff estimates.

*Headline inflation eased significantly in 2023, thanks to the moderation of oil and food prices.*

### Contributions to Headline Inflation

(Percentage points, year-on-year)




Source: National Bank of Cambodia; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Food includes non-alcoholic beverages.

*The current account registered a narrower deficit in Q1 2023 compared with 2022, before turned to a surplus in Q2 and Q3 2023.*

### Current Account Balance

(Percent of GDP)




Source: National Bank of Cambodia; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Nominal GDP figures in 2023 are based on AMRO staff estimates.

*Since May 2023, the riel has depreciated against the US dollar, leading to NBC interventions in September and October 2023.*

### Central Bank's FX Intervention and Exchange Rate

(Millions of US dollars; KHR/USD)




Source: National Bank of Cambodia; AMRO staff calculations.

*In 2023, credit growth slowed down in most sectors, except for personal essential loans, which spiked up starting from September.*

### Credit Growth by Sector

(Percentage points, year-on-year)




Source: National Bank of Cambodia; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: This chart refers to the credit distributed to the nonfinancial institutions by banks only.

*The fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 6.9 percent of GDP in 2023 due to slowdown of revenue collection and higher spending related to the expansion of the cash transfer program.*

### Fiscal Balance

(Percent of GDP)



Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance.

## Cambodia: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                               | -3.1                                            | 3.0   | 5.2   | 5.3   |
| Private consumption                                    | -3.0                                            | 3.7   | 3.3   | 9.2   |
| Government consumption                                 | 13.0                                            | 78.7  | 8.3   | 35.1  |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | -2.7                                            | 6.8   | 2.1   | 14.9  |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -8.9                                            | 23.1  | 1.2   | 11.5  |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -11.3                                           | 13.5  | 13.5  | 8.7   |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                | -3.4                                            | -40.4 | -25.7 | -2.6  |
| Trade balance                                          | -9.8                                            | -41.8 | -29.9 | -7.8  |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | 12.7                                            | 45.5  | 23.8  | 6.8   |
| Direct investment                                      | 13.5                                            | 12.6  | 11.6  | 11.0  |
| Portfolio investment                                   | -0.4                                            | -0.2  | -0.4  | -0.4  |
| Other investment                                       | -1.5                                            | 32.3  | 11.9  | -4.7  |
| Errors and omissions                                   | -6.8                                            | -4.8  | 3.1   | -2.2  |
| Overall balance                                        | 2.5                                             | 0.3   | 1.2   | 1.9   |
| Gross external debt                                    | 67.8                                            | 73.8  | 75.0  | 75.8  |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 21.3                                            | 20.3  | 18.0  | 18.4  |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 23.4                                            | 21.5  | 23.5  | 22.3  |
| Expenditure                                            | 28.8                                            | 30.1  | 26.8  | 29.3  |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -5.3                                            | -8.6  | -3.3  | -6.9  |
| Government debt                                        | 33.7                                            | 35.0  | 34.0  | 35.4  |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money                                            | 15.3                                            | 16.4  | 8.2   | 11.0  |
| Domestic credit                                        | 20.0                                            | 32.5  | 19.2  | 13.6  |
| Private sector credit                                  | 17.2                                            | 23.6  | 18.5  | 15.0  |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in KHR billion)                           | 106                                             | 111   | 121   | 130   |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | 2.9                                             | 2.9   | 5.3   | 2.6   |
| Exchange rate (in KHR/USD, period average)             | 4,093                                           | 4,099 | 4,102 | 4,110 |

Source: National authorities; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

# China

Economic recovery in 2023 was bumpy, with comprehensive policy measures helping to cushion drags from the later-than-expected pick-up of consumption, strains in the real estate sector, subdued external trade, and cautious sentiment. GDP growth in 2023 was 5.2 percent, characterized by a strong rebound in the first quarter after the reopening from the pandemic, a sharp slowdown in the second quarter, and a notable recovery from then until the end of the year.

As China's macroeconomic fundamentals remain sound, the recovery is expected to further normalize in 2024. Data for January and February was generally positive except for real estate sector fixed asset investment (FAI). For this year, consumption will continue as the primary driver of growth, supported by further improvements in labor market conditions. Investment may gain greater traction in the later months, driven by the expansion of traditional infrastructure, construction of modern and advanced infrastructure, and robust investments in high-tech manufacturing and services. Real estate investments may also start to recover gradually by then. Exports should pick up as the global electronics cycle turns around.

China's labor market conditions were relatively stable in 2023, and there is room for improvements in 2024. The urban surveyed unemployment rate, which peaked at 6.2 percent in February 2020 and averaged 5.2 percent in 2023. The 12.4 million jobs created exceeded the official 12 million target. In 2024, labor market conditions are expected to improve but will also reflect structural challenges and the varying pace of recovery across sectors. Challenges are pronounced for low-skilled migrant workers, recent university graduates, real estate sector employees, and those working in micro, small, and medium enterprises.

Inflation was exceptionally low at 0.2 percent in January, flat in January–February 2024, and anticipated to rise gradually in 2024. In general, the low inflation in 2023 reflected a negative output gap stemming from weak growth in 2022, ample supplies in the consumer market, and falling global commodity prices. Inflation will remain well-contained in 2024, barring any supply shocks.

China's external position is strong, marked by a substantial current account surplus and sizeable foreign reserves. In 2023, China's current account had a surplus of CNY 1,862 billion. This included a surplus of CNY 4,312 billion under trade in goods, a deficit of CNY 1,629 billion under trade in services, a deficit of CNY 929 billion under primary income, and a surplus of CNY 107 billion under secondary income. Foreign currency reserves remain substantial at

USD 3.2 trillion as of December 2023, providing a solid buffer against sizeable capital outflows during several months in 2023.

The banking system was sound in 2023, facilitating initiatives to boost credit growth to support the economic recovery. Bank capital and liquidity buffers were solid overall. This is despite some pockets of vulnerability among city and rural commercial banks, where consolidation is ongoing. Total social financing growth, which slowed from 13.3 percent in 2020 to 10.0 percent in 2022, was 9.8 percent in 2023. Authorities implemented several measures to strengthen banks and encouraged them to increase lending to creditworthy borrowers while reducing exposure to high-risk borrowers and projects. In 2024, credit growth will be supported by the economic rebound, restored confidence, and improved asset quality. These factors will reduce the need for accommodative policy measures.

The real estate sector's recovery will be gradual. Fixed asset investments have been subdued, and funding for property development remains tight. Authorities have taken several policy measures to ensure the recovery continues. These include completing stalled residential property projects and having developers make progress in resolving their financial difficulties through asset sales, deferred bond payments, loan restructuring, and possibly even liquidation. These measures need time to take full effect and bring about the full recovery of the real estate sector.


China has maintained fiscal soundness overall, but there are pressures leading to budget deficit widening. Due to the economic slowdown and real estate sector downturn in 2022 and 2023, government spending on support measures increased. As a result, the general public budgetary account deficits were as follows: 3.2 percent of GDP (the actual implementation was 3.1 percent) in 2021, 2.8 percent in 2022, and 3.8 percent in 2023.

There are several domestic challenges and external uncertainties. The recovery of the real estate sector could face setbacks. Financial strains on some local governments may dampen the economic recovery in affected regions. In some sectors of the economy, high leverage remains a vulnerability, and orderly deleveraging is necessary to avoid financial distress. In the external environment, forces pulling in the direction of geoeconomic fragmentation could remain formidable, making conditions for trade, investment, and technological gains difficult. Perennial challenges, such as population aging, socioeconomic disparities, and climate change, require bold and forward-looking policy actions. These near-term risks and longer-term challenges will strain China's financial resources and policy capacity, necessitating continuous policy adjustments and structural reforms.

## China: Selected Figures


*In 2023, China's economic recovery faced hurdles with delayed pick-up of consumption, weak real estate investment, and cautious sentiment.*

**Contributions to GDP Growth**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)




*The surveyed urban unemployment rate averaged 5.2 percent in 2023, with labor market conditions having considerable room for further improvements in 2024.*

**Surveyed Urban Unemployment Rate**  
(Percent)




*Total social financing increased by 9.8 percent in 2023, supported by policy measures and banking system soundness.*

**Total Social Financing**  
(Percent, year-on-year, year-to-date)




*Consumer price inflation was exceptionally low in 2023, due to robust food harvests, some pandemic-induced weakness in consumer spending, and softening of consumer sentiment.*

**Consumer Price Inflation**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)




*China's external position is strong, marked by a substantial current account surplus and sizeable foreign reserves.*

**Overall Balance of Payments**  
(Percent of GDP)



*Fiscal revenue growth moderated in mid-2023 when the economic recovery slowed while the pace at which spending increased also eased as policies became more targeted.*

**Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year, year-to-date)



## China: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                                 | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                        | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                                  | 2.2                                             | 8.4   | 3.0   | 5.2   |
| Private consumption                                       | -0.9                                            | 9.8   | 1.8   | 5.7   |
| Gross fixed capital formation                             | 5.1                                             | 2.6   | 5.1   | 3.0   |
| Imports of goods and services                             | -0.4                                            | 30.1  | 1.1   | -0.5  |
| Exports of goods and services                             | 9.9                                             | 29.9  | 7.7   | 0.3   |
| <b>External sector</b>                                    | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                   | 1.7                                             | 2.0   | 2.2   | 1.5   |
| Trade balance                                             | 2.4                                             | 2.6   | 3.2   | 2.1   |
| Capital and financial account balance                     | -0.6                                            | -1.2  | -1.7  | -1.0  |
| Direct investment                                         | 0.7                                             | 0.9   | 0.2   | -0.9  |
| Portfolio investment                                      | 0.6                                             | 0.2   | -1.6  | -2.0  |
| Other investment                                          | -1.7                                            | -1.4  | 0.3   | 0.2   |
| Errors and omissions                                      | -1.1                                            | -0.8  | -0.5  | 0.0   |
| Gross external debt                                       | 15.0                                            | 15.5  | 14.1  | 14.2  |
| Foreign exchange reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 3,217                                           | 3,250 | 3,128 | 3,238 |
| <b>Fiscal sector<sup>1</sup></b>                          | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                        | 18.0                                            | 17.7  | 16.8  | 17.4  |
| Expenditure                                               | 24.2                                            | 21.5  | 21.5  | 21.8  |
| Fiscal balance                                            | -6.2                                            | -3.8  | -4.7  | -4.4  |
| Government debt                                           | 45.8                                            | 47.0  | 51.0  | 54.8  |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money <sup>2</sup>                                  | 10.1                                            | 9.0   | 11.8  | 9.9   |
| Total Social Financing                                    | 13.3                                            | 10.3  | 10.0  | 9.8   |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                                  |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in RMB trillion)                             | 101                                             | 113   | 121   | 129   |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)     | 2.5                                             | 0.9   | 2.0   | 0.2   |
| Lending rate (LPR), 1 year (period-end)                   | 4.35                                            | 3.85  | 3.65  | 3.45  |
| Exchange rate (in RMB/USD, period average)                | 6.90                                            | 6.45  | 6.74  | 7.07  |

Source: National authorities via CEIC and WIND; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> Includes only general government account and incorporates AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>2/</sup> Refers to M2.

# Hong Kong, China

After a significant downturn in 2022, the economy showed resilience and revived as activities gradually normalized. With the progressive reopening of Hong Kong and mainland China since late 2022, the economy resumed a growth of 3.2 percent year-on-year in 2023, driven by resilient domestic consumption and a rebound in tourism. Gross fixed asset investment grew by 10.6 percent, underpinned by recovery in both real estate investment and investment in machinery and equipment. Due to sluggish global trade and the cyclical downturn in the semiconductor industry, (re)export activities remained lackluster, impeding the recovery.

The labor market continued to improve. Seasonally adjusted unemployment rate declined from its most recent peak of 5.5 percent in February–April 2022 to 2.9 percent in October–December 2023. Total employment recovered significantly to 3.7 million in October–December 2023, but remained 3.7 percent below what it was in the fourth quarter of 2019, reflecting the compounding effects of population aging and the pandemic.

Inflation remained soft despite the economic recovery. Headline consumer prices rose 2.1 percent in 2023. The moderation in food inflation and the declining prices of durable goods helped contain consumer prices. Low food inflation in mainland China and the appreciation of the Hong Kong dollar against the renminbi through the first half of 2023 also contributed.

The overall external position stayed strong. The value of Hong Kong's merchandise exports decreased by 7.8 percent year-on-year in 2023, due mainly to subdued global demand. Supported by strong services and primary income surpluses, Hong Kong maintained a large current account surplus in the first three quarters of 2023. Capital outflows moderated after late 2022 because local interest rates rose sharply and rate differentials between the Hong Kong dollar and US dollar shrank. Foreign reserves were largely stable throughout 2023, fluctuating from a high of USD 437 billion at the end of January to a low of USD 416 billion at the end of September.

The fiscal budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 aims to strike a balance between supporting the economic recovery and ensuring fiscal prudence. While the government continues to provide support to individuals and companies through

tax relief and consumption vouchers, this has been scaled back amid an improving economic outlook. The package of relief measures was reduced sharply from HKD 170 billion in FY2022 to HKD 59.4 billion in FY2023, resulting in a 6.1 percent reduction in budgeted fiscal expenditure. Besides these relief measures, the government has allocated funds to revitalize the tourism sector, enhance Hong Kong's innovation and technology ecosystem, and promote development of the digital economy and infrastructure.

The banking sector remained sound, underpinned by ample capital and liquidity buffers. The aggregate capital adequacy ratio stood at 20.9 percent at the end of the third quarter of 2023 and the liquidity coverage ratio increased to 174.5 percent from 161.8 percent in the fourth quarter 2022. Despite an uptick of nonperforming loan ratio from 1.2 percent in the third quarter of 2022 to 1.6 percent a year later, the overall asset quality of Hong Kong's banking sector is healthy. That said, close attention should be paid to the quality of mainland China-related loans. Their nonperforming ratio rose from 1.8 percent in the third quarter of 2022 to 2.7 percent a year later.

Domestic financial and credit conditions have tightened in recent months. Total credit contracted by 3.6 percent year-on-year at the end of 2023, mainly driven by declines in credit for use outside Hong Kong and trade finance. The Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate has followed the upward trend of rising US interest rates. The property market, despite signs of recovery in the first quarter of 2023, remained under pressure, with various segments exhibiting downward prices.


Whereas the growth outlook has improved, downside risks in the short term remain high. The risk of a protracted global trade downcycle remains a significant concern given the Hong Kong economy's strong connections with the global economy. Recession in the US and Europe would hurt Hong Kong's economic growth. A faltering economic recovery in mainland China would also weaken Hong Kong's economic recovery. Weakness in the property market, if prolonged, could weigh on the finance of households and firms. In the medium term, any escalation of US-China tensions and broader global geoeconomic fragmentation would stand as major risks for Hong Kong's economy.

# Hong Kong, China: Selected Figures

Hong Kong's economy recovered in 2023 after contracting in 2022.

## Gross Domestic Product

(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)




Source: Census and Statistics Department.

Overall employment improved in 2023, but the recovery remained uneven across sectors.

## Employment by Sector

(2018 = 100, non-seasonally adjusted, three-month average)




Source: Census and Statistics Department.

The external position was stable in 2023, supported by current account balance and moderated capital outflows.

## Balance of Payments

(Billions of Hong Kong dollars)




Sources: Census and Statistics Department.

FX reserves remained ample, covering about 39 months of retained imports.

## Foreign Reserves

(Billions of US dollars; months of imports)




Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

Inflation rose moderately on rising housing rentals.

## Consumer Price Inflation

(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)




Source: Census and Statistics Department.

The government projected fiscal reserves as a percentage of GDP would reverse its declining trend in FY2027.

## Fiscal Reserves Projections

(Billions of Hong Kong dollars; percent of GDP)



Source: Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau.  
Note: gray bars denote government projections in the 2024 Budget Speech.

## Hong Kong, China: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                               | -6.5                                            | 6.5   | -3.7  | 3.2   |
| Private consumption                                    | -10.6                                           | 5.6   | -2.2  | 7.3   |
| Government consumption                                 | 7.9                                             | 5.9   | 8.0   | -4.3  |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | -11.1                                           | 8.3   | -7.4  | 10.8  |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -7.0                                            | 15.8  | -12.2 | -5.3  |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -7.1                                            | 16.9  | -12.5 | -6.5  |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                | 7.0                                             | 11.8  | 10.0  | 7.5   |
| Trade balance                                          | 1.9                                             | 5.6   | 3.9   | 1.3   |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | 0.7                                             | -13.3 | -22.8 | -12.3 |
| Direct investment                                      | 9.9                                             | 11.9  | 1.0   | 2.8   |
| Portfolio investment                                   | -19.7                                           | -21.6 | -11.3 | -17.8 |
| Other investment                                       | 9.9                                             | -4.8  | -17.5 | -1.8  |
| Errors and omissions                                   | 2.1                                             | 1.2   | -0.2  | -0.1  |
| Overall balance                                        | 9.8                                             | -0.3  | -13.0 | -5.0  |
| Gross external debt                                    | 518.7                                           | 507.1 | 494.9 | 489.9 |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 492                                             | 497   | 424   | 426   |
| <b>Fiscal sector<sup>1</sup></b>                       | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 21.1                                            | 24.2  | 22.1  | 19.7  |
| Expenditure                                            | 30.5                                            | 24.2  | 28.8  | 25.4  |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -9.4                                            | 0.0   | -6.7  | -5.7  |
| Government debt                                        | 1.0                                             | 2.0   | 4.3   | 6.2   |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money <sup>2</sup>                               | 5.8                                             | 4.3   | 1.6   | 4.0   |
| Domestic credit                                        | 1.2                                             | 3.8   | -3.0  | -3.6  |
| Private sector credit                                  | 1.6                                             | 4.8   | 0.0   | -0.5  |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in HKD trillion)                          | 2.7                                             | 2.9   | 2.8   | 3.0   |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | 0.3                                             | 1.6   | 1.9   | 2.1   |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum, period average)     | 0.90                                            | 0.50  | 2.10  | 5.45  |
| Exchange rate (in HKD/USD, period average)             | 7.76                                            | 7.77  | 7.83  | 7.83  |

Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; IMF; BIS; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> Refers to fiscal year which starts on 1 April and ends on 31 March, fiscal budget.

<sup>2/</sup> Refers to M3.

# Indonesia

The economy continued to grow strongly in 2023 in the face of external headwinds. Strengthening consumption and investment underpinned growth of 5.0 percent for the year even as exports weakened. Robust domestic demand backed by consumer confidence and election-related spending and investment in national strategic projects (including the new capital city), together with a gradual recovery in exports, are expected to support a pickup in growth in 2024.

Supply and demand-side measures anchored inflation within the target range. A consistent policy response from Bank Indonesia (BI) and a close policy synergy between the central bank and the government to control inflation<sup>1</sup> contributed to a decline in the headline consumer price index to within 3.0±1 percent in 2023. In addition to energy subsidies, the government increased rice imports and strengthened interregional supply and distribution of necessity goods, especially food, to combat the impact of the El Niño weather system. Continued policy synergy is expected to keep inflation within a lower target range of 2.5±1 percent in 2024.

The external position remained resilient, with the trade balance still recording surpluses despite less favorable terms of trade. This, coupled with a rebound in tourism, supported the current account amid persistent primary income deficits. Continued FDI inflows buttressed the capital and financial accounts. In addition, nonresident portfolio inflows resumed in most of 2023, except for August–October when risk aversion heightened, due to renewed concerns about a tighter-for-longer monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve. External debt moderated to 29.7 percent of GDP by the end of the year. The debt structure remained sound, with short-term external debt accounting for about 17.2 percent of total external debt and 47.8 percent of gross international reserves as of December 2023.

Bank Indonesia has strengthened its mix of monetary, macroprudential, and payment system policies to maintain stability and support sustainable economic growth. The central bank has raised the policy rate, maintained rupiah stability, strengthened monetary operations with the issuance of BI bills, known as SBRI, and enhanced financial deepening. As the banking sector remained sound, an accommodative macroprudential policy stance was maintained through a further reduction in the reserve requirement ratio among banks that lend to priority sectors and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises to

encourage lending to businesses. Efforts were also stepped up to support a secure, steady, and reliable digital payment system and promote local currency transactions.

Strong revenue collection allowed the government to increase spending while keeping the fiscal deficit below the fiscal rule of 3 percent of GDP in 2023. Solid tax revenue backed by the implementation of tax reforms since 2022 and increased profit transfers from state-owned enterprises underpinned a stronger-than-budgeted revenue collection as commodity windfalls waned. The government raised capital spending to support growth and increased cash/food handouts to low-income households to support their purchasing power (actual expenditure is estimated at IDR 3,122 trillion versus IDR 3,061 trillion in the original budget plan). Meanwhile, the fiscal deficit narrowed to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2023 (compared with a planned 2.8 percent), from 2.4 percent in 2022. The government is likely to pursue a neutral fiscal stance in 2024.

With domestic demand underpinning solid economic growth, Indonesia's near-term outlook could be affected by ongoing external headwinds. A sharp slowdown in major trading partners, especially China, could weigh on export recovery. The risk of global food and energy price spikes persists amid El Niño conditions and geopolitical tensions. While risk aversion has eased as the US Federal Reserve signaled the end of its interest rate hiking cycle, emerging markets (EMs), including Indonesia, might continue to experience capital flow volatility if tight US monetary policy were to be prolonged into 2024. As with other EMs, Indonesian financial markets might be adversely impacted by spillovers from the US presidential election campaign.

Indonesia faces challenges in its efforts to improve economic resiliency and transition smoothly to a green economy. The country's economic, trade, and fiscal structure remains resource-based in comparison to several ASEAN peers, exposing its vulnerability to commodity price shocks. While significant progress has been achieved in improving connectivity and reducing the cost of logistics, the need for infrastructure development is still large. Limited fiscal resources and recent financial difficulties experienced by state-owned enterprises in the construction and infrastructure sectors may affect future infrastructure financing. Likewise, significant investment would be required to achieve Indonesia's climate change commitment, while securing financing for this remains a challenge.


The author of this note is Thi Kim Cuc Nguyen.

<sup>1</sup> Policy synergy has been strengthened through the Central and Regional Inflation Control Teams (TPIP and TPID), as well as the National Movement for Food Inflation Control (GNPIP) in various regions.

## Indonesia: Selected Figures


*Robust growth was sustained in 2023, backed by strengthening consumption and investment as exports weakened.*

**Contribution to Real GDP Growth**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)




*Bank Indonesia has kept policy rates elevated to anchor inflationary expectations and support rupiah stability.*

**Bank Indonesia's Policy Rate and Inflation**  
(Percent)




*Continued trade surpluses and a tourism rebound supported the current account balance.*

**Current Account Balance**  
(Percent of GDP)




*Capital inflows resumed as risk aversion eased in most of 2023 ...*

**Net Capital Flows to Government Bond and Equity Markets**  
(Trillions of rupiah)




*... supporting the rupiah and reserve position.*

**Gross Foreign Reserves and Rupiah Spot Rate**  
(Billions of US dollars; IDR/USD)



*Strong revenue collection and spending normalization post-pandemic underpinned fiscal consolidation.*

**Budget Revenue, Expenditure, and Overall Balance**  
(Percent of GDP)



## Indonesia: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021   | 2022   | 2023e  |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |        |        |        |
| Real GDP                                               | -2.1                                            | 3.7    | 5.3    | 5.0    |
| Household consumption                                  | -2.6                                            | 2.0    | 4.9    | 4.8    |
| Government consumption                                 | 2.1                                             | 4.3    | -4.5   | 2.9    |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | -5.0                                            | 3.8    | 3.9    | 4.4    |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -17.6                                           | 24.9   | 15.0   | -1.6   |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -8.4                                            | 18.0   | 16.2   | 1.3    |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |        |        |        |
| Current account balance                                | -0.4                                            | 0.3    | 1.0    | -0.1   |
| Trade balance                                          | 1.7                                             | 2.5    | 3.2    | 2.1    |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | 0.7                                             | 1.1    | -0.7   | 0.6    |
| Direct investment                                      | 1.3                                             | 1.5    | 1.4    | 1.1    |
| Portfolio investment                                   | 0.3                                             | 0.4    | -0.9   | 0.2    |
| Other investment                                       | -0.9                                            | -0.9   | -1.2   | -0.6   |
| Overall balance                                        | 0.2                                             | 1.1    | 0.3    | 0.5    |
| Gross external debt                                    | 39.3                                            | 34.9   | 30.1   | 29.7   |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 136                                             | 145    | 137    | 146    |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |        |        |        |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 10.7                                            | 11.8   | 13.5   | 13.3   |
| Expenditure                                            | 16.8                                            | 16.4   | 15.8   | 14.9   |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -6.1                                            | -4.6   | -2.4   | -1.7   |
| Government debt                                        | 39.4                                            | 40.7   | 39.7   | 39.0   |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |        |        |        |
| Broad money                                            | 12.5                                            | 14.0   | 8.4    | 3.5    |
| Private sector credit                                  | -1.8                                            | 6.7    | 9.9    | 10.7   |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |        |        |        |
| Nominal GDP (in IDR trillion)                          | 15,434                                          | 16,971 | 19,588 | 20,892 |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | 2.0                                             | 1.6    | 4.2    | 3.7    |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum)                     | 3.75                                            | 3.50   | 5.50   | 6.00   |
| Exchange rate (in IDR/USD, period average)             | 14,148                                          | 14,308 | 14,850 | 15,255 |

Source: Bank Indonesia; Ministry of Finance of Indonesia; Statistics Indonesia; CEIC; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Trade balance data refer to goods and services trade. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

# Japan

The economy rebounded at a strong pace of 1.9 percent in 2023 following the full post-pandemic reopening. In the first quarter of 2023, real GDP grew by 4.0 percent (at a seasonally adjusted annual rate, quarter-on-quarter), and remained strong at 4.2 percent in the second quarter. The economy contracted by 3.2 percent in the third but recovered to grow by 0.4 percent in the fourth quarter on the back of strong investments. Exports have consistently surprised on the upside while imports have contracted. Exports were supported by robust global demand for automobiles and a boost in service exports from tourism. Private consumption was weak, as consumer spending was dampened by escalating prices that have so far outpaced wage growth, while business investment has gradually stabilized reflecting ongoing efforts toward digitalization and the adoption of labor-saving technologies.

Labor market conditions remained tight amid economic recovery and structural constraints in the labor market, while wage hikes lagged inflation. The unemployment rate declined gradually to 2.4 percent in December 2023 from its 3.1 percent pandemic peak of October 2020. Although nominal wage growth gained momentum, the surge in inflation has led to negative real wage growth since April 2022. Continued pressure for higher wages is expected to result from the combination of elevated inflation and a structural labor shortage caused by population aging.

Consumer price inflation moderated but continued to be relatively high. In December 2023, excluding fresh food the consumer price index remained elevated at 2.3 percent year-on-year, although down from 4.2 percent peak in January 2023, primarily because energy prices decreased. Inflation has continued to exceed the Bank of Japan's 2 percent target since April 2022. The "core-core" inflation index, which excludes fresh food and energy, declined to 3.7 percent in December due to price rises of processed food moderating. Although consumer price inflation (less fresh food) is decreasing as the pass-through effects of cost increases diminish, it is expected to fall very gradually and remain still above the central bank's inflation target.

Japan's external position stayed strong, supported by a substantial primary income surplus and a steadily narrowing trade deficit. For 2023, the current account surplus increased to 3.5 percent of GDP, from 1.9 percent in 2022, driven by the recovery of exports, mainly rising automobiles and capital goods exports to the United States and Europe. Meanwhile, imports declined sharply due to lower energy prices. The services account deficit

also narrowed, thanks largely to the steady rise of inbound tourism following the easing of border restrictions. Meanwhile, the primary income surplus remained strong. The yen continued to depreciate against the US dollar, by about 6 percent in 2023, reflecting the divergence of monetary policy stance between the Bank of Japan and the US Federal Reserve.

The banking sector continued to be sound with stable credit growth. Bank lending expanded by more than 4 percent in 2023, with most pandemic-related financial relief measures having been terminated. Corporate lending expanded across a wide range of sectors, including real estate, manufacturing, and electricity and gas, while personal loans also continued to rise reflecting the accommodative lending stance of banks. The asset quality of the banking system continued to be strong, with the low nonperforming loan ratio at 0.8 percent for major banks and 1.7 percent for regional banks respectively as of March 2023. At the same time, capital adequacy ratios (CARs) remain well above the regulatory requirements. For major banks, profitability picked up in 2023, while regional banks saw a decrease in profit due to a decline in gains from investment trust redemptions.

Amid ongoing stimulus spending, strong tax revenue growth played a key role in reducing the fiscal deficit to 3.6 percent of GDP in Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 from 5.9 percent of GDP in FY2021. In November 2023, the government announced a supplementary budget equivalent to 2.2 percent of GDP. As a result, the fiscal deficit for FY2023 is estimated to rise to 5.2 percent of GDP, as fiscal policy remains supportive of the economy.


Key risk factors for Japan's economy in the short term stem from the external sector and risks to growth are tilted to the downside. With Japan's heavy reliance on energy and raw material imports, an upward spike in commodity prices would be a major shock to its economy, worsening the terms of trade and weighing down domestic consumption. A sharp slowdown in the United States or Europe would adversely affect Japan's manufacturing and export sectors by dampening demand. Another key risk in the short term is the resurgence of inflation that would dampen economic growth and lead to stagflation, which may complicate the exit from ultra-easy monetary policy. Medium to long-term vulnerabilities and challenges include weakening fiscal discipline, side effects of prolonged monetary easing, and the demographic drag caused by population aging and low fertility rates.

# Japan: Selected Figures

The Japanese economy rebounded strongly in 2023 following the full reopening post-pandemic.

## Gross Domestic Product

(Percent, quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted annualized rate)




Source: Cabinet Office via Haver Analytics.

The current account balance strengthened in 2023 supported by a large primary balance surplus and narrowing trade deficit.

## Current Account Balance

(Trillions of yen)




Source: Ministry of Finance via Haver Analytics.

Loan growth recovered to pre-pandemic levels, driven by financing needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and households.

## Bank Lending Growth

(Percent, year-on-year)




Source: Bank of Japan via Haver Analytics.

Although inflation has moderated, it has matched or exceeded the central bank target since April 2022.

## Consumer Price Inflation

(Percent, year-on-year)




Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications via Haver Analytics.

The yen continued to depreciate against the US dollar by about 6 percent in 2023.

## Exchange Rates

(JPY/USD; JPY/EUR)




Source: Bank of Japan via Haver Analytics.

The fiscal deficit is expected to remain elevated in FY2023.

## General Government Fiscal Balance

(Percent of GDP)



Source: Cabinet Office via Haver Analytics.

## Japan: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                                          | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                                 | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                                           | −4.1                                            | 2.6   | 1.0   | 1.9   |
| Private consumption                                                | −4.4                                            | 0.8   | 2.2   | 0.6   |
| Government consumption                                             | 2.4                                             | 3.4   | 1.7   | 0.9   |
| Gross fixed capital formation                                      | −3.6                                            | −0.1  | −1.4  | 2.1   |
| Imports of goods and services                                      | −6.8                                            | 5.1   | 7.9   | −1.3  |
| Exports of goods and services                                      | −11.6                                           | 11.9  | 5.3   | 3.0   |
| <b>External sector</b>                                             | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                            | 3.0                                             | 3.9   | 1.9   | 3.5   |
| Trade balance                                                      | 0.5                                             | 0.3   | −2.8  | −1.1  |
| Capital account balance                                            | 0.0                                             | −0.1  | 0.0   | −0.1  |
| Financial account balance                                          | 2.4                                             | 1.8   | 2.3   | 3.2   |
| Direct investment                                                  | 1.7                                             | 3.5   | 2.9   | 3.8   |
| Portfolio investment                                               | 0.8                                             | −4.0  | −3.4  | 4.7   |
| Financial derivatives                                              | 0.1                                             | 0.4   | 0.9   | 1.1   |
| Other investment                                                   | −0.3                                            | 1.9   | 1.9   | −6.5  |
| Errors and omissions                                               | −0.3                                            | −0.8  | −0.9  | 0.4   |
| Overall balance                                                    | 0.2                                             | 1.2   | −1.3  | 0.7   |
| Gross external debt                                                | 92.6                                            | 95.9  | 104.1 | 104.5 |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period)             | 1,395                                           | 1,406 | 1,228 | 1,295 |
| <b>Fiscal sector<sup>1</sup></b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                                 | 36.7                                            | 37.8  | 38.8  | 35.5  |
| Expenditure                                                        | 46.7                                            | 43.6  | 42.3  | 40.7  |
| Fiscal balance                                                     | −10.0                                           | −5.9  | −3.6  | −5.2  |
| Government debt                                                    | 261.1                                           | 258.6 | 261.0 | 260.0 |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                              | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money                                                        | 4.1                                             | 5.6   | 3.8   | 2.6   |
| Domestic credit                                                    | 4.9                                             | 4.8   | 1.0   | 2.7   |
| Private sector credit                                              | 5.4                                             | 7.0   | 0.3   | 3.6   |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                                           |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in JPY trillion)                                      | 540                                             | 553   | 560   | 592   |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)              | 0.0                                             | −0.3  | 2.5   | 3.3   |
| Core inflation, less fresh food (in percent y-o-y, period average) | −0.2                                            | −0.2  | 2.3   | 3.1   |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum, end of period)                  | −0.10                                           | −0.10 | −0.10 | −0.10 |
| Exchange rate (in JPY/USD, period average)                         | 107                                             | 110   | 131   | 141   |

Source: Japanese authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> Refers to fiscal year, which starts on 1 April and ends on 31 March.

# Korea

Economic momentum weakened in the first half of 2023 and improved in the second half of 2023. GDP growth declined from 2.6 percent year-on-year in 2022 to 0.9 percent in the first half of 2023, mainly because exports declined. Growth improved in the second half of 2023 to 1.8 percent thanks to an export recovery, particularly in semiconductors. Facility investments showed signs of recovery in the fourth quarter of 2023, driven by an upturn in the semiconductor industry.

The labor market was tight in 2023 despite the softening economic momentum. The unemployment rate fell to 2.7 percent in 2023 from 2.9 percent in 2022, while the labor force participation rate was at 64.4 percent at the end of 2023, higher than pre-pandemic levels. Job growth decelerated in 2023, from an exceptionally high pace in 2022, due to lower hiring in manufacturing and services, especially in education and public administration services, while employment of senior citizens aged 60 or above continued to rise.

Headline inflation declined to 3.6 percent in 2023, from 5.1 percent in 2022, driven by declines in energy prices and government support measures before rebounding to above 3.0 percent in the last few months of 2023 as a result of rising food and oil prices. Meanwhile, core inflation, the main driver of overall inflation in 2023, fell steadily. Moderate wage growth, despite the tight labor market, and declining short-term inflation expectations have helped limit the second-round effects of inflation.

The external sector remained resilient with recovering current account balances and ample reserves. The current account turned to a surplus from May 2023. Increased net outflows on the financial account resulted from a decrease in other investment caused by decreased loans in liabilities despite a fall in outward investments due to prolonged high interest rates, concerns over a global economic slowdown, and high volatility in foreign exchange (FX) markets. Foreign reserves were ample at USD 416 billion at the end of January 2024, covering about 6.6 months' worth of imports and 3.1 times the short-term external debt.

The Bank of Korea has maintained its restrictive policy stance given still-high inflation. The central bank has kept the base rate unchanged at 3.5 percent since February 2023 after delivering seven consecutive rate hikes from April 2022 to January 2023. Concerns over the strength of the US dollar amid the US Federal Reserve's hawkish stance, high inflation, and a rebound in household debt prompted the Bank of Korea to maintain its tight policy.

Amid weak economic conditions and high interest rates, total loan growth decelerated to 3.5 percent year-on-year in October

2023 from 6.7 percent at the end of 2022, primarily driven by slower growth of loans to small and medium-sized enterprises and self-proprietors. However, month-on-month household loan growth turned around in May 2023 alongside a recovery of housing prices and transaction volumes. However, as the government actively responds to the housing market and maintains adequately tight macroprudential measures<sup>1</sup>, the household debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to decline to 100.8 percent in 2023 from 104.5 percent in 2022.

The fiscal position in 2023 improved, although less than budgeted due to a sizeable revenue shortfall. Fiscal revenue is estimated to have shrunk 6.9 percent in 2023 due to declining income taxes and lower VAT and customs duty. Meanwhile, fiscal spending is estimated to have fallen by 10.8 percent, largely after the withdrawal of pandemic-related support and a reduction in mandatory transfers for funding local government and education. The fiscal deficit in 2023, excluding social security funds, is estimated at 3.8 percent of GDP, higher than the budgeted 2.6 percent but lower than the 5.4 percent budgeted in 2022.

The National Fiscal Management Plan 2023–2027 envisages a slowdown in fiscal consolidation. The fiscal deficit is set to decrease to below 3 percent of GDP in 2025 and gradually approach about 2.5 percent by 2027, adhering to the fiscal deficit ceiling of the proposed fiscal rules. However, the fiscal balance improvement is expected to not happen as fast as in the previous fiscal management plan (2022–2026) as revenue is expected to be lower following the contraction in 2023 while expenditure growth is projected to be lower than that in the previous plan.

The near-term economic outlook remains highly uncertain. Key near-term risk factors include (1) high inflation leading to interest rates being higher for longer, (2) weaker external demand arising from economic recession in the United States and Europe and limited spillover effects from China's economic recovery, and (3) financial distress in the project finance market.

Over the medium term, geopolitical tensions could intensify. This would lead to disruptions in manufacturing and a weakening of investment sentiment. In addition, the high level of household debt continues to be a vulnerability in the financial system.

Structural headwinds could impede long-term economic stability and potential. The substantial increase and ongoing upward trend in government debt have raised concerns about fiscal sustainability. Rapid population aging will weigh on economic potential, other things being equal.


The author of this note is Xu (Kimi) Jiang.

<sup>1</sup> 50 percent loan-to-value limit for new residential mortgages and 40 percent debt service coverage ratio for personal loans.

## Korea: Selected Figures

*GDP growth declined in 2023, mainly due to weak private consumption and exports.*


**Contribution to GDP Growth**  
(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)



Source: Bank of Korea; Haver Analytics.

*Job growth slowed due to lower hiring in manufacturing and services.*


**Job Growth**  
(Thousands, year-on-year, non-seasonally adjusted)



Source: Statistics Korea; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

*Loans to the households have turned around since May 2023, led by bank lending.*


**Change in Household Loans**  
(Trillions of won, non-seasonally adjusted)



Source: Financial Supervisory Service; Haver Analytics.

*Headline inflation has rebounded to exceed 3.0 percent in the last months of 2023, while core inflation continued to edge down.*


**Inflation and Inflation Expectation**  
(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)



Source: Statistics Korea; Haver Analytics.

*Foreign reserves remained ample despite some declines due mainly to currency interventions.*


**Foreign Reserves**  
(Billions of US dollars)



Source: Bank of Korea; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

*Short-term money market rates stabilized after the episode of credit market stress in late 2022.*

**Policy and Short-term Interest Rates**  
(Percentage, basis points)



Source: Bank of Korea; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

## Korea: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                               | -0.7                                            | 4.3   | 2.6   | 1.4   |
| Private consumption                                    | -4.8                                            | 3.6   | 4.1   | 1.8   |
| Government consumption                                 | 5.1                                             | 5.5   | 4.0   | 1.3   |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | 3.5                                             | 3.2   | -0.5  | 1.2   |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -3.1                                            | 10.1  | 3.5   | 3.0   |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -1.7                                            | 11.1  | 3.4   | 2.8   |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                | 4.6                                             | 4.7   | 1.5   | 2.0   |
| Trade balance                                          | 4.9                                             | 4.2   | 0.9   | 2.0   |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | 3.9                                             | 3.5   | 3.3   | 2.1   |
| Direct investment                                      | 1.6                                             | 2.4   | 2.4   | 1.1   |
| Portfolio investment                                   | 2.5                                             | 1.1   | 1.5   | 0.4   |
| Other investment                                       | -0.5                                            | 0.0   | -1.1  | 0.6   |
| Errors and omissions                                   | 0.4                                             | -0.4  | 0.1   | -0.2  |
| Overall balance                                        | 1.1                                             | 0.8   | -1.7  | -0.8  |
| Gross external debt                                    | 33.5                                            | 34.9  | 40.0  | 32.3  |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 443                                             | 463   | 423   | 420   |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue                                                | 24.7                                            | 27.7  | 28.6  | 25.6  |
| Expenditure                                            | 28.3                                            | 29.2  | 31.6  | 27.1  |
| Fiscal balance (include social security funds)         | -3.7                                            | -1.5  | -3.0  | -1.5  |
| Government debt <sup>1</sup>                           | 43.6                                            | 46.7  | 49.4  | 50.4  |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money                                            | 9.8                                             | 12.9  | 4.0   | 3.9   |
| Domestic credit                                        | 9.7                                             | 12.1  | 7.9   | 5.1   |
| Private sector credit                                  | 9.1                                             | 11.3  | 6.9   | 4.0   |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in KRW trillion)                          | 1,941                                           | 2,080 | 2,162 | 2,249 |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | 0.5                                             | 2.5   | 5.1   | 3.6   |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum, period average)     | 0.50                                            | 1.00  | 3.25  | 3.50  |
| Exchange rate (in KRW/USD, period average)             | 1,180                                           | 1,144 | 1,291 | 1,300 |

Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup> Government debt refers to only debt securities and loans.

# Lao People's Democratic Republic

The economy was still facing headwinds in 2023 as droughts and continued currency depreciation weighed on growth recovery. While services and construction sectors continued to recover from the pandemic, driven by the tourism and logistic industry as well as FDI inflows, overall GDP growth slowed slightly as El Niño weather conditions affected hydropower and agriculture. Elevated inflation and continued depreciation of the kip likely dampened real incomes and consumption. GDP growth is estimated to have slowed to 4.3 percent in 2023 from 4.4 percent in 2022.

Inflation peaked in 2023, driven by rising food prices and continued currency depreciation. Weak agriculture sector activity driven by droughts could have upward pressure on food prices. Annual consumer price inflation averaged 31.2 percent in 2023. Month-on-month inflation declined in late 2023, from 3.5 percent in September to 0.1 percent in December, reflecting the recent kip appreciation and lower oil prices.

The external balance is estimated to have improved in 2023. According to official statistics, gross international reserves increased to USD 1,782 million in September 2023, up from USD 1,480 million at the end of 2022.<sup>1</sup> The overall balance of payments is supported by improved trade balance, a recovery in tourism receipts, and higher FDI inflows, although drought reduced electricity exports while increasing its imports during the dry season. Having depreciated about 30 percent between February and October 2023, the kip rebounded somewhat in November and December amid a decline in oil prices.

The kip liquidity condition was tighter toward the end of 2023. The loan-to-deposit ratio for kip increased to almost 100 percent as of October 2023, reflecting robust loan growth amid a slowdown in deposit growth. To reduce the liquidity in the system, the central bank continued to issue bills with 15 percent interest rates and raised the reserve requirement ratio in the third quarter of 2023. New Bank of Lao PDR (BOL) bills issued in the first 9 months of 2023 amounted to LAK 9.5 trillion, of which 7.0 trillion was issued to the public and 2.5 trillion to banks via open market operations. The BOL bill issuance net out the amount matured in the year was hence LAK 6.3 trillion, of which LAK 3.9 trillion was held by the public. Consequently, the growth in the monetary base slowed from the peak of 39 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2023 to 26 percent in the third quarter.

Bank-level data continued to indicate financial fragility. While the aggregate capital adequacy ratio improved following bank

recapitalization, it was still low among local banks, with the largest bank falling below the minimum requirement. Moreover, the scale of low nonperforming loans could be masked by uncleared expenditure arrears related to government projects.

The fiscal balance is estimated to have turned to a surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP in 2023 from a 0.2 percent deficit in 2022. Robust revenue growth, fueled by strong taxation and high inflation, and delays in public investment execution led to the improvement.

The external environment poses risks to the Lao economic outlook. Slower recovery in China would weigh on the growth and external position through lower exports and foreign direct investment. A possible spike in global food and energy prices could put pressure on the exchange rate, inflation, and trade balance.

Persistent currency depreciation or a deterioration of the primary fiscal balance could undermine government debt sustainability. The government debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated to have increased to 99.7 percent in 2023 despite a fiscal surplus, which reflects the effects of depreciation. Ongoing arrears clearance could push up government debt further. Financial weakness in state-owned electricity company EDL could inflict a fiscal burden.

It remains a challenge for the government to meet its increased foreign exchange needs. In August, Ministry of Finance of Lao PDR (LMOF) attracted USD 22 million in bond investment in Thai market, falling USD 99 million short of target. A sovereign bond downgrade from investment grade to non-investment grade in September from TRIS Rating could further narrow access to the Thai market and create challenges in repaying maturing debt. Given thin gross international reserves, the government has secured foreign exchange (FX) through tax and non-tax revenue in foreign currencies, and suspended repayment on some external debt pending negotiation.

Pockets of financial vulnerability remain as banks have potentially higher impaired loans. Nonperforming loans could increase on the withdrawal of regulatory forbearance and/or the deterioration of electricity-sector loans into bad debt. Continued kip depreciation would likely affect the debt service capacity of borrowers with foreign-currency loans but earnings in kip.


The author of this note is Yoki Okawa.

<sup>1/</sup> The authorities have recently updated the gross international reserves (GIR) data by including the foreign exchange swap transaction with the People's Bank of China in foreign assets since July 2020. The new statistics is higher than previous statistics by USD 501 million as of July 2020. However, full information on the swap agreement and its activation has not been disclosed.

# Lao PDR: Selected Figures

GDP growth slowed as drought and continued depreciation weighed the economic activity.


**Contributions to Real GDP Growth**  
(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)



Sources: Lao Statistics Bureau; AMRO staff estimates.  
Note: e denotes AMRO staff estimates.

Inflation peaked in early 2023 driven by food price.


**Contributions to Consumer Price Inflation**  
(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)



Source: Lao Statistics Bureau.  
Note: CPI = Consumer Price Index.

The kip depreciated sharply from March to June 2022 while it gradually appreciated from November 2022 to January 2023.


**Exchange Rate**  
(LAK/USD)



Source: Bank of Lao PDR.  
Note: Gap is a difference between parallel rate and bank rate.

FX reserve rebounded in 2023 after hitting the bottom in late 2022.


**Gross International Reserves**  
(Millions of US dollars)



Sources: Bank of Lao PDR.  
Note: The authorities have recently updated the gross international reserves (GIR) data by including the FX swap foreign exchange transaction with People's Bank of China in foreign assets since July 2020. The new statistics is higher than previous statistics by USD 501 million as of July 2020. However, full information on the FX swap agreement and its activation has not been disclosed. Updated data ends in September 2023, and previously reported data is to July 2023.

Both credit growth and M2(deposit) growth remain elevated in 2023.


**Monetary and Credit Growth**  
(Percent, year-on-year)



Source: Bank of Lao PDR.  
Note: Data ends in October 2023.

The primary balance improved in 2023 but public debt increased because of currency depreciation.

**Primary Balance and Public Debt**  
(Percent of GDP)



Source: Ministry of Finance; AMRO staff estimates.  
Note: e denotes AMRO staff estimates.

## Lao PDR: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                                                           | 2020                                            | 2021    | 2022    | 2023e   |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                                                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |         |         |         |
| Real GDP                                                                            | 3.3                                             | 3.5     | 4.4     | 4.3     |
| Agriculture                                                                         | 1.1                                             | 2.5     | 3.3     | 2.6     |
| Industry                                                                            | 9.2                                             | 6.1     | 4.4     | 3.5     |
| Services                                                                            | -1.3                                            | 1.4     | 5.0     | 5.7     |
| <b>External sector</b>                                                              | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |         |         |         |
| Current account balance                                                             | -1.2                                            | 2.4     | -0.1    | 3.0     |
| Trade balance                                                                       | 3.9                                             | 7.5     | 6.3     | 5.1     |
| Capital and financial account balance                                               | 5.7                                             | 1.7     | 2.0     | 6.0     |
| Direct investment                                                                   | 5.1                                             | 5.6     | 4.2     | 11.0    |
| Portfolio investment                                                                | -1.3                                            | -1.6    | 0.5     | -0.5    |
| Other investment                                                                    | 1.9                                             | -2.4    | -2.7    | -4.5    |
| Errors and omissions                                                                | -2.8                                            | -4.3    | -2.9    | -7.6    |
| Overall balance                                                                     | 1.7                                             | -0.3    | -0.9    | 1.4     |
| Gross external debt                                                                 | 84.8                                            | 95.7    | 126.5   | 119.6   |
| International reserves, newly reported <sup>1</sup> (in USD billion, end of period) | 1,821                                           | 1,737   | 1,480   | 1,807   |
| International reserves, previously reported (in USD billion, end of period)         | 1,319                                           | 1,263   | 1,121   | 1,326   |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                                                | (in percent of GDP)                             |         |         |         |
| Revenue and grants                                                                  | 12.6                                            | 14.7    | 14.8    | 15.2    |
| Expenditure                                                                         | 17.8                                            | 16.0    | 15.0    | 15.1    |
| Fiscal balance                                                                      | -5.2                                            | -1.3    | -0.2    | 0.1     |
| Primary balance                                                                     | -3.7                                            | -0.1    | 1.6     | 2.6     |
| Government debt                                                                     | 62.3                                            | 76.9    | 99.0    | 99.7    |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                                               | (in annual percentage change)                   |         |         |         |
| Broad money                                                                         | 16.3                                            | 24.0    | 36.9    | 30.3    |
| Domestic credit                                                                     | 4.3                                             | 11.5    | 45.6    | 27.0    |
| Private sector credit                                                               | 5.5                                             | 10.6    | 47.3    | 26.4    |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                                                            |                                                 |         |         |         |
| Nominal GDP (in billions of kip)                                                    | 172,919                                         | 184,982 | 215,602 | 265,029 |
| Nominal GDP (in millions of US dollar)                                              | 19,099                                          | 18,984  | 15,060  | 14,168  |
| Exchange rate (in LAK/USD, average)                                                 | 9,054                                           | 9,744   | 14,316  | 18,707  |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)                               | 3.8                                             | 3.8     | 23.0    | 31.2    |

Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> The authorities have recently updated the gross international reserves (GIR) data by including the transaction of FX swap with People's Bank of China in foreign assets since July 2020. The new statistics is USD 501 million higher than previous statistics as of July 2020. However, full information on the FX swap agreement and its activation has not been disclosed.

# Malaysia

The economy continued to show robust growth in 2023, with resilient domestic demand cushioning soft external demand. Malaysia's GDP growth moderated from 8.7 percent in 2022 to 3.7 percent in 2023, partly reflecting high base effects. Private consumption growth remained robust, benefiting from favorable labor market conditions. Labor force participation reached a historical high of 70.2 percent and the unemployment rate fell to the pre-pandemic level of 3.3 percent in December 2023. While merchandise exports declined because of the slowdown in global trade, their effect was offset by higher travel receipts. International tourist arrivals in 2023 reached 77 percent of pre-pandemic levels, with room for Chinese tourists for further catch up. There are some signs that exports are starting to turn around, supported by a pickup in the global technology cycle. Investment growth was supported by business expanding capacity and higher government spending on fixed assets.

Inflation trended lower, in line with easing global supply chain disruptions and a decline in global commodity prices. Headline inflation moderated to 2.5 percent in 2023 from 3.3 percent in 2022. Core inflation also declined, averaging 3.0 percent in 2023, although still elevated relative to its long-term average. In 2023, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) raised the overnight policy rate by 25 basis points to 3.0 percent in May 2023—the only adjustment last year—and kept the rate unchanged for the fourth consecutive time in January 2024. Although inflation cooled, upside risks stem from the government's planned shift to a targeted subsidy mechanism as well as higher commodity prices due to geopolitical conflicts and El Niño weather conditions.

The external position weakened amid a challenging external environment. The current account recorded a surplus of 1.2 percent of GDP in 2023, smaller than the 3.1 percent in 2022. A continued goods trade surplus, particularly exports of electrical and electronic products and commodities, supported the current account surplus, as did a strong recovery in tourism. Although FDI moderated to 2.2 percent of GDP in 2023, from 4.2 percent in 2022, approved investments have remained high. These positive developments have helped mitigate the decline in BNM's international reserves amid currency depreciation pressures and portfolio investment outflows as a result of the US Federal Reserve's higher-for-longer interest rates. The ringgit weakened by 3.5 percent against the US dollar in 2023, following a 6.2 percent depreciation in 2022. BNM's international reserves fell to USD 113.5 billion as of the end of 2023, from USD 114.7 billion at the end of 2022,

but remain adequate to finance 5.4 months of imports and sufficient to cover 1.0 time of short-term external debt.

The banking system, with ample capital and liquidity buffers, is in a position to facilitate continued credit growth. The banking system's 18.2 percent capital adequacy ratio and common equity tier 1 capital ratio, at 14.6 percent as of December 2023, were above their regulatory thresholds of 10.5 percent and 7.0 percent (inclusive of the capital conservation buffer). Banks also maintained strong liquidity positions, with the liquidity coverage ratio well above 150 percent and a net stable funding ratio of well above 100 percent. Loan impairments remained low at 1.7 percent as of December 2023, slightly lower than at the end of 2022. Despite the increase in lending rates from BNM policy normalization, average loan growth remained healthy at 4.8 percent in 2023, with sustained high approval and disbursement rates.

Fiscal performance was in line with official projections, while the 2024 Budget remains committed to fiscal consolidation. The fiscal deficit narrowed from 5.6 percent of GDP in 2022 to 5.0 percent in 2023, meeting the official target. The 2024 government budget is the largest on record, but represents a reduction compared to total expenditure in 2023, primarily due to the absence of 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) bond redemption and a reduction in spending from the government's planned subsidy rationalization program.

The key risks to Malaysia's outlook in the near-term stem mostly from external factors. Weaker-than-expected growth in the world's major economies—including uncertainty over whether the United States can pull off a "soft landing" and the underwhelming post-pandemic recovery in China—could derail the nascent upturn in the global technology cycle, with consequences for employment and wages. The US presidential election this year also could have wide-ranging impact on global trade and technology. Meanwhile, supply-related disruptions, such as those arising from geopolitical conflicts, could keep inflation elevated and dampen domestic demand. An extended higher-for-longer interest rate environment in the United States can lead to continued currency depreciation pressures and tight financial conditions.


Medium to long-term risks include global economic fracturing which could pose challenges to cross-border financial flows, technology transfers, and supply chain security; the shortage of skilled labor amid an aging population; inadequate retirement savings; and the physical and transition risks from climate change.

## Malaysia: Selected Figures

*GDP growth moderated to 3.7 percent in 2023, partly reflecting the high base in 2022, with domestic demand staying resilient.*

### Contributions to Real GDP Growth


(Percentage points, year-on-year)



*Labor conditions continue to improve, with sustained wage growth and declining unemployment rate.*

### Wages and Unemployment Rate


(Percent, year-on-year; percent)



*Merchandise exports appear to have bottomed out in Q3 2023, broadly in line with the trend in the global technology cycle.*

### Global Semiconductor Sales and Malaysia's Merchandise Exports


(Percent, year-on-year)



*Both headline and core inflation have declined steadily.*

### Contributions to Consumer Price Inflation


(Percentage points, year-on-year)



*Loan growth remained robust in 2023 despite the increase in lending rate following BNM's monetary policy normalization.*

### Loan Growth and Lending Rate


(Percent, year-on-year; percent)



*The fiscal deficit has continued to narrow as the government remains committed to fiscal consolidation.*

### Fiscal Balance

(Billions of ringgit; percent of GDP)



## Malaysia: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023  |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                               | -5.5                                            | 3.3   | 8.7   | 3.7   |
| Private consumption                                    | -3.9                                            | 1.9   | 11.2  | 4.7   |
| Government consumption                                 | 4.1                                             | 6.4   | 4.5   | 3.9   |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | -14.4                                           | -0.8  | 6.8   | 5.5   |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -7.9                                            | 21.2  | 15.9  | -7.6  |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -8.6                                            | 18.5  | 14.5  | -7.9  |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                | 4.2                                             | 3.9   | 3.1   | 1.2   |
| Trade balance                                          | 9.7                                             | 11.5  | 10.4  | 7.3   |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | -5.5                                            | 1.0   | 0.7   | -1.1  |
| Direct investment                                      | 0.2                                             | 2.0   | 0.9   | 0.3   |
| Portfolio investment                                   | -3.5                                            | 1.2   | -2.8  | -2.5  |
| Other investment                                       | -2.2                                            | -2.0  | 2.7   | 1.4   |
| Errors and omissions                                   | 0.0                                             | -2.0  | -0.8  | -1.3  |
| Overall balance                                        | -1.4                                            | 2.9   | 3.0   | -1.1  |
| Gross external debt                                    | 67.6                                            | 70.0  | 63.9  | 68.2  |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 108                                             | 117   | 115   | 113   |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 15.9                                            | 15.1  | 16.4  | 17.3  |
| Expenditure                                            | 22.0                                            | 21.5  | 22.0  | 22.3  |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -6.2                                            | -6.4  | -5.6  | -5.0  |
| Government debt                                        | 62.0                                            | 63.3  | 60.3  | 64.3  |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money                                            | 4.0                                             | 6.4   | 4.3   | 6.0   |
| Private sector credit                                  | 4.2                                             | 4.2   | 4.7   | 4.7   |
| Loans                                                  | 3.7                                             | 4.2   | 4.7   | 4.9   |
| Corporate bonds                                        | 6.3                                             | 4.2   | 4.6   | 4.2   |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in MYR billion)                           | 1,418                                           | 1,549 | 1,791 | 1,823 |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | -1.2                                            | 2.5   | 3.3   | 2.5   |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum)                     | 1.75                                            | 1.75  | 2.75  | 3.00  |
| Exchange rate (in MYR/USD, period average)             | 4.20                                            | 4.14  | 4.40  | 4.56  |

Source: National authorities; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year.

# Myanmar

Economic recovery gained momentum in 2023, though at a modest pace, after the significant downturn experienced in 2021. Domestic demand remained constrained by sluggish economic activities and elevated inflation. Investments from both domestic and foreign sources continued to be subdued, primarily because persistent political uncertainties eroded investor confidence. This hindered the economy's full recovery and its ability to reach pre-pandemic levels. Despite the general slowdown of the manufacturing, there are signs of a modest recovery in Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and garment export manufacturing activities. While air transport and freight activities grew steadily during the past year, land and inland water transport were constrained by high fuel cost, and other logistical barriers.

Inflation surged from late 2022 because of rising import and food costs as well as a notable decline in the value of the local currency. Headline inflation accelerated to 28.6 percent year-on-year in June 2023. The surge in inflation was driven primarily by rising imported goods prices and exchange rate depreciation. Food inflation increased as a result of supply chain disruptions and higher transport costs. The foreign exchange liquidity crunch, coupled with implementation of an import license and quota system, reduced imports, adding to inflationary pressures.

The external position worsened due to a substantial decline in foreign investment, discontinuation of development financing, and a terms-of-trade shock. The suspension of operations by international firms, partly due to geopolitical uncertainties and domestic instability, has continued to discourage FDI inflows. Access to external financing has since been severely restricted, with all multilateral loans suspended. Trade activities have remained relatively stable but with limited improvements, as importers continue to face challenges from the large number of licenses needed to trade and the limited quota imposed on them for certain products. Remittances from overseas workers improved, benefiting from a new incentive program introduced by the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM).

Following the severe local currency liquidity crunch in the banking system in 2021, liquidity conditions have now stabilized. Both the current account balances and cash in vaults in banks stabilized after large deposit withdrawals occurred in 2021. The CBM provided kyat liquidity through various channels, including a foreign exchange (FX) swap facility, credit lines, and a discount window facility. Bank profitability improved due to non-interest income from digital services but remained below levels prior to the

COVID-19 pandemic. Overall, the banking system remains fragile despite a modest recovery in operations.

Tax and non-tax revenue collection in Fiscal Year (FY) 2022/23 increased in line with the economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly evident in the improvement of commercial tax and personal income tax collection. Grants remained considerably lower than anticipated due to continued international sanctions. The Ministry of Planning and Finance announced a clear expenditure policy aimed at reducing administrative costs while prioritizing essential spending such as on education, health, infrastructure development, and expenses related to the COVID-19 recovery. The reduction in the fiscal deficit can be attributed to a combination of increasing revenue and lower expenditure.

Rising prices pose upside risks to Myanmar, as inflation remains at double-digits for several months and is expected to persist. This trend has resulted from a combination of factors, including increases in commodity prices, a sharp depreciation of the kyat exchange rate, and disruptions in the supply chain caused by international isolation. A major concern lies in the potential second-round effects of inflation, particularly through the link between inflation, wage increases, and currency depreciation.


The high government debt-to-GDP ratio raises concerns about debt sustainability, particularly in relation to the medium-term fiscal outlook for Myanmar. The elevated government debt presages a potential strain on public finances and the ability to meet future debt obligations. Such a situation can impede economic growth, limit investment opportunities, and hinder the government's ability to provide essential public services.

Myanmar's FX market remains volatile and susceptible to external shocks, exacerbated by ongoing international isolation. The persistent shortage of FX liquidity puts a significant strain on the economy. Moreover, FX policies pose considerable challenges for businesses. Fluctuating exchange rates, restrictions on foreign currency transactions, and uncertainties regarding the repatriation of funds, are risks and obstacles for companies operating in Myanmar. In December 2023, the CBM announced that it will no longer determine the exchange rate on foreign currency transactions in the FX market online trading platform. The exchange rate is free to operate depending on the rates set between exporters and importers in accordance with market trends. The CBM's policy change may spark another rise in prices of basic goods.

## Myanmar: Selected Figures

After a sharp decline in GDP in 2021, the Myanmar economy started to recover modestly since 2022.

### Contributions to Real GDP Growth (Percent points, year-on-year)




Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance; and AMRO staff estimation.

Note: FY19/20 and FY20/21 started on 1 October and ended 30 September; FY21/22 started on 1 October and ended on 31 March; FY22/23 started on 1 April and ended on 31 March.

Inflation has continued to rise in 2023 on the back of higher energy and food prices.


### Contributions to Consumer Price Inflation (Percentage points, year-on-year)



Source: Central Statistical Organization.

The overall balance has been picked up in 2023 after deteriorated in 2022.


### Balance of Payments (Millions of US dollars)



Source: Central Bank of Myanmar; AMRO staff calculations.

CBM announced that it will no longer set and maintain fixed exchange rates for foreign currencies in December 2023.


### Exchange Rate (MMK/USD)



Source: Central Bank of Myanmar.

Foreign reserves continued to be under pressure amid significant uncertainties.


### Gross International Reserves (Billions of US dollars)



Source: Central Bank of Myanmar.

The reduction in the fiscal deficit can be attributed to a combination of increasing revenue and lower expenditure.

### Fiscal Balance (Percent of GDP)



Source: Ministry of Planning and Finance.

Note: FY19/20 and FY20/21 started on 1 October and ended 30 September; FY21/22 started on 1 October and ended on 31 March; FY22/23 started on 1 April and ended on 31 March.

## Myanmar: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | FY19/20                                         | FY20/21 | FY21/22 | FY22/23 |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |         |         |         |
| Real GDP                                               | 3.2                                             | -5.9    | 2.4     | 3.4     |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |         |         |         |
| Current account balance                                | -2.0                                            | -0.2    | -2.0    | -3.4    |
| Trade balance                                          | -5.3                                            | -1.7    | -1.8    | -5.5    |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | 4.3                                             | 2.7     | 7.0     | 2.1     |
| Direct investment                                      | 3.0                                             | 1.5     | 5.4     | 2.9     |
| Other investment                                       | 1.8                                             | 1.6     | -1.0    | -0.8    |
| Errors and omissions                                   | -0.8                                            | -1.2    | -4.6    | 1.3     |
| Overall balance                                        | 1.5                                             | 1.4     | 0.4     | 0.0     |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 6,913                                           | 7,879   | 8,067   | 7,960   |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |         |         |         |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 20.5                                            | 14.7    | 15.3    | 19.5    |
| Expenditure                                            | 26.8                                            | 22.7    | 17.4    | 22.3    |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -6.2                                            | -7.6    | -2.3    | -3.0    |
| Government debt                                        | 42.2                                            | 53.8    | 52.7    | 55.6    |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |         |         |         |
| Broad money                                            | 15.0                                            | 11.4    | 3.8     | 8.6     |
| Domestic credit                                        | 14.4                                            | 14.5    | 13.0    | 8.9     |
| Private sector credit                                  | 8.6                                             | 1.5     | -0.9    | 6.4     |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |         |         |         |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | 5.7                                             | 3.6     | 13.2    | 24.4    |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum, end period)         | 7.00                                            | 7.00    | 7.00    | 7.00    |
| Exchange rate (in MMK/USD, period average)             | 1,429                                           | 1,490   | 1,793   | 2,016   |

Source: National authorities via WIND/ CEIC/ Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> FY19/20 and FY20/21 started on 1 October and ended 30 September; FY21/22 started on 1 October and ended on 31 March; FY22/23 started on 1 April and ended on 31 March.

# The Philippines

The economy maintained its robust growth momentum in 2023. GDP grew by 5.6 percent in the year due to high base effects and weaker external demand, following a multidecade high of 7.6 percent in 2022. Economic growth was supported by resilient household consumption helped by a strong labor market recovery and driven primarily by the services sector. Meanwhile, private and public construction and durable equipment sustained their robust growth and played a major role in driving overall investment.

Headline inflation increased to 6.0 percent in 2023 from 5.8 percent in 2022, while core inflation rose faster at 6.6 percent in 2023—a notable increase from 3.9 percent in 2022. The high inflation was driven by local supply constraints, coupled with domestic demand factors such as a positive output gap and second-round effects induced by minimum wage hikes and expectations of persistently high inflation. Nevertheless, due to a moderation in international commodity prices, headline inflation declined throughout the year to 3.9 percent year-on-year in December 2023 from an 8.7 percent peak in January. Meanwhile, from May 2022 to the end of the year, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) tightened monetary policy aggressively by raising the policy rate 10 times from a historic low of 2.0 percent to 6.5 percent to address rising inflation.

Overall labor market conditions continued to improve in 2023. However, the quality of jobs has worsened as the share of higher-income positions declined. The unemployment rate fell to an all-time low at 3.1 percent in December 2023, below the pre-pandemic level of 5.3 percent (January 2020). Total employment has surpassed pre-pandemic levels, although the increase is concentrated in low-paying jobs.

The external position was sound, while the peso fluctuated in the second half of 2023 in line with regional currencies. The current account deficit of 2.6 percent of GDP in 2023, narrowed from 4.5 percent in 2022 and was offset by net inflows into the financial account (3.5 percent of GDP). The peso stabilized in the first half of 2023 before depreciating by 2.8 percent in the third quarter as the US Federal Reserve was expected to keep interest rates higher for longer, then rebounded 2.5 percent to PHP 55.57 by the end of the year. In 2023, the peso appreciated by 1.0 percent against the US dollar and appreciated by 1.4 percent in nominal effective terms. Meanwhile, gross

international reserves (GIR) rose from USD 96.1 billion at the end of 2022 to USD 104 billion at the end of 2023, mainly on account of valuation gains. The GIR level is sufficient to cover the country's short-term external funding needs with import coverage of 7.8 months and 3.8 times of short-term external debt in residual maturity as of December 2023.

Resilient bank lending has provided support for economic activities, with a strong expansion in consumer loans. Loans increased by 7.9 percent year-on-year in December 2023, lower than the 11.5 percent increase in 2022, while corporate loans grew by 5.9 percent and household loans by 24.6 percent. Corporate loan growth slowed down due to higher interest rates and a delay in borrowing in anticipation of a decline in lending rates. On the other hand, household loan growth was driven by credit card loans.

The fiscal position continued to improve in 2023, attributable to robust revenue collection and moderate expenditure. Fiscal revenue increased by 7.9 percent year-on-year in 2023, reflecting the strong economic recovery since 2022. Meanwhile, expenditure rose by 3.4 percent, despite buoyant disbursement of capital expenditure, mainly due to a decline in transfers to local government units. The fiscal deficit fell to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2023, from 7.3 percent of GDP in 2022.


The Philippine economic outlook is clouded by various risk factors and challenges. In the near term, growth prospects are relatively robust, but high inflation is a risk, especially as a result of local supply shocks in the food sector and the impacts of geopolitical conflicts on international energy prices. These will exert upward pressure on inflation which can dampen domestic demand. Additionally, an economic slowdown in major trading partners and volatility in the global financial market, along with tighter financial conditions that increase funding costs for the government, corporates, and households, also pose risks. Looking at the longer term, growth potential will largely hinge on the economic scarring effects of the pandemic, the pace of infrastructure development, and heightened geopolitical tensions between China and the United States. Meanwhile, as one of the most disaster-prone countries, the Philippines faces increasing social and economic costs due to global climate change. These factors underscore an urgent need for a comprehensive strategy to foster resilient, sustainable, and inclusive long-term growth.

## The Philippines: Selected Figures

*The momentum of economic recovery was still robust.*

### Contributions to Real GDP Growth

(Percentage points, year-on-year)




Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority; AMRO staff calculations.

*Inflationary pressure eased but inflation remained elevated at above the 2–4 percent target range.*

### Headline CPI and Core CPI

(Percent, year-on-year)




Sources: Philippine Statistics Authority; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: CPI = consumer price index (base year = 2018).

*The monetary policy continued to tighten in 2023.*

### Monetary Policy and Market Rate

(Percent)




Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

*The fiscal deficit narrowed with solid revenue performance.*

### Fiscal Balance

(Percent of GDP)




Source: Bureau of Treasury.

*The current account deficit narrowed, driven by slowed imports.*

### Current Account Balance

(Percent of GDP)




Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

*International reserves remained sufficient for external funding needs.*

### International Reserve Adequacy

(Months/times; billions of US dollars)



Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Note: Import cover refers to number of months of average imports of goods and payment of services and primary income.

## The Philippines: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021   | 2022   | 2023   |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |        |        |        |
| Real GDP                                               | -9.5                                            | 5.7    | 7.6    | 5.6    |
| Private consumption                                    | -8.0                                            | 4.2    | 8.3    | 5.6    |
| Government consumption                                 | 10.5                                            | 7.2    | 4.9    | 0.4    |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | -27.3                                           | 9.8    | 9.7    | 8.1    |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -21.6                                           | 12.8   | 13.9   | 1.6    |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -16.1                                           | 8.0    | 10.9   | 1.3    |
| <b>External sector<sup>1</sup></b>                     | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |        |        |        |
| Current account balance                                | 3.2                                             | -1.5   | -4.5   | -2.6   |
| Trade balance                                          | -5.5                                            | -9.8   | -13.3  | -10.7  |
| Capital and financial account balance <sup>1</sup>     | -1.9                                            | -1.6   | -3.2   | -3.5   |
| Direct investment                                      | -0.9                                            | -2.5   | -1.3   | -1.1   |
| Portfolio investment                                   | -0.5                                            | 2.6    | -0.3   | 0.2    |
| Other investment                                       | -0.5                                            | -1.8   | -1.5   | -2.6   |
| Errors and omissions                                   | -0.7                                            | 0.2    | -0.5   | -0.1   |
| Overall balance <sup>1</sup>                           | 4.4                                             | 0.3    | -1.8   | 0.8    |
| Total external debt                                    | 27.2                                            | 27.0   | 27.5   | 24.9   |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 110                                             | 109    | 96.1   | 104    |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |        |        |        |
| Revenue                                                | 15.9                                            | 15.5   | 16.1   | 15.7   |
| Expenditure                                            | 23.5                                            | 24.1   | 23.4   | 22.0   |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -7.6                                            | -8.6   | -7.3   | -6.2   |
| Government debt                                        | 54.6                                            | 60.4   | 60.9   | 60.2   |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |        |        |        |
| Broad money <sup>2</sup>                               | 8.7                                             | 8.0    | 8.0    | 7.3    |
| Domestic claims                                        | 4.7                                             | 8.2    | 12.9   | 9.2    |
| Claims on private sector                               | -0.2                                            | 3.8    | 11.1   | 8.8    |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |        |        |        |
| Nominal GDP (in PHP billion)                           | 17,952                                          | 19,411 | 22,025 | 24,289 |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | 2.4                                             | 3.9    | 5.8    | 6.0    |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum, end of period)      | 2.00                                            | 2.00   | 5.50   | 6.50   |
| Exchange rate (in PHP/USD, period average)             | 49.60                                           | 49.30  | 54.50  | 55.60  |

Source: National authorities via CEIC and Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year.

<sup>1/</sup> The Philippines' balance of payments follows BPM6. A negative (positive) financial account balance indicates net inflow (outflow).

Overall balance = Current account balance - Capital and financial account balance + Errors and omissions.

<sup>2/</sup> Refers to M4.

# Singapore

Growth momentum moderated in the face of strong global headwinds. After growing at 3.8 percent in 2022, the economy expanded by 1.1 percent in 2023. In particular, the manufacturing sector weakened significantly as goods exports fell. The services sector remained strong, thanks to the return of tourists and relatively resilient private consumption. The construction sector continued to recover as the return of foreign labor following the reopening eased the supply constraint.

Inflationary pressure abated. Headline inflation declined from a high of 7.5 percent in September 2022 to 3.7 percent in December 2023 as food and private transport price pressure subsided.

The labor market stayed relatively tight in 2023, with the ratio of job vacancies to unemployed persons still relatively high, at 1.6 in September 2023, compared to the pre-pandemic level of 0.9 in December 2019. The seasonally adjusted overall unemployment rate continued to decline, to 2.0 percent in December 2023 from a high of 3.5 percent in October 2020. Following the relaxation of border restrictions in 2022, employers backfilled vacancies that rely more on foreign workers, easing labor shortages to the extent that resident and nonresident employment have exceeded their pre-pandemic levels. While there are signs that labor demand is cooling in some sectors, the ratio of job vacancies to unemployed persons is still relatively high, at 1.6 in September 2023, compared to the pre-pandemic level of 0.9 in December 2019.

Non-oil domestic exports slowed along with output growth. After growing at 3 percent in 2022, Singapore's exports were anemic in 2023, with non-oil domestic exports contracting by about 13 percent, dragged down by both electronics and non-electronics exports.

The banking sector remained sound thanks to effective macroprudential measures, strong capital buffers, adequate liquidity, and robust asset quality. The banking system's overall nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio fell to 1.7 percent in the third quarter of 2023 from 2.0 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021, although the NPL ratios in construction and transport and storage segments were higher at 6.4 percent and 5.2 percent respectively, reflecting the greater impact of the pandemic on certain sectors. Capital and liquidity buffers remain strong and well above regulatory requirements.

Recent cooling measures and high interest rates appear to have moderated transactions in the private residential property market. The rising private residential prices in 2021–2022 reflected robust demand stemming from strong household balance sheets and sustained income growth, as well as investors from other countries, amid relatively tight supply conditions. More recently, in April 2023, the Additional Buyer's Stamp Duty (ABSD) rates for some buyer groups were raised pre-emptively to curb investment demand. The private residential property market has since shown signs of moderation, with private residential prices increasing at a slower pace of 6.8 percent in 2023, compared to the increase of 8.6 percent and 10.6 percent in 2022 and 2021 respectively.

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 budget maintains a similar fiscal stance to that of FY2023 outturn. The FY2024 basic budget balance (which does not include top-ups to endowment and trust funds, Net Investment Returns Contribution, and SINGA) is expected at –0.9 percent of GDP, compared with –0.8 percent of GDP in FY2023, as higher revenue from GST and asset taxes are offset by higher operating expenditure and continued financial support for households and businesses amid higher living costs. However, the overall fiscal balance in FY2024 is forecast to be in surplus, at 0.1 percent of GDP, compared with a deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP in FY2023, largely on the back of a decline in top-ups to endowment and trust funds.


A gloomier outlook for global demand and commodity price volatility constitute key risks through 2024. First, although policy rates in major global economies are expected to decline, the effect of past tightening likely has yet to be fully transmitted, hence weighing on global growth and affecting Singapore's highly export-dependent manufacturing sector in the near term. Second, although both headline and core inflation are expected to ease, commodity price volatility remains a major external risk amid elevated geopolitical tensions and the El Niño weather pattern. Domestically, private transport costs and wage pressure warrant monitoring on the domestic front. Over the longer term, Singapore will need to contend with challenges arising from an aging population and climate change.

## Singapore: Selected Figures

*Singapore's growth momentum moderated in the face of strong external headwinds ...*

### Contributions to Real GDP Growth

(Percentage points, year-on-year)




Source: Singapore Department of Statistics; CEIC; AMRO staff calculations.

*Inflation abated as food and private transport price pressure subsided.*

### Contributions to Consumer Price Inflation

(Percentage points, year-on-year)




Source: Singapore Department of Statistics; CEIC; AMRO staff calculations.

*The SGD NEER appreciated throughout 2023.*

### Nominal Effective Exchange Rate

(Index, Jan 1999 = 100)




Source: MAS; CEIC; AMRO staff calculations.

*... as reflected in the sharp deceleration of exports.*

### Contributions to Export Growth

(Percentage points, year-on-year)




Source: Singapore Department of Statistics; CEIC; AMRO staff calculations.

*The FY2024 budget maintains a similar fiscal stance to that of FY2023 realization.*

### Change in Fiscal Impulse

(Percent of GDP)

AMRO's Estimated Fiscal Impulse (Percent of GDP)




Source: Ministry of Finance; CEIC; AMRO staff calculations.

*Accommodation costs remain high despite having cooled in recent months.*

### Private Housing Rental Prices

(Index, Q1 2010 = 100)



Source: Singapore Department of Statistics; URA; CEIC; AMRO staff calculations.

## Singapore: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                               | -3.9                                            | 9.7   | 3.8   | 1.1   |
| Private consumption                                    | -13.3                                           | 8.1   | 8.2   | 3.8   |
| Government consumption                                 | 13.2                                            | 3.9   | -1.9  | 2.6   |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | -14.2                                           | 23.6  | 2.5   | -0.2  |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -1.7                                            | 9.6   | 3.3   | 1.0   |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -0.2                                            | 9.2   | 3.0   | 2.4   |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                | 16.6                                            | 19.8  | 18.0  | 19.8  |
| Trade balance                                          | 29.7                                            | 28.0  | 30.2  | 30.9  |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | -4.8                                            | 4.6   | 40.6  | 7.1   |
| Direct investment                                      | -11.7                                           | -17.5 | -19.4 | -22.4 |
| Portfolio investment                                   | 17.2                                            | 17.0  | 12.1  | 19.1  |
| Other investment                                       | -10.3                                           | 5.1   | 47.9  | 10.3  |
| Errors and omissions                                   | 0.0                                             | 0.0   | -0.3  | -0.6  |
| Overall balance                                        | 21.4                                            | 15.2  | -22.9 | 12.2  |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 362                                             | 418   | 289   | 351   |
| <b>Fiscal sector<sup>1</sup></b>                       | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 13.8                                            | 13.9  | 13.8  | 14.0  |
| Expenditure                                            | 17.6                                            | 15.5  | 15.3  | 15.6  |
| Fiscal balance <sup>2</sup>                            | -10.5                                           | 0.3   | 0.3   | -0.5  |
| Government debt                                        | 146.1                                           | 133.4 | 157.1 | 170.8 |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Broad money                                            | 10.7                                            | 8.8   | 7.8   | -     |
| Resident non-bank loan growth                          | 1.1                                             | 9.3   | -0.3  | -     |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in SGD billion)                           | 482.2                                           | 583.2 | 687.2 | 673.3 |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | -0.2                                            | 2.3   | 6.1   | 4.8   |
| Exchange rate (in SGD/USD, period average)             | 1.38                                            | 1.34  | 1.38  | 1.34  |

Source: National authorities via CEIC; and AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> Singapore's balance of payments follows BPM6. A negative (positive) financial account balance indicates net inflow (outflow).

Overall balance = Current account balance - Capital and financial account balance + Errors and omissions.

<sup>2/</sup> Fiscal balance denotes the overall fiscal position, i.e., the difference between operating revenue and expenditure, minus special transfers and top-ups to endowment and trust Funds, plus Net Investment Returns Contribution and capitalization of nationally significant infrastructure, net of depreciation and Significant Infrastructure Government Loan Act interest costs and loan expenses.

# Thailand

Economic growth in 2023 was underpinned by resilient private consumption and investment, as well as a rebound in tourist arrivals, but weighed down by a drop in government consumption and public investment due to delays in the budgetary process. Private consumption and investment grew by 7.1 percent and 3.2 percent respectively, in contrast to the 4.6 percent decline in government consumption and public investment. Overall GDP grew by 1.9 percent in 2023. On the production side, the rebound in tourism bolstered expansion in the services sector, whereas manufacturing activities remained subdued given weak external demand. Inventories declined mainly due to a depletion in the rice stock.

The unemployment rate edged down to 1.0 percent in 2023 from the pandemic peak of 2.3 percent in 2021, in line with the economic recovery. The number of underemployed workers also fell to pre-pandemic levels.

Headline inflation declined to 1.2 percent in 2023, from 6.1 percent in 2022, mainly due to a drop in oil and food prices. Core inflation also fell from 2.5 percent in 2022 to 1.3 percent in 2023 as prices of prepared and cooked foods moderated, while other prices of major items such as housing, transportation, and medical and personal care services remained low and stable.

Gross international reserves rose to USD 224.5 billion as of December 2023 from a multiyear low of USD 199.4 billion in September 2022. They are sufficient to cover 2.3 times short-term external debt. Although exports contracted by 1.7 percent in 2023 due to weak global demand, especially for electronics, machinery and automobiles, the current account balance registered a surplus of 1.3 percent in 2023 due to higher tourism receipts and lower oil and gas import prices.

Banks' asset quality continued to be stable with low levels of nonperforming loans and high buffers for capital, liquidity, and provisioning. Total credit growth to the private sector moderated to 2.2 percent in the end of 2023 from 4.0 percent at the end of 2022. The decline in lending reflects a normalization of bank lending activities, in line with the progressive rollback of measures which

supported continued credit intermediation during the COVID-19 pandemic. The interbank market remained orderly, as reflected by smooth adjustments of the Bangkok Interbank Offered Rates in response to changes in the Bank of Thailand's policy rate.

The overall fiscal deficit narrowed from 5.8 percent of GDP in Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 to 3.3 percent in FY2023 due to higher revenue outturns. The public debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to remain stable at slightly above 60 percent in the medium term. In FY2024, the authorities intend to rollout a digital wallet scheme with a budget of THB 500 billion (2.6 percent of GDP in year 2022). Although the proposed plan is expected to stimulate short-term growth, it may potentially lead to higher inflation and will likely delay the pace of fiscal consolidation.

Downside risks to growth still remain. A weaker-than-expected recovery in China could hinder the recovery in tourism and the Thai economy. In addition, any recession in the United States and Europe could curtail demand for Thai manufacturing exports. Supply-side disruptions such as a more severe El Niño could affect food production and prices, as well as the implementation of new stimulus policies and wage increases by the government.


Despite a decline in the household debt-to-GDP ratio to 90.9 percent in the third quarter of 2023 from its peak of 95.5 percent early in 2021, it remains high, posing a risk to the Thai economy. Young adults, low-income earners, farmers, and small businesses are especially susceptible to economic shocks, which could impair their ability to service debts and potentially lead to higher nonperforming loans in the banking sector.

The government's debt-to-GDP ratio rose to 62.4 percent in FY2023 from 41.0 percent in FY2019, compressing the policy space for authorities to take countercyclical measures to support the economy during a downturn. In addition, social welfare spending in the medium to long term is on a rising trend, and if it is not accompanied by increases in revenue, the higher spending will narrow the fiscal space available to respond effectively to future shocks.

## Thailand: Selected Figures

*Thailand's GDP has recovered to pre-pandemic levels since early 2023.*


**Real GDP Growth, Seasonally Adjusted**  
(Index, 100 = December 2019)



Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council.

*Headline inflation contracted due to lower oil and commodity prices.*


**Contribution to Consumer Price Inflation**  
(Percentage points, year-on-year)



Source: Bank of Thailand; Thailand Ministry of Commerce.  
Note: Policy rate refers to 1-day repurchase rate of Thailand.

*The trade deficit narrowed as imports contracted at a faster pace than exports in 2023.*


**Trade Balance**  
(Percent, year-on-year; billions of US dollars)



Source: Bank of Thailand; AMRO staff calculations.  
Note: Data for exports and imports are on customs basis.

*Tourist arrivals recovered and the hotel occupancy rate rose but remained lower than pre-pandemic levels.*


**Tourism Sector**  
(Millions of persons; percent)



Source: Bank of Thailand.

*The public debt-to-GDP ratio rose more slowly due to the narrower budget deficit.*


**Fiscal Balance and Public Debt**  
(Percent of GDP; percent of GDP)



Source: Ministry of Finance; AMRO staff estimations.  
Note: The fiscal year (FY) runs from 1 October to 30 September.

*The high household debt-to-GDP ratio has eased slightly but remained elevated.*

**Household Debt and Bank Lending to Households**  
(Percent, year-on-year; percent of GDP)



Source: Bank of Thailand; AMRO staff calculations.

## Thailand: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021  | 2022  | 2023e |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |       |       |       |
| Real GDP                                               | -6.1                                            | 1.6   | 2.5   | 1.9   |
| Private consumption                                    | -0.8                                            | 0.6   | 6.2   | 7.1   |
| Government consumption                                 | 1.4                                             | 3.7   | 0.1   | -4.6  |
| Gross fixed capital formation                          | -4.7                                            | 3.1   | 2.3   | 1.2   |
| Imports of goods and services                          | -14.0                                           | 17.8  | 3.6   | -2.2  |
| Exports of goods and services                          | -20.0                                           | 11.1  | 6.1   | 2.1   |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |       |       |       |
| Current account balance                                | 4.2                                             | -2.0  | -3.2  | 1.3   |
| Trade balance                                          | 8.0                                             | 6.5   | 2.8   | 3.3   |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | -2.3                                            | -1.0  | 1.3   | 2.0   |
| Direct investment                                      | -4.6                                            | -0.8  | 0.8   | 3.1   |
| Portfolio investment                                   | -2.4                                            | -2.4  | 1.2   | -2.5  |
| Other investment                                       | 4.8                                             | 2.4   | -0.6  | 1.2   |
| Errors and omissions                                   | 1.8                                             | 1.6   | -0.2  | 0.0   |
| Overall balance                                        | 3.6                                             | -1.4  | -2.1  | 4.3   |
| Gross external debt                                    | 38.0                                            | 38.8  | 40.4  | 37.4  |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 258                                             | 246   | 217   | 225   |
| <b>Fiscal sector<sup>1</sup></b>                       | (in percent of GDP)                             |       |       |       |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 15.0                                            | 14.8  | 14.8  | 15.0  |
| Expenditure                                            | 20.0                                            | 20.0  | 18.4  | 18.3  |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -4.9                                            | -5.2  | -3.6  | -3.3  |
| Government debt                                        | 49.4                                            | 58.4  | 60.5  | 62.4  |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Broad money                                            | 10.2                                            | 4.8   | 3.9   | 2.0   |
| Domestic credit <sup>2</sup>                           | 8.1                                             | 8.8   | 3.5   | 3.4   |
| Private sector credit                                  | 5.0                                             | 5.0   | 4.0   | 2.4   |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |       |       |       |
| Nominal GDP (in THB trillion)                          | 15.7                                            | 16.2  | 17.4  | 17.9  |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | -0.8                                            | 1.2   | 6.1   | 1.2   |
| Policy rate (in percent per annum)                     | 0.50                                            | 0.50  | 1.25  | 2.50  |
| Exchange rate (in THB/USD, period average)             | 31.29                                           | 31.98 | 35.05 | 34.78 |

Source: National authorities via CEIC; and AMRO staff estimates.

Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> The fiscal year (FY) runs from 1 October 1 to 30 September. FY2023 is from 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023.

<sup>2/</sup> Domestic credit composes net claims from central government, local government, nonfinancial corporations and households.

# Vietnam

Economic growth weakened to 5.1 percent in 2023, primarily due to external pressures. Subdued overseas orders led to weak manufacturing production, delayed capital investment and job retrenchment in the first half of the year. Uncertainty in the employment outlook weighed down on consumer confidence and thus household consumption. Construction and real estate market activities were also lukewarm. However, in the second half, the economy bottomed out, attributed to a recovery in new overseas orders.

Inflation remained under control. Headline inflation was well below the government's 4.5 percent annual ceiling in 2023, due to softening domestic demand, adequate domestic food production, and lower energy prices. Amid a temporary 2 percent cut in value-added tax, average headline inflation stood at 3.3 percent. Meanwhile, core inflation was elevated at 4.2 percent in 2023, reflecting a higher cost of services and increasing rents.

Despite the weak external demand, trade surpluses and resilient FDI inflows were the key factors behind the improvement of external balance in 2023. The export contraction was offset by import compression and a recovery in tourism. FDI inflows remained strong amid global supply chain reconfiguration. The improvement in the external balance allowed the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) to accumulate its foreign reserves. The reserves stood at USD 89.7 billion as of the end of October, sufficient to cover 2.7 times of short-term external debt.

The Vietnamese government employed macroeconomic policy judiciously to tackle the weakening economic growth. VAT on certain goods and services was cut temporarily by 2 percent to reduce prices affecting households' living expenses, while deferrals of VAT, corporate income tax, personal income tax on self-employed businesses, and land rent were introduced in the second half of 2023. Registration fees for domestically manufactured cars were also halved during the period. Public capital investment was also expedited. Primarily due to lower tax revenue collection, the budget deficit widened to 4.0 percent of GDP in 2023 from 3.6 percent in 2022.

In view of muted inflationary pressure and weakening economic growth, the SBV employed accommodative monetary policy and rolled out special credit support measures. The SBV cut operating interest rates four times in 2023 and set an annual credit growth target at 14–15 percent, slightly up from the 14 percent target in 2022. The central bank also implemented credit support measures, including the 2 percent interest rate support program and the loan moratorium program.

Risks to the growth outlook are tilted toward the downside. The primary downside risk stems from external factors, such as slower-than-expected economic growth in the United States, the European Union, and China. On the domestic front, certain developers are grappling with persistent risks of subdued revenue and financial distress. Additionally, there are upside risks to consumer prices arising from extreme weather affecting food production and the depreciation of the dong.


Elsewhere, asset quality in the financial sector has deteriorated. The weakening economic activities have led to rising nonperforming loans. Some property developers are struggling to repay debt, refinance bank loans and roll over bonds, and thus face heightening difficulties to meet payment obligations going forward. Moreover, there remains room to enhance corporate governance practices and raise capital buffers of local banks.

Over the longer term, Vietnam's growth potential faces a confluence of structural challenges. The country's high growth is primarily attributable to multinational corporations; however, domestic supply chains need to be built up as part of the manufacturing ecosystem. Local micro, small and medium-sized enterprises have faced difficulties in advancing up the value chains. Skilled labor is also in shortage. Additionally, the country faces intensifying climate risks and exposure to extreme weather due to the concentration of economic activities along the extensive coastline. Lastly, aging population and thus a decline in working population would become an imminent risk facing the Vietnamese economy in the coming decade as the country is one of the most rapidly aging countries in the region.

## Vietnam: Selected Figures

*Growth slowed down in the first half of 2023 due to weak external demand, before improving in the second half.*


**Contributions to Real GDP Growth**  
(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)



Source: General Statistics Office; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

*Softening demand and lower energy prices kept inflation lower than the government's ceiling.*


**Contributions to Consumer Price Inflation**  
(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)



Source: General Statistics Office; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

*Trade balance registered a surplus on the back of import compression.*


**Trade Balance**  
(Percent year-on year, millions of US dollars)



Source: General Statistics Office; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

*Strong current account surplus was the key factor behind the improvement of external balance.*


**Balance of Payments**  
(Millions of US dollars)



Source: State Bank of Vietnam; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

*The budget deficit widened in 2023, primarily due to lower tax revenue.*


**Fiscal Balance**  
(Percent of GDP)



Source: Ministry of Finance; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff estimations.

*Weak loan demand led to a slowdown of credit growth.*

**Credit Growth**  
(Percentage points contribution, year-on-year)



Source: State Bank of Vietnam; Haver Analytics; AMRO staff calculations.

## Vietnam: Selected Economic Indicators

| Indicator                                              | 2020                                            | 2021   | 2022   | 2023e  |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| <b>Real sector</b>                                     | (in annual percentage change)                   |        |        |        |
| Real GDP                                               | 2.9                                             | 2.6    | 8.1    | 5.1    |
| Agriculture, forestry, and fishing                     | 3.0                                             | 3.7    | 3.5    | 4.4    |
| Industry and construction                              | 4.4                                             | 3.2    | 7.9    | 3.5    |
| Services                                               | 2.0                                             | 1.7    | 10.1   | 7.1    |
| Product tax excluding subsidy                          | 0.9                                             | 2.3    | 5.8    | 8.0    |
| <b>External sector</b>                                 | (in percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified) |        |        |        |
| Current account balance                                | 4.3                                             | -2.2   | -1.1   | -4.3   |
| Trade balance                                          | 8.9                                             | 4.3    | 6.3    | 6.8    |
| Capital and financial account balance                  | 2.4                                             | 8.4    | 2.3    | 0.9    |
| Direct investment                                      | 4.4                                             | 4.2    | 3.7    | 4.6    |
| Portfolio investment                                   | -0.4                                            | 0.1    | 0.4    | -2.0   |
| Other investment                                       | -1.6                                            | 4.2    | -1.8   | -3.4   |
| Errors and omissions                                   | -2.0                                            | -2.3   | -7.6   | -4.8   |
| Overall balance                                        | 4.8                                             | 3.9    | -5.6   | 0.6    |
| Gross external debt <sup>1</sup>                       | 47.9                                            | 38.1   | 36.1   | 33.6   |
| International reserves (in USD billion, end of period) | 95.5                                            | 110    | 87.2   | 89.7   |
| <b>Fiscal sector</b>                                   | (in percent of GDP)                             |        |        |        |
| Revenue and grants                                     | 18.7                                            | 18.8   | 19.1   | 15.9   |
| Expenditure                                            | 21.3                                            | 20.1   | 19.3   | 19.9   |
| Fiscal balance                                         | -2.5                                            | -1.4   | -0.2   | -4.1   |
| Government debt                                        | 39.6                                            | 39.3   | 34.7   | 37.0   |
| <b>Monetary and financial sectors</b>                  | (in annual percentage change)                   |        |        |        |
| Broad money                                            | 14.0                                            | 9.2    | 8.1    | 9.6    |
| Domestic credit                                        | 12.2                                            | 13.6   | 14.2   | 13.8   |
| Private sector credit (in percent of GDP)              | 114.3                                           | 123.2  | 125.3  | 143.8  |
| <b>Memorandum items:</b>                               |                                                 |        |        |        |
| Nominal GDP (in VND trillion)                          | 8,044                                           | 8,480  | 9,513  | 10,222 |
| Headline inflation (in percent y-o-y, period average)  | 3.2                                             | 1.8    | 3.2    | 3.3    |
| Operating rate (in percent per annum) <sup>2</sup>     | 2.50                                            | 2.50   | 4.50   | 3.00   |
| Exchange rate (in VND/USD, period average)             | 23,240                                          | 22,900 | 23,429 | 23,854 |

Source: National authorities via CEIC; and AMRO staff estimates.  
 Note: y-o-y = year-on-year. Numbers in red denote AMRO staff estimates.

<sup>1/</sup> The Gross External Debt to GDP ratio from 2020-2022 refers to data published by the Vietnam Ministry of Finance's Public Debt Bulletin. The 2023 ratio is estimated by AMRO staff, based on the outstanding external debt as at the end of June 2023.

<sup>2/</sup> Discount rate of the State Bank of Vietnam.



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